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Preface 
This thesis deals with pool sharing in humanitarian logistics. Pool sharing is the 
capability of pool members to share capacity in any form like information, 
human resources, inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and equipment. 
All kinds of actors – civil, public, and private - can be part of such a pool. This 
thesis, however, focuses on civil actors like non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and UN agencies. Pool sharing – defined as process innovation – is 
analysed on both the conceptual, and the theoretical levels. On the former level 
the fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship and its different designs are 
presented. On the latter level the thesis summarizes the status quo and presents 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), and the Humanitarian 
Logistics Association (HLA). With help of this structure’s findings it can be 
concluded that the main benefits of pool sharing are a decrease of cost, a 
decrease of risk, an increase of service level, and an increase of income. 
However, pool sharing is found to be mainly conceptual as the number of 
organizations that thoroughly apply it is supposedly very low. Existing obstacles 
to the implementation of pool sharing turned out to be donor orientation, 
competition, organizational culture, and lack of strategic thinking.  
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1. Introduction 
This thesis deals with pool sharing in humanitarian logistics. Pool sharing is the 
capability of pool members to share capacity in any form like information, 
human resources, inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and equipment. 
Generally pool sharing should be regarded as essential for the emergency supply 
chain’s reduction of cost and increase of service level. As this supposedly leads 
to more reputation and thus an increase of funds, several actors involved in 
humanitarian relief consequently use or start to use this recent approach. Despite 
the importance of pool sharing conceptual as well as empiric literature on the 
issue is very scarce. Thus it would be opportune to scrutinise the status quo and 
any form of development in this matter. As this constitutes a diploma thesis 
rather than an entire research project the scope will be limited and exclusively 
includes civil humanitarian actors like non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
and UN agencies. After this introduction a brief research outline is presented in 
chapter two. The thesis itself starts with chapter three about humanitarian aid and 
development assistance. It describes principles, triggers, and actors of the 
humanitarian sector and further explains the distinct characteristics of logistics in 
an emergency environment and accompanying coordination and cooperation 
problems. All these points are accompanied by many praxis examples like the 
2004 Asian tsunami relief efforts or crisis relief in the Central African Republic. 
Chapter 4 is the heart of this thesis and delivers a thorough analysis of the pool 
sharing concept’s possibilities. On the conceptual level it defines the 
fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship and its different designs. On the 
practical level it summarizes the status quo and presents the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations 
Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), and the Humanitarian Logistics Association 
(HLA). To conclude chapter four both conceptual and practical findings are used 
in order to specify the costs and benefits of as well as the obstacles to pool 
sharing. The thesis ends with conclusion and outlook. Research questions are 
answered and factors that promote pool sharing presented.      
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2. Research Outline 
This chapter provides basic information about the relevance of pool sharing for 
the field, the status of current research, the research questions, and research 
methodology. 
 
Relevance for the field 
Pool sharing constitutes the capability of pool members to share capacity in any 
form like information, knowledge, human resources, inventory space, 
distribution, and relief goods and equipment. All kinds of actors – civil, public, 
and private - can be part of such a pool. As this constitutes a diploma thesis 
rather than an entire research project the scope will be limited and exclusively 
includes civil humanitarian actors like NGOs and UN agencies. And: no 
distinction is made between organizations involved in short-term relief and those 
active in medium- to long-term development as these activities are more and 
more intertwined. A practical example of pool sharing would be the UN Joint 
Logistics Centre (UNJLC). It acts as an information platform for UN agencies 
and major NGOs in order to enhance the pool partners’ decision-making 
capabilities. Another service of the UNJLC is its broker function that brings 
together agencies demanding capacity – like inventory space – and agencies with 
excess capacity (Kaatrud et. al. 2003: 13). Pool sharing services thus should be 
regarded as essential for the emergency supply chain’s reduction of cost and 
increase of service level. As this supposedly leads to more reputation and thus to 
an increase of funding, several actors involved in humanitarian relief should use 
this approach.  
 
Status of current research 
Despite the importance of pool sharing theoretical as well as empiric literature on 
the issue is very scarce. With regard to humanitarian logistics the term pool 
sharing is not even defined yet. Literature that covers – in the humanitarian 
context - elements of pool sharing often runs under the name of ‘coordination’ or 
‘cooperation/collaboration’. This is valid for Oloruntoba and Gray (2009), who 
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work on customer service in emergency relief chains, Pettit and Beresford 
(2009), who define critical success factors in the context of humanitarian aid 
supply chains, Kovacs and Spens (2007; 2009), whose object of research is 
humanitarian logistics in general, Mayr (2006), who deals with supply pipeline 
logistics, Perry (2007), who scrutinized the 2004 Asian tsunami relief efforts, 
Thomas and Kopczak (2005), who led the way for a supply chain perspective in 
humanitarian logistics, and Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, who work on 
partnerships in humanitarian logistics and in their case studies portray UNJLC 
missions. Hence it could be argued that current research lacks to incorporate 
these thoughts on coordination and cooperation into a concrete concept. In this 
thesis a concept is elaborated that has the name pool sharing. 
 
Research questions  
The primal research question is ‘What is pool sharing’. Due to the current status 
of research it is intentionally vague and further classified into sub-questions. 
They all refer to the context of humanitarian relief. 
 
What is ‘pool sharing’? 
• Q1: Why do organizations cooperate?  
• Q2: What are the fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship? 
• Q3: Which designs of pool sharing exist? 
• Q4: What are the benefits of pool sharing? 
• Q5: What are the obstacles to pool sharing? 
 
Methodology  
The diploma thesis is based on a literature review and uses a qualitative 
approach. Thereby elements of literature on partnerships and cooperation in 
humanitarian logistics are brought together in order to define the concept pool 
sharing. The outcome of this thesis should be a better conceptualization and 
understanding of pool sharing and should help getting aid supply chains more 
effective and efficient.            
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3. Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance 
Simply spoken these forms of humanitarianism deal with giving aid respectively 
assistance to people who are in need of it. The difference between the former and 
the latter is time and scope. Whereas humanitarian aid is about giving immediate 
relief after disasters or during violent conflicts, development assistance1 is about 
avoiding another of these crises in future. Thus the former deals with goods and 
services like nutrition, shelter, emergency health care or psychological 
assistance, the latter with general health care, reconstruction work (infrastructure, 
schools etc.), education and the like. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), for example, defines humanitarian aid as goods and 
services like material and technical aid or measures for protecting the human 
rights of the civilian population (OECD 1999: 10; quoted in McGuire 2006: 4). 
Development assistance on the other hand is defined as “the international transfer 
of public funds in the form of loans or grants, either directly from one 
government to another (bilateral aid), or indirectly through nongovernmental 
organizations or a multilateral agency (multilateral aid) such as the WHO” 
(WHO 2009). These definitions are used by the author throughout this thesis.  
 
Whereas humanitarian aid is about giving immediate relief after disasters or 
during violent conflicts, development assistance is about avoiding another of 
these crises in future. 
 
Figure 1: Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance 
 
Furthermore humanitarian aid and development assistance have a significant 
economic importance. Official development assistance amounted to US$ 119.8 
billion in 2008 (OECD 2009), private donors not included. Apparently the 
humanitarian sector involves considerable investment and is worth to scrutinise. 
Thus the following subchapters deal with the cognitive basis for pool sharing in 
humanitarian logistics. It starts with 3.1 which ought to explain the main 
principles of humanitarian aid as well as the framework build by them – the so-
                                                 
1
 Names for similar concepts are development cooperation and development aid 
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called humanitarian space. In addition 3.2 covers the actual relief-to-development 
debate and should explain why both types of aid mentioned above - and 
consequently organizations active in both of these areas - fall into the category of 
pool sharing. Then it is elaborated what triggers humanitarian aid and 
development assistance. These triggers, namely natural and man-made disasters, 
violent conflicts as well as complex emergencies are introduced to the reader in 
subchapter 3.3. Thereby questions will be put like ‘What is a disaster?’, ‘What is 
a complex emergency?’, or ‘Is there any crisis lifecycle?’ After this definition of 
terms, humanitarian actors like the United Nations, NGOs, governments, military 
and business are briefly presented in chapter 3.4. Thereby the focus lies on NGOs 
as – together with the UN - primal actors in the humanitarian sector. Facts and 
figures, principles and ideologies, dependencies as well as location decisions of 
NGOs are analysed. The last part of chapter 3, 3.5, constitutes an introduction to 
humanitarian logistics. As there is a lot of work on the humanitarian supply chain 
in general, it will be a mixture of a brief general structure and a detailed status 
quo of an inherent problem in the humanitarian sector – the organizational 
coordination and cooperation problem which is shown in brief crisis examples of 
the Central African Republic, Angola, Mozambique, and the 2004 Southeast-
Asian tsunami and which leads directly to its remedy – pool sharing – which 
constitutes the heart of this thesis. 
 
3.1. Humanitarian Principles 
Following Princeton University a principle is “a basic generalization that is 
accepted as true and that can be used as a basis for reasoning or conduct” (2009). 
There are three acknowledged principles that make aid truly humanitarian, 
namely humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. They were introduced by the 
business man Henry Dunant after the battle of Solferino (1859), have been part 
of the Geneva Convention since 1864 and were the basis for the Red Cross 
Movement (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 20-21). Today they 
constitute the main guiding principles in humanitarian aid and development 
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assistance and thus not only set the “parameters for action”, but also delineate 
“the roles of agencies” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 21). The 
humanitarian principles are now briefly presented:   
 
• Humanity: Humanity is about relieving suffering wherever possible. 
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove call it “the very reason why humanitarian 
organizations are deployed” (2009b: 21). Thereby scarce resources are 
brought into societies that are not only affected by disaster, but commonly 
also by conflicts resulting from social change (Keen 1998; quoted in 
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 21).  
  
• Neutrality: This principle is a manifesto for relief “without bias or affiliation 
to a party in the conflict” and consequently leads to an agency’s potential 
decision “not to participate in local issues if there is an eminent risk of getting 
trapped by political agendas” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 22). 
 
• Impartiality: This principle aims not only at non-discrimination, but also at 
giving priority to the most urgent needs. It can be evaluated in terms of non-
discrimination between groups, proportionality in relation to need, and non-
subjective recognition of needs as identified by the community (Pictet 1979; 
quoted in Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 23). 
 
Together they define the so-called humanitarian space. In the psychological 
sense, it defines the ‘space’ someone has when it comes to decision-making in 
humanitarian action. In the physical one Tomasini and Van Wassenhove call it “a 
zone where civilians, non-combatants and aid workers are protected from 
violence and attack and can move and operate freely” (2009b: 26). Thereby the 
main challenge to a proper humanitarian space is the fact that it is determined 
and – sometimes – confined by non-humanitarian actors like governments, 
combatants and the military. Thus conflict between humanitarian and non-
humanitarian actors is always lurking as the latter’s decision-making criteria are 
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often not motivated by the humanitarian principles (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 25). In order to provide accountability in this matter, NGOs 
strive for independence, especially from the military. In every kind of 
cooperation with the latter, the humanitarian space – framed by the principles – 
has to be guaranteed (Von Pilar 1999; quoted in Mayr 2006: 20). Complementary 
NGOs worked on international “guidelines for ‘operational’ disaster response to 
determine minimum standards in regard to quality and accountability” (Mayr 
2006: 11). Such standards are part of the ‘Sphere Project’ mentioned above, 
‘People in Aid Code’, ‘Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA)’ or the ‘Code 
of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies’.  
 
There are three acknowledged principles that make aid truly humanitarian, 
namely humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. 
 
Figure 2: Humanitarian Principles 
 
3.2. The Relief-to-Development Debate 
Historically there has been a distinction between immediate humanitarian aid – 
called relief - and development assistance. Consequently Kovacs and Spens 
(2007: 101) talk about the “two main streams of humanitarian logistics”. But 
today it seems increasingly difficult to separate these activities – especially from 
an organizational perspective. More and more actors in the humanitarian sector 
do both - relief and development. Authors like Appel (2009: 98) mention that 
relief is getting more and more important for organizations traditionally involved 
in development. Likewise Smillie (2000: 25; quoted in Appel 2009: 98) argues 
that NGOs that have the capacity and expertise for both – relief and development 
– would have a competitive advantage over other NGOs. This development has 
several reasons. First more and more relief is privatised by governments, 
meaning that state authorities assign these activities to NGOs (Roth 2005: 117; 
quoted in Appel 2009: 98). Another example would be the budgetary shift away 
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from development assistance to emergency relief of big international 
organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) between the 1980s and the 
1990s (Feldbrügge 2001: 1). This bears resemblance to the shift of governmental 
funding to refugee and emergency aid by the German Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development (BMZ) in the 1990s (Feldbrügge 2001: 1).  
 
The idea behind these developments is the relief-to-development model that 
acknowledges the need for a continuum between relief, rehabilitation and 
development. Although these activities have distinct characteristics with regard 
to implementation, time, scope and the like, they must be ‘thought-together’ and 
engaged in at the same time (Smillie 2000: 17; quoted in Appel 2009: 99). 
Following Feldbrügge it is all about transition and derived from “the idea that 
deficiencies resulting from the separation of relief aid and development aid might 
be reduced by linking the two areas” (2001: 87). Consequently the relief-to-
development concept deals with the incorporation of long-term aspects in every 
activity of the humanitarian sector. Arguably this is not always possible, 
especially in violent conflicts (Feldbrügge 2001: 88). Nevertheless, the model 
has been favoured by the UN and the EU (Commission of the European 
Communities 1996; quoted in Feldbrügge 2001: 90). 
 
A counter-argument against the trend of treating relief and development as 
intertwined would be the decision of the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to clearly separate humanitarian aid and 
development assistance in 2000 (Chomilier, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 
15). Anyway, this restructuring exercise may be necessary due to the fragmented 
organizational structure of the IFRC. 
 
3.3. Crises: Trigger of Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance 
The distinction between humanitarian aid and development assistance overcome, 
it is opportune to specify their triggers. This thesis distinguishes three types of 
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triggers, namely disasters, violent conflicts and complex emergencies. Thereby it 
follows the thoughts of Quarantelli and Feldbrügge on this topic. The former 
differentiates between disasters and violent conflicts as distinct categories of 
crisis situations (Quarantelli 1998a: 238-242). The latter adds the third trigger 
complex emergency, an intersection between disaster and violent conflict 
(Feldbrügge 2001: 6). What can be said already at this point is that these three 
phenomena are costly “in terms of human suffering and well being for the 
population affected, costly to economic performance and development efforts, 
and costly to social interplay” (Feldbrügge 2001: 36). Significantly, Thomas 
speaks of an estimated 150,000 deaths caused by and 200 million people affected 
by natural disasters and other humanitarian crises every year (2003: 3). 
 
3.3.1. Disaster  
This subchapter includes the sections ‘What is a disaster?’ - which defines this 
term - and ‘Facts and figures’ – which provides background information. 
 
What is a disaster? 
Easily deductible classifications of disasters would be natural vs. man-made 
respectively slow- vs. sudden-onset disasters. Anyway, a lot of researchers - most 
of them apply a sociological perspective - deal with the definition of disaster. 
Some of these attempts are presented below: 
 
• “A unique type of social problem.” (Drabek 2003: Xix) 
• “A breakdown in the normal functioning of a community.” (PAHO 2001; 
quoted in Mayr 2006: 4) 
• “Many people trying to do quickly what they do not ordinarily do, in an 
environment with which they are not familiar.” (Tierney 1985a: 77; quoted in 
Auf der Heide 1989: 52) 
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• “An event, natural or man-made, sudden or progressive, which impacts with 
such severity that the affected community has to respond by taking 
exceptional measures.” (Carter 1991: SXVII)  
• “An occurrence of a severity and magnitude that normally results in deaths, 
injuries, and property damage and that cannot be managed through the routine 
procedures and resources of government.” (FEMA 1984c: I-3; quoted in Auf 
der Heide 1989: 51) 
• “A serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, 
widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether 
caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing 
suddenly or as a result of complex, long-term processes.” (UN/ISDR 2004: 3; 
quoted on Kovacs and Spens 2009: 508) 
 
What we have seen is a wide variety of attempts, ranging from rather abstract to 
more concrete definitions. Anyway, what they all have in common is their 
sociological perspective. Thereby Claude Gilbert distinguishes three main 
historical paradigms, namely disasters as duplication of war (external agent), as 
expressions of social vulnerabilities (social process) and as an entrance into a 
state of uncertainty (1998: 3). The most interesting and now dominant paradigm 
is the second one. It abandoned the dominant notion of agent. Disaster agents are 
inter alia earthquake, tornado, flood, drought, extreme cold, avalanches or 
landslide. On the contrary, disasters are seen as “process tightly tied to social 
vulnerability” and thus analysed in their social context (Gilbert 1998: 6). This 
notion is based on works of authors like Carr and Feldbrügge who stated: 
 
“Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. A 
catastrophe is known by its works; that is, to say, by the occurrence of disaster. 
So long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as the city resists the earth-
shocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of the 
cultural protections that constitutes the disaster proper.” (1932: 211; quoted in 
Dombrowsky 1998: 18-19) 
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“First, events such as earthquakes and droughts may be mistaken for the disaster. 
However, not the quaking of the earth is the disaster, but its interaction with a 
society that is structured and organised in a specific way (e.g. necessity to reside 
in a flood-prone area; benefits from volcanic eruptions for cultivating etc.). 
Second, disasters appear to be singular, independent events. A lack of clarifying 
concepts results in an insufficient integration of interactions of various disasters 
with each other (e.g. within a country) or over time.” (Feldbrügge 2001: 34) 
 
Sometimes authors like Kreps reach out radically to define disasters as “systemic 
events and social catalysts”, as “social constructions” (1998: 25). But even when 
we do not go that far, it can be argued that a categorization according to disaster 
agent is often not appropriate. Similarly Feldbrügge states that other 
classifications have proofed better like sudden-onset and slow-onset, 
predictability, controllability, length of possible forewarning duration, scope of 
impact (number and type of affected persons and required relief needs), 
destructive potential and the like (2001: 35). Eventually it is also important to 
include the environment in any disaster definition, the “interaction and mutual 
constitution of society and environment” (Ingold 1992: 51; quoted in Oliver-
Smith 1998: 180). These arguments have convinced the author to use a more 
concrete sociological definition of disaster in this thesis, namely: 
 
A disaster is “a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a 
significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, 
whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing 
suddenly or as a result of complex, long-term processes.” (UN/ISDR 2004: 3; 
quoted on Kovacs and Spens 2009: 508) 
 
Figure 3: Definition of Disaster 
 
To conclude this subchapter it has to be said that the presented sociological 
perspective generally helps when it comes to disaster response. As the reactivity 
of our systems is challenged, it is all about the capacity of actors like 
government, military, civil society and humanitarian organizations to work 
together (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009a: 549).  
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Facts and Figures 
This section provides some essential information about the impact of disasters to 
capital in any form. Albala-Bertrand, for example, distinguishes human-, 
physical and social capital (1993; quoted in Feldbrügge 2001: 37). The 
differentiation is made as these levels are differently affected by disasters. Hence 
“losses of capital stocks are much higher in earthquakes, losses of production and 
indirect losses higher in cases of floods and droughts” (Feldbrügge 2001: 41).  
 
Disasters also mainly occur in poor countries. Following the World Bank 94% of 
the biggest disasters worldwide affect developing countries (2001; quoted in 
Lipok 2007: 6). Likewise 97% of all deaths caused by natural disasters occur in 
these parts of the globe (Engelmann 2005; quoted in Lipok 2007: 6). Many of 
these countries are underdeveloped and overpopulated. Because of the fact that 
continuous disasters cause not only human causalities, but also “economic and 
social loss, these populations are facing repeated setbacks and are often not able 
to reach a higher stage of development” (Carter 1991: 5). This vicious cycle 
could be fuelled by the forecast that both natural and man-made disasters will 
increase another five-fold until the midst of this century due to environmental 
degradation, rapid urbanization and the spread of HIV/AIDS in the developing 
world (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 1).  
 
However, it should be noted that natural disasters account only for 3% of relief 
operations, but man-made ones for 97% (Van Wassenhove 2005: 476). Again, 
we should not forget that man-made disasters do not include wars, but 
phenomena like industrial accidents, floods/drought due to mal-constructed 
embankment dams and the like. Furthermore disasters are responsible for 
extraordinary economic losses. Thomas and Kopczak, for example, refer to the 
Munich Reinsurance group and speak of annual US$ 659.9 billion in the 1990s 
(2005: 1). Last, but not least people are affected by this type of crisis2. Thereby it 
                                                 
2
 Natural disasters alone “result in the temporary displacement of approximately five million people” 
(Thomas 2003: 3). 
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is interesting that the number of casualties poses more problems than the severity 
of injuries (Auf der Heide 1989: 107). This leads to the reason for the huge 
logistical challenges in disaster relief. As usually all three of the above 
mentioned types of capital – human, physical and social – are affected, there are 
some common tasks relief managers must conduct. Feldbrügge states: 
 
“The six most common generic functions are warnings, evacuations, sheltering, 
emergency medical care, search and rescue, and protection of property. Others 
include the assessment of damage, the restoration of essential public services, 
task delegation and division of labour. The last includes the integration of 
emergent groups, i.e. newly established groups that carry out new disaster-related 
tasks, such as handling of mass casualties, large search and rescue as well as 
other activities.” (2001: 90)  
 
These facts form the main reason for the huge logistical challenges faced by 
humanitarian actors. After the Asian Tsunami in 2004, for example, more than 
200 humanitarian organizations and 3,000 military personnel from a dozen 
countries gave aid to the population (Mayr 2006: 10). 
 
Disasters affect human, physical, and social capital. 94% of worldwide disasters 
and 97% of the associated casualties occur in developing countries. 97% of 
disasters are man-made. The annual economic loss of disasters in the 1990s is 
estimated to be US$ 659.9 billion.     
 
Figure 4: Disaster Facts 
 
3.3.2. Violent Conflict 
Violent conflicts played an important role in history and continue to do so. The 
OECD defines a conflict environment as one “in which there is significant and 
sustained fighting between two or more factions or one in which remains 
significant potential for the resumption of conflict” (1998: 3). Violent conflicts 
alone account for “an average of 13 million refugees and 20 million internally 
displaced people each year” (Thomas 2003: 3). The reasons for violent conflicts 
are manifold, but horizontal inequality supposedly is a bigger trigger than 
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vertical income inequality of individuals (Feldbrügge 2001: 21). Harbom and 
Wallensteen globally record 228 armed conflicts in 148 locations since the end of 
WWII (2005: 623). 118 of them occurred within a period of 16 years after the 
end of the Cold War (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005: 623). Anyway, the total 
number of armed conflicts has decreased considerable 40% since 1992 (Human 
Security Centre 2005).  
 
Another fact that is important when we talk about violent conflicts are so-called 
‘intra-state conflicts’. Today this type is dominant as less than 5% of all armed 
conflicts take place between countries (Human Security Centre 2005). In 2005 all 
of the 24 global high intensity conflicts, inter alia two wars, as well as 74 crises 
with violent force occurred not between, but rather within states (HIIK 2005: 1; 
quoted in McGuire 2006: 1). The big difference between inter-state and intra-
state conflicts such as civil wars – conflict environments with more than one 
thousand deaths - can be explained by the immense multitude of diverse actors in 
the latter case (Mack 2005: 131; quoted in McGuire 2006: 4). Often this leads to 
a situation where the official authorities, if still existing, are not able to exercise 
power over the territory of the state. Then this void “is filled by a multitude of 
(illegitimate) actors such as paramilitaries, separatists, insurgents, rebels, 
vigilantes, militias, mercenaries, warlords, irregular fighters and criminal gangs” 
(McGuire 2006: 38). Consequently, this often leads to a situation where 
contractual agreements can not be enforced. Important stipulations in the 
humanitarian sector covering activities like renting of warehouses, purchasing of 
goods or employment of staff, are thus concluded at the risk of the humanitarian 
actors (McGuire 2006: 38).  
 
Today’s dominant violent conflicts are intrastate conflicts. More than 95% of all 
armed conflicts take place within countries. This causes situations where the 
official authorities are not able to exercise power and contractual agreements can 
not be enforced. Important activities like purchasing of goods or employment of 
staff are thus concluded at the risk of the humanitarian actors. 
 
Figure 5: Violent Conflict Facts 
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3.3.3. Complex Emergency 
Complex emergencies are common and show elements of both disaster and 
violent conflict. Thereby the public may recognize only one type of crisis, as it is 
often the case when we hear about famine. The latter is regularly classified as 
natural disaster; actually it should be subsumed under the category complex 
emergency as often civil conflict, drought, and political instability combine to 
famine (Feldbrügge 2001: 35). The main reason for this misclassification may be 
the stronger commitment towards crisis relief than towards crisis avoidance 
(Feldbrügge 2001: 34). One possible explanation of the existence of complex 
humanitarian emergencies is delivered by Beamon and Kotleba who trace them 
back to situations characterised by racially and/or ethnically and/or religiously 
charged warfare (2006b: 3). The same authors show a specific characteristic of 
complex emergencies, namely the blurred dividing line between civilians and 
combatants: 
 
“The disturbing trend with complex humanitarian emergencies is that when 
conflicts erupt within the borders of a country, the dividing line between civilians 
and combatants is frequently blurred. Militant or rebellious groups are usually 
the same civilians living and socialising in and around the villages they attack. 
This type of warfare commonly resorts to the use of insidious tactics where 
humanitarian agencies are denied access to groups of people in need of 
assistance. Also, at the centre of these shocking developments is the emergence 
of civilians, including woman, children and humanitarian workers, as the 
deliberate targets of warfare rather than its incidental victims.” (Beamon and 
Kotleba 2006b: 3)  
 
Indeed, 90% of today’s war victims are civilians, moreover women are 
disproportionately affected by violent conflicts (Human Security Centre 2005). 
In addition, this type of crisis usually has a very long duration, which “imposes 
not only financial hurdles, but also legal, moral and political dilemmas on those 
attempting to provide relief” (Beamon and Kotleba 2006b: 3). Sudan’s civil war 
is a crisis that incorporates all the elements listed above. This crisis basically has 
last now for more than 20 years and has left over two million people dead as well 
as over four million displaced (US Committee for Refuges and Immigrants: 
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2004). To respond politically it would be important to address the underlying 
problems that contribute to the crisis such as economic instability/social 
problems or human rights violations (OECD 1998: 5). The resulting long-term 
perspective together with limitations in infrastructure, political system and the 
like make humanitarian logistics a challenging task in this type of crisis.  
 
Complex emergencies show elements of both disaster and violent conflict. Their 
duration is very long as the underlying problems are usually very complex.   
 
Figure 6: Complex Emergency Facts 
 
3.3.4. Crisis Lifecycle 
Every type of crisis has a similar lifecycle that includes the period of time before 
a crisis, immediately after its outbreak and in the aftermath. In their work 
Humanitarian Logistics Rolando Tomasini and Luk van Wassenhove distinguish 
between mitigation, preparedness, response and rehabilitation (2009b: 44). Other 
authors name it preparation-, immediate response-, and reconstruction phase 
(Kovacs and Spens 2007: 101). Consequently many emergency preparedness 
plans build upon this scheme. Nevertheless, they often do not cover humanitarian 
logistics (Chaikin 2003; quoted in Kovacs and Spens 2007: 102). This lack of 
relief logistics is also mirrored by the academic literature’s focus on the 
preparation phase (Auf der Heide 1989; Carter 2001; Drabek 1986, 2003). 
Researchers assume particular scenarios and work with already existing nodes of 
supply and demand, thereby neglecting the dynamics of the immediate response 
phase (Özdamar et al. 2004). Consequently many decision support systems and 
technologies developed for specific disaster scenarios are inadequate. (Kovacs 
and Spens 2007: 102).  
 
Furthermore it is able to distinguish three types of coordination occurring in the 
response and rehabilitation phases. They mirror not only the crisis lifecycle – the 
need to ramp up, to sustain, and to ramp down the relief efforts - but also the task 
intensity (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 80). These types of 
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coordination are termed coordination by command, coordination by consensus 
and coordination by default (Donini 1996: 14).  
 
• Coordination by command is a centralized tool where one coordinator 
controls resources, delegates tasks, and collects and disseminates information 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 81). Thereby the underlying 
responsibilities and objectives are clearly defined. Issues that fall into this 
category constitute obtaining visas, negotiating landing rights, getting 
customs clearance, arranging licenses for vehicles, signing agreements with 
the military on accessible corridors and the like (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 81).  
 
• Coordination by consensus is characterised by joint planning and decision-
making. This form of coordination is often accompanied by joint access to 
shared communications equipment, liaison and inter-agency meetings, pre-
mission assessments and so on (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 81).  
 
• Coordination by default is full of frequent, routine contact between the 
different humanitarian actors and is often described as ‘light coordination’ 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 82). 
 
Every type of crisis has a similar lifecycle that includes the period of time before 
a crisis, immediately after its outbreak and in the aftermath. The latter two – 
response and rehabilitation – are characterised by three types of coordination that 
usually occur in chronological order: coordination by command, coordination by 
consensus and coordination by default.     
 
Figure 7: Disaster Lifecycle 
 
To conclude this chapter it has to be said that researchers like Feldbrügge (2001: 
1) and Thomas and Kopczak (2005: 1) expect the impact of crises – disasters, 
violent conflicts and complex emergencies - to rise globally, especially in 
developing countries. Thereby the harm to children is of extraordinary severity as 
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it is estimated that the violent conflicts of the last decade have resulted in two 
million children killed, four to five million seriously injured or disabled, 12 
million homeless and more than one million either orphaned or separated from 
their families (Feldbrügge 2001: 44). Another figure speaks of ten million 
children traumatised (UNICEF 1996; quoted in Feldbrügge 2001: 45).  
 
These facts lead to the introduction of the main actors in humanitarian aid, 
organizations whose primal purpose is it to reduce suffering. 
 
3.4. Actors in Humanitarian Aid 
There are manifold types of actors directly or indirectly involved in humanitarian 
aid, inter alia host and neighbouring governments, the military, the United 
Nations (UN), NGOs as well as not-for-profit initiatives of private businesses 
like logistics service providers (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003; 
European Commission 1998a: 36; quoted in McGuire 2006: 18). A prerequisite 
for classifying an organization to be humanitarian is the not-for-profit principle: 
 
“Unlike the private sector where the bottom line motivates the constant need to 
measure performance and invest in improving it, the humanitarian sector operates 
without the market forces of demand and supply regulated through price.” (Van 
Wassenhove 2005: 477) 
 
In addition these actors can be classified as civil, private, or public:  
 
Civil actors Private actors Public actors 
NGOs Private business Government agencies 
Certain UN organizations  Military 
 
Figure 8: Humanitarian Actors 
 
Most of these organizations concentrate on sectors such as food, non-food, 
medicines and general healthcare, logistics, security and the like. Some of them 
even apply a multisector approach and operate in many fields, making operations 
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very complex as “each sector requires different technology, materials and 
information” (University of Wisconsin 2005; quoted in Mayr 2006: 29). 
 
In addition since the beginning of the 1980s there has been a significant growth 
of the humanitarian sector (European Commission 1998a: 36; quoted in McGuire 
2006: 18). In 2004, for example, the budget of the ten biggest aid agencies 
topped $14 billion (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 3)3. As these organizations do 
not charge money for their services, they are dependent on funds from 
governments, business, foundations and private individuals. From governments 
aid agencies receive “$6 billion in annual aid targeted at alleviating suffering 
caused by natural and manmade disasters” (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 3).  
 
However, this growth in income has not been accompanied by some form of 
regulation with regard to services or information technology. Thus Buchanan-
Smith considers the humanitarian sector as “one of the largest unregulated 
industries in the world” (2002: 40; quoted in McGuire 2006: 28), which means 
that it lacks “common standards and mechanisms for evaluation” (European 
Commission 1998b: 42; quoted in McGuire 2006: 28). However, there are some 
efforts to change this like the Sphere Project or People in Aid, initiatives which 
aim to share and diffuse best practices on organizational level. In addition there 
are also other endeavours, like the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA), 
which works on the individual level and will be presented in 4.2.3. The Sphere 
Project, for instance, builds upon International Humanitarian-, Human Rights-, 
and Refugee Law as well as upon the Code of Conduct of the IFRC, publishes an 
own handbook and represents a voluntary community of NGOs, the IFRC, UN 
organizations, donor agencies, governments as well as delegates of affected 
populations (Sphere Project 2009a)4. Specific efforts of the Sphere Project are to 
                                                 
3
 The figures of Thomas and Kopczak base on three categories of international aid agencies, namely UN 
organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), the IFRC that is “auxiliary to country 
governments”, and global NGOs such as CARE and World Vision (2005: 4). Thus Thomas and Kopczak 
separate IFRC and NGOs, a practice widely applied by researchers. 
4
 Its board is comprised of delegates of NGOs like ActionAid, CARE International, Caritas 
Internationalis, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, International Federation of Red Cross and 
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connect relief efforts of NGOs and UN organizations as well as to set up and 
supervise minimum standards in sectors like water and sanitation, nutrition, 
housing, shelter, warehousing and health care (Sphere Project 2004; quoted in 
Lipok 2007: 40).  
 
Adding to the regulation issue, there are also big differences in “local presence, 
size, and mandate” as well as organizational structure of humanitarian actors 
(Kovacs and Spens 2009: 511). Governments of affected countries, for instance, 
have the mandate to implement national contingency plans by directing, 
organizing, and coordinating national disaster response units such as fire 
brigades, ambulances, police and the national army (Mayr 2006. 27). Beyond 
that, they should guarantee that international emergency assistance is “fully 
integrated into the disaster management plans and priorities of recipient 
countries” (Mayr 2006: 22). On the other side authorities of donating countries 
may attempt to relief suffering by channelling aid through humanitarian 
organizations. Thereby demand is often assessed by aid agencies themselves 
(Long and Wood 1995).  
 
When we go to the military, the mandate and structure differs from that of NGOs 
and it is a recent development that armed forces are part of humanitarian 
operations. Consequently Mayr states that besides the UN and single-country 
missions, the NATO “becomes increasingly involved in humanitarian operations, 
both in natural disasters and complex emergencies” (2006: 20)5.  
 
On the other side, there are big differences in mandate and structure even 
between non-governmental bodies. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), for example, is a non-governmental, but sovereign entity which 
                                                                                                                                               
Red Crescent Societies, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam International, World Vision International as 
well as Save the Children (Sphere 2009b). 
5
 This was, for example, the case in Kosovo 1999 during the first ‘humanitarian intervention’ ever. The 
military’s interventions showed positive elements – regarding logistics NATO was essential – as well as 
negative ones – it took over the responsibilities of the UNHCR “without mandate to do so” (Mayr 2006: 
21).  
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derives its legal mandate directly from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 
national societies of the ICRC are thus organizations regulated by international 
humanitarian law (Lanord 2000). The major share of NGOs is not sovereign 
though. Furthermore some of these types of humanitarian actors may have a kind 
of ‘loose’ connection between national sections, usually combined with an 
international coordinating committee, whereas others, like UN organizations, 
“have no national presence per definition” (Kovacs and Spens 2009: 511). 
 
Humanitarian actors show big differences in operational- and geographical range, 
size, and mandate as well as organizational structure. Furthermore some of them 
may have a kind of ‘loose’ connection between national sections, usually 
combined with an international coordinating committee, whereas others, like UN 
organizations, are centralized per definition. 
 
Figure 9: Humanitarian Actors Facts 
 
UN organizations and NGOs are of primal interest in this thesis. The United 
Nations is maybe the most important actor in the humanitarian sector. As its 
structure is very complex it will not be presented in detail. Reference is here 
given to the works of Mayr (2006) and Gscheitmayr (2002). Nevertheless, it is 
now elaborated what the UN humanitarianly does in general and some of its aid 
agencies – Kovacs and Spens call them supranational (2009: 511) – are 
introduced to the reader. After this brief description of the UN (3.4.1), there is a 
detailed analysis of NGOs in the following subchapters that cover facts and 
figures (3.4.2), ideologies (3.4.3), dependencies (3.4.4) as well as location 
decisions of NGOs (3.4.5).  
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3.4.1. UN Agencies as Primal Actors 
International emergency assistance is not free of borders. It constitutes the 
sovereignty of the affected country to accept foreign help or not6. This is the first 
point where the United Nations acts “on behalf of the humanitarian community 
with the affected country the terms and conditions for international relief work” 
(Mayr 2006: 17). Likewise in complex emergencies the UN negotiate standards 
with the often high number of warring parties before the relief activities can start 
(Mayr 2006: 19). Consequently many individuals involved in international 
humanitarian work argue like Tomasini and Van Wassenhove: 
 
“Even though the humanitarian ecosystem is certainly not restricted to the UN 
and its agencies, many field workers would claim informally that it is not until 
the UN arrives in a country or region that the gates truly open for aid to flow. 
Other humanitarian agencies can, and do, go into countries or regions on their 
own before the UN arrives, but often they lack the political support and 
recognition of the UN system.” (2009b: 66)  
 
Another interesting fact is the specialization of UN organizations. Since the 
creation of the UN humanitarian system these aid agencies have special 
mandates. The titles of them resemble their specific mandate like World Food 
Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) or the World Health Organization 
(WHO). Anyway, as a crisis usually shows elements of intertwined needs like 
‘food-health’ or ‘shelter for children-health’ they coordinate their efforts and 
collaborate on a wide area of agendas. Often they also work together with 
international and local NGOs. Consequently Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
state that “the majority of the UN programs are actually implemented through 
NGO partners with the support and blessing of the local communities and 
governments, so these other stakeholders need to be included in the coordination 
game” (2009b: 66). Furthermore, as working together is key, UN bodies exist 
that are specialized on coordination like the Office for the Coordination of 
                                                 
6
 With regard to humanitarian aid only in certain circumstances – for example when world peace is 
endangered – this principle of sovereignty is no longer valid (Gareis and Varwick 2006: 38).  
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Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), directed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, 
and the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC). Both organizations are 
made up of staff from the specialized agencies mentioned before. They are 
portrayed in detail in 4.2.1 (OCHA) respectively 4.2.2 (UNJLC). 
 
The United Nations is a primal actor in international crisis relief. Its aid agencies 
have a specific mandate like food or health care and its coordinating 
organizations negotiate with the affected country about the terms and conditions 
of relief as well as coordinate the work of manifold actors. Thereby many UN 
programs are channelled through NGOs.  
 
Figure 10: The United Nations as Primal Actor of International Crisis Relief 
 
3.4.2. NGOs as Primal Actors 
This subchapter comprises facts and figures, principles and ideologies, 
dependencies, and location decisions of NGOs.  
3.4.2.1. Facts and Figures  
This subchapter is divided into definition, reasons for existence, environment, 
historical development, figures, and trends of NGOs.  
 
Definition 
This work uses the definition of Salamon et al. (1999: 9; quoted in Appel 2009: 
32-34) who state that NGOs are characterised by: 
 
• formal structure and a public agenda, 
• private ownership and thus neither part of state authorities, nor dependent on 
governments, 
• acting autonomously by nature, 
• being subject to the non-distribution-constraint, which means that they do not 
distribute funds to their members 
• voluntary membership as well as transfer of resources 
 
Figure 11: Characteristics of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
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Moreover, Drucker argues that NGOs do not have a bottom line, but nevertheless 
are more money-conscious than profit-oriented enterprises (Drucker 1989: 89; 
quoted in McGuire 2006: 28). Complementary to these fundamental ’ways’ there 
exist also several methods how to walk on them. Consequently, “NGOs can be 
large or small…externally funded or driven by volunteers, charitable and 
paternalistic or radical and ‘empowerment’-based” (Lewis 2007: 13). Another 
important point is the fact that there are many different types of NGOs which 
constantly question their roles. Likewise non-governmental development 
organizations (NGDOs), for instance, debate about what “‘development’ means 
and how problems of poverty and social justice can be addressed” (Lewis 2007: 
15). Eventually it is also interesting that there are so-called ‘third-party NGOs’ 
like Global Impact, AidMatrix and Charitic.fr – charities that match private funds 
with needs recorded by aid agencies (Stapleton et al. 2008; quoted in Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove 2009a: 555). Global Impact, for example, has raised - since 
its 1956 founding – more than US$ 1 billion dedicated to relief and development 
projects (Global Impact 2009).  
 
Existence: since when and why 
It is not possible to specify since when NGOs do exist as elements of NGOs may 
have existed in a wide variety of organizations since the ancient world. 
International organizations that resemble NGOs are known since the midst of the 
19th century (Davies 2008: 7). Anyway, the term NGO was created in the 
environment of the United Nations after WWII as “there was provision made for 
certain international citizen organizations that were independent from UN 
member governments, to observe and participate in UN affairs” (Lewis 2007: 7). 
Another important question is why NGOs do exist. Thus the author would like to 
present two explanations, one that includes economic reasons only (Yaziji and 
Doh), and one that includes social, economic, political and cultural arguments 
(Lewis). Following Yaziji and Doh there are three reasons for NGO emergence, 
social desirability, externalization and imperfect competition (2009: 19-20):  
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• Social desirability occurs when people either do not have the economic 
means to buy goods or not even the possibility as products which ought to be 
not profitable are not produced by the market (e.g. vaccines needed in the 
least-developed-countries). 
  
• Externalization means that the price of a good or service does not reflect the 
real costs as it is the case when we talk about pollution, genetically-modified 
organisms or CO² emissions. 
 
• Imperfect competition includes structures full of monopolistic manifestations 
or asymmetric information.  
 
Yaziji and Doh argue that organizations that do not adhere to market principles 
can help to avoid respectively mitigate these market failures. The notion that 
there is a ‘public agenda niche’ where NGOs do have an advantage over 
governments is also postulated by Lewis who classifies them to be independent 
from government, equipped by value-driven resources, more cost-effective, less 
vulnerable to political upheaval than governments, and more sensitive to local 
needs (Lewis 2007: 96). 
 
Environment 
Following Lewis there are three layers of NGO environment, each characterised 
by a different influence potential, namely control, influence and appreciate 
(2007: 165). The control area lies within the boundaries of the own organization 
and allows an NGO to ‘control’ staff, budget and objectives. Influence, on the 
other side, includes the wider area on an organizational basis like government 
agencies, other NGOs, donors, private business, media, community groups and 
the like. Appreciate constitutes the wider environment on a cultural basis like 
national political structures, macro-economic system, legal framework, 
ecological factors, socio-economic context and so on (Lewis 2007: 165). These 
layers of environment play an important role in chapter four too as they 
 26 
constitute a theoretical ‘proof-of-concept’ of pool sharing in the sense of ‘as 
influence is possible working together is possible’. To conclude this Lewis states:   
 
“The boundaries around these three areas are neither permanent nor clear-cut, but 
will change from time to time as an organization gains more influence over parts 
of an environment, such as when the NGO increases its lobbying work, manages 
to attract more funds or when it enters a new coalition with other organizational 
actors.” (2007: 166) 
 
Historical development 
About the historical development of NGOs there is a lot of literature; facts are 
now presented from researchers like Beamon and Kotleba, Lewis and Woods. 
The first one to start is Woods as this researcher in 2000 delivered the most 
comprehensive survey about European NGOs to date. For her OECD publication 
Facts about European NGOs Active in International Development she used a 
survey population of 4436 NGOS from 26 European countries. Because of the 
big survey population derived from four databases (EU, Council of Europe, UN) 
and the considerably high response rate of app. 50% (Woods 2000: 10), this 
study allows very significant conclusions and will accompany the remaining 
subchapter.  
 
Regarding the historical development of NGOs Woods revealed that “an 
acceleration in NGO formation began in the 1960s and early 1970s, gained 
momentum in the late 1970s and peaked in the 1980s, when 40 per cent of the 
survey population were established” (2000: 11). This is also confirmed by the 
findings of Lindenberg and Bryant who recorded the greatest period of 
international NGO growth in the late 70s and early 80s of the last century (2001; 
quoted in Beamon and Kotleba 2006a: 188). Also Lewis’ findings answer in the 
affirmative (2007: 74). Following Woods this development correlates with the 
“creation by many Western European governments of NGO co-financing 
programmes for development co-operation in the 1960s and early 1970s, and 
subsequent large increases in the availability of government funding for NGO 
activities in the 1980s” (2000: 11). Lewis argues similarly and further speaks 
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about a “rise of ‘global civil society’” (2007: 66). As the reasons behind 
government-NGO instead of government-government channelling of funds he 
identifies the shift from geopolitical interests to the role of “northerners as 
supporters, volunteers and contributors” as well as the governments’ then recent 
view of NGOs being “more effective as concerns engaging with citizens in 
developing countries” like minorities or women (2007: 74). Anyway a donor-
receiver view has remained, something also evidenced in the roles of Northern 
and Southern NGOs: also here the role model of donor-receiver respectively 
project planner–implementer has endured (Lewis 2007: 74-77). More important 
developments in the NGO sector – that in the 1990s grew too (Woods 2000: 9) – 
have been the evidence of more competition as well as the resulting 
professionalization with regard to human resources, fundraising, marketing as 
well as public relations (Appel 2009: 106). 
 
Figures 
This section starts with an approximation of the ‘Number of NGOs that are 
internationally active’ and some facts about official development assistance 
(ODA) channelled through NGOs. Then the structure of Woods’ work on 
European NGOs is followed and figures are presented that cover aspects such as 
‘Resources’, ‘Income Concentration (among NGOs)’, ‘Personnel’, ‘Location of 
personnel’, ‘Distribution by NGO size’, ‘Development Co-operation Activities’ 
and ‘Regional Distribution of Support’. 
 
Regarding the number of international NGOs many diverging figures exist due to 
differences in registration and geographic scope. The Yearbook of International 
Organizations, for example, speaks of approximately 6,000 internationally active 
NGOs in 2000 (Appel 2009: 126). The United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), on the other side, in 1993 identified 50,000 NGOs worldwide (Kellow 
1999; quoted in Yaziji and Doh 2009: 15). A third figure comes from Koch who 
states that “umbrella organizations of international NGOs in the OECD countries 
had more than 2,500 members in 2008” (2009: 1). Whatever figure is right, it is 
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likely that the total number of NGOs continues to increase in future. Yaziji, for 
instance, used recent statistics to back up this trend by indicating a 400 per cent 
increase in numbers (2004a; quoted in Yaziji and Doh 2009: xiii). On a more 
qualitative level, Yaziji speaks of a twenty-fold rise in citations of ‘NGOs’ or 
‘nongovernmental organizations’ in the newspapers Wall Street Journal and 
Financial Times over the period of the last ten years (2004b; quoted in Yaziji and 
Doh 2009: xiii), another indicator for more NGO presence in future. 
 
Official development assistance (ODA) is public sector financing with the aim to 
enhance the economic development of specific target countries. ODA to 
developing countries reached US$ 78.6 billion in 2004 (OECD 2005), US$ 103.7 
billion in 2007 (OECD 2008; quoted in Kovacs and Spens 2009: 507), and US$ 
119.8 billion in 2008 (OECD 2009).  
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2004-2008
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Figure 12: Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2004-2008 
 
Thereby it is of interest how much ODA is channelled through NGOs. Yaziji and 
Doh estimate this figure to be over 15 per cent (2009: 15), whereas Koch speaks 
about 10 per cent for the OECD countries in 2005-6 (2009: 17).       
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Resources are of extraordinary importance for any type of organization. Income 
necessary comes from either official and private funding as well as self-financing 
(Woods 2000: 15). Woods conservatively estimates the total resources mobilised 
by European NGOs to be US$ 7.3 billion in 1993 (2000: 12). In addition she 
estimates the total resources mobilised in all DAC countries7, including the EU-
15, Japan and the US, to be US$ 15.5 billion in 1993 (2000: 13). A more recent 
figure comes from Gatignon who estimated the 2005 annual budget of 
international NGOs to be US$ 26.9 billion (2007; quoted in Koch 2009: 1). To 
underpin these impressive figures it should be said that the “annual budget of 
World Vision International exceeds the official foreign-aid budget of Italy” 
(Koch 2009: 1). 
 
International NGOs have an estimated annual budget of US$ 26.9 billion. 
 
Figure 13: International NGO Budget 
 
Income concentration is an issue that is noticed in both profit- and non-profit 
worlds. Consequently in her OECD paper Woods states that “the largest 20 per 
cent of them (in terms of 1993 income) receive 90.5 per cent of the sector’s total 
income” 8 (2000: 17). Using Wood’s conservative figures (4436 European NGOs 
with a total income of US$ 7.3 billion) this would mean that approx. 900 
organizations account for US$ 6.6 billion and that every of these organizations 
accounts for resources of approximately US$ 7.3 million on average. But as the 
income of these 20 per cent is not evenly distributed, Woods also recorded the 
financial resources of the ten biggest European NGOs and found out that these 
organizations receive 21 per cent of the sector’s total financial resources (2000: 
                                                 
7
 The DAC countries, the abbreviation stands for Development Assistance Committee, include Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, Commission of the European Communities (OECD n.d.).      
8
 Even if there are some variations – the data for Greece and Slovakia are only 67 percent, but for Poland 
96 per cent – the vast majority of country figures is between 85.5 and 91.5 per cent (Woods 2000: 18). 
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17)9. If these funds – approx. US$ 1.5 billion - would have been distributed 
evenly, this would mean around US$ 150 million per NGO.        
 
20 per cent of European NGOs receive 90.5 per cent of the sector’s total income. 
The ten biggest NGOs receive 21 per cent – evenly distributed this would mean 
US$ 150 million per NGO.  
 
Figure 14: Income Concentration of European NGOs 
 
Another interesting point is the personnel of European NGOs. In 1993 a total 
number of 1983 European NGOs employed 913,000 people, of whom 91 per cent 
were volunteers and 9 per cent salaried personnel10 (Woods 2000: 18). Thereby 
the majority of volunteers recorded France (590,237) and Germany (175,721), 
the majority of salaried personnel the U.K. (21,227), Austria (13,490) and 
Switzerland (11,222) (Woods 2000: 19). In only four out of 22 countries 
scrutinised - Switzerland, Norway, Ireland and Austria – did volunteers account 
for less than 50 per cent of the total (Woods 2000: 19). In France, for instance, 
salaried employees constitute only 1 per cent of total personnel.   
 
900,000 people work for European NGOs - 91 per cent of them voluntarily. 
 
Figure 15: Number of Employees of European NGOs 
 
The location of personnel is also of interest, namely the proportion of personnel 
in Europe or in developing countries. 55% of salaried personnel work in Europe, 
whereas 45% per cent are active in developing countries. The ratio would be 
even higher without the predominantly ‘foreign-based’ NGOs from the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and Ireland as in the vast majority “the percentage of 
salaried employees in home countries considerably exceeds that abroad” (Woods 
                                                 
9
 The ten organizations are Caritas Italiana (ITA), Misereor – Bishops’ Relief Fund (BRD), SOS 
Childrens’ Village International (AUT), Save the Children Fund (UK), Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
(BRD), Caritas France (FRA), Association Nationale pour le Développement Agricole (ANDA) (FRA), 
Hermann-Gmeiner-Fonds Deutschland (BRD), Oxfam (UK), International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (UK) (Woods 2000: 18). 
 
10
 826,819 volunteers and 86,344 salaried personnel 
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2000: 20). In Germany and France, for instance, the ratio is around 75:25 
(Woods 2000: 21). With regard to voluntary personnel the figures are not that 
skewed. Following Woods the vast majority - 94 per cent - are located in Europe 
and in 16 out of the 22 countries analysed – especially the big ones – more than 
75 per cent of volunteers are active within the boundaries of Europe (2000: 21).       
 
The next step would be to analyse if the income concentration elaborated above 
bears a resemblance with the indicator Personnel distribution by NGO size. The 
latter shows even more concentration as “95 per cent of all NGO personnel are 
employed by 10 per cent of NGOs” (Woods 2000: 22). The biggest NGOs thus 
employ thousands and thousands of people, a fact commented by Woods as being 
traceable to the popularity and image of the big NGOs (2000: 22). Anyway, a 
slim majority has a rather small staff. Woods states that “61 per cent employ ten 
or fewer salaried workers and 51 per cent ten or fewer volunteers” (Woods 2000: 
22). 
 
10 per cent of European NGOs employ 95 per cent of all NGO personnel. 
 
Figure 16: Personnel Concentration of European NGOs 
 
The agenda of NGOs constitutes the core of NGO activities. Woods calls them 
Development Co-operation Activities and analysed the main conceptual activities 
of European NGOs. Thereby the ranking is not based on resource transfers, but 
only on the number of NGOs addressing a specific topic. The outcome speaks for 
more than 50 per cent of European NGOs supporting Education (1), Health (2), 
and Rural Development (3), whereas only 37 per cent support emergency relief 
and only 34% are engaged in environment activities (Woods 2000: 24-25). 
 
The last indicator of Woods is Regional Distribution of Support. Woods divided 
the world into five spheres, asked the survey population for a ‘Yes, active!’ or a 
‘No, not active!’ and registered “prevailing support” for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(78%), followed by Central & South Asia (42%), North Africa & Middle East 
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(36%), Latin America & Caribbean (27%) and South East Asia, East Asia & 
Oceania (24%) (2000: 26). This means that 78% of all European NGOs operate 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but only 24% in South East Asia, East Asia & Oceania. 
Anyway, Woods did not include resource transfers. This constitutes a fact that 
makes these figures not really significant.  
 
Another OECD publication, on the other side, works with other regional areas, 
but with transfers of funds and traced 37.1% of NGO aid going to Africa, 30.5% 
to Latin America, 28.2% to Asia, 2.3% to Europe and 1.8% to the Middle East 
(OECD 2007; quoted in Koch 2009: 180). It is also interesting to compare these 
figures with bilateral aid – funds channelled from governments through 
governments. Following the OECD 45.7% of bilateral aid goes to Africa, 25.8% 
to Asia, 13.3% to Latin America, 7.8% to the Middle East and 7.3% to Europe 
(OECD 2007; quoted in Koch 2009: 180). Evidently, there are big discrepancies 
regarding Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. This may due to political 
reasons on the government side as well as organizational reasons like path 
dependence11 on the NGO side.  
  
Region Transfers of NGO in % Transfers of GOV in % 
Africa 37.1 45.7 
Latin America 30.5 13.3 
Asia 28.2 25.8 
Europe 2.3 7.3 
Middle East 1.8 7.8 
 
Figure 17: Geographical Distribution of NGO and Government Aid 
 
To conclude the figures section, Yaziji and Doh award the NGO sector an 
intellectual touch as ”half the employees of the largest, most influential NGOs 
have master’s or law degrees, and 10-20 percent have doctorates” (2009: 129). 
                                                 
11
 The phenomenon that a system evolves out of its history. Regarding NGO location a manifestation of 
path dependence would be the self-reinforcing networks of international NGO staff (Koch 2009: 74). 
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Trends 
As any industry, the NGO sector shows trends. As elaborated above, the non-
profit and non-governmental sphere has recorded immense growth in the last 30 
years. For the organizations themselves the question has remained how to change 
organizational structures within this period of growth. Koenig registered two 
main trends, namely the emergence of international (INGOs) and transnational 
NGOs (1996; quoted in Lewis 2007: 204). Lewis further elaborated the thoughts 
of Koenig and stated: 
 
“There are two main trends: there are INGOs which began in one country but 
which have expanded to new ones in a process of ‘going international’ (such as 
ActionAid); and there are new transnational NGOs specifically formed with 
representatives from more than one country (such as CIVICUS). This brings a 
distinctive set of organizational problems, and two structural forms are emerging: 
‘ethnocentric’ structures based on tight control of subsidiary offices by 
centralized headquarters, and ‘polycentric’ structures with a high degree of 
decentralized local control and interconnectedness.” (Lewis 2007: 2004) 
 
Another trend in the NGO sector is service provision. Today more and more 
NGOs act as service provider and consult governments on policy or NGO clients 
on specific issues (Lewis 2007: 83). Donors increasingly see NGOs not only as 
implementers of a specific policy, but as important source of information for the 
policies themselves. In addition NGOs provide “training services to other 
organizations or to government, or offer research or conflict resolution services 
to other agencies” (Lewis 2007: 132). 
  
3.4.2.2. Ideologies of NGOs Active in Humanitarian Aid 
This is a subchapter dealing with a general description of NGO ideologies. 
Following Princeton University an ideology is a “political orientation: an 
orientation that characterizes the thinking of a group or nation” (2009). Adapted 
to the humanitarian world, it can be said that organizations incorporate different 
types of ideologies, but all adhere the humanitarian principles. The outcome of 
their efforts is supposed to be the same, but the impetus is different. In 
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comparison with the United Nations, for instance, NGOs are more diverse with 
regard to ideology. To better understand this issue three types of ideologies are 
now introduced, namely faith-based organizations, dunantists and wilsonians 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 24). These are now briefly presented: 
 
1. Faith-based organizations in their work combine “religious values with social 
goals” though being ecumenical and not imposing “their values on the 
beneficiaries they serve” (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2009b: 24). Typical 
actors of this kind are Caritas and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  
 
2. Dunantists solely adhere to the humanitarian principles and do not use them in 
order to live religious values. Their beliefs are “firmly rooted in the principles 
advocated by Henry Dunant” and they “advocate a non-interventionist strategy in 
conflict” (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2009b: 24). Organizations that form 
this group include the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Save the 
Children, Oxfam, Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger), and Médecins 
Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 
2009b: 24). 
 
3. Wilsonians have a more political agenda. Following Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove “they encompass former President Woodrow Wilson’s ambitions to 
project US values and influence as a force for good in the world” (2009b: 24). 
Today it spans the whole political spectrum and includes organizations like 
CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere).  
 
Regarding the types one and three – faith-based organizations and wilsonians – it 
can be said that they may have a “built-in conflict of interest depending on how 
much their ideologies influence their agenda (political or religious)” (Tomasini 
and van Wassenhove 2009b: 25).  
 
To conclude this subchapter, it should be noted that the adherence to this 
combination of principles and ideologies of NGOs “can prove to be very 
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expensive (e.g., Southern Africa), or controversial (e.g., the Balkans)” (Tomasini 
and van Wassenhove 2009b: 39). This is especially difficult as – following 
Tomasini and van Wassenhove – “humanitarian operations are not judged by 
their speed or costs, but rather by their impact” (2009b: 39). 
 
3.4.2.3. Dependencies of NGOs 
As mentioned before NGOs have three sources of income: official funding, 
private funding and self-financing (Woods 2000: 15). Predominantly are the first 
two sources as – although the NGO industry becomes more and more 
professional – they are value-based and thus usually dependent on public and 
private donations as well as voluntarism (Mayr 2006: 19). NGOs are usually 
involved in partnerships with different donors. On the official side, many NGOs 
apply for “internationally announced projects that are either undertaken by a UN 
agency or are sponsored by large donor institutions such as ECHO12 (Mayr 2006: 
19). On the private side, organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) 
also work with donations from businesses13 (Mayr 2006: 37). Apparently it is of 
interest if there are any dependencies towards one of these sources as in recent 
years – in addition to official funding – “foundations, individual donors and the 
private sector have become important sources of funds for aid agencies” (Kovacs 
and Spens 2007: 107).  
 
Anyway – due to the scarce literature on private funding - the main focus lies on 
a potential dependency towards official donors. Following Thomas and Kopczak 
in recent years the United States and the European Union alone have accounted 
for approximately 33 respectively 10 per cent of total humanitarian aid (2005: 3). 
Other major governmental donors are the remaining European countries as well 
as Canada, Japan and Australia (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 3). Official funds 
                                                 
12
 ECHO stands for European Commission Humanitarian Office and is further explained in 4.2.3. 
13
 After the 2004 South-East-Asian tsunami, for example, American companies alone donated “more than 
$565 million: about $273 million in cash contributions; $79 million in employee matching contributions; 
$140 million in in-kind donations; and $73 million in customer donations” (Thomas and Fritz 2006: 114). 
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account for approximately 40 per cent of NGO income (Woods 2000: 15). Koch, 
for instance, reports that due to the increasing channelling of official aid through 
these humanitarian actors the majority of NGOs now receives more than 50 per 
cent of its budget from official sources (2009: 2). This situation challenges a 
NGO’s independence. Koch comes to the conclusion that it is unclear ”whether 
they have become the executing subcontracting agencies of Northern 
governments or whether they are still able to make autonomous policy and 
country choices” (2009: 2).  
 
The same thoughts are expressed by Woods: 
 
“Of particular interest is: whether NGOs are being increasingly used as ‘sub-
contractors’ for government-initiated projects rather than as recipients of official 
funds for NGO-initiated projects; and whether the funding received by NGOs for 
their own projects is being accompanied by increased conditionality.” (2000: 16) 
 
It is the concern that NGOs become ‘donor-driven’, resource-led instead of 
socially-responsive organizations that shift their accountability away from the 
beneficiaries and towards governments (Woods 2000: 15)14. And eventually it is 
also questionable if NGOs are still non-governmental then.  
 
The majority of NGOs receives more than 50% of its budget from official 
sources. There is the concern that NGOs become ‘donor-driven’.  
 
Figure 18: The Dependency of NGOs on Official Sources 
 
This problem and the accompanying anxiousness of NGO researchers are 
ubiquitous. Anyway, regarding this issue it is opportune to differentiate. If we 
assume that official back donors15 not only want to channel aid through NGOs, 
but also an imminent interest, we have to distinguish between an economic and a 
political interest.  
 
                                                 
14
 For more information see 4.5.1 Donor orientation. 
15
 The prefix ‘back’ refers to the fact that many official donors do not directly engage in crisis relief, but 
indirectly via their implementing partners like NGOs or UN organizations.  
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Koch, for example, shows that the more trade occurs between countries, the more 
NGO aid is reduced (2009: 33). Thus it appears that NGO aid is “not affected by 
the economic interests of back donors” (Koch 2009: 34). Anyway, following 
Koch NGOs tend to focus “on those countries where their back donors are 
active” (Koch 2009).  
 
What remains then is the possible political interest of governments, true to the 
motto “More aid, more influence”. Accordingly, Koch found that “with higher 
dependence rates of international NGOs on their government, they are 
increasingly mimicking the country choice priorities of their back donor” (2009: 
123-124). Similarly McGuire argues that “donors may attach conditions such as 
utilizing funds for specific programmes, specific groups of recipients, using 
funds in a specific geographical area or country and spending the money by a 
certain deadline” (2006: 31).  
 
The more dependent NGOs are on their governments, the more they imitate their 
back donor’s aid distribution patterns with regard to country choice. 
 
Figure 19: The Impact of NGO Dependency on Country Choice 
 
But anyway, following the Sphere Project, any type of humanitarian organization 
should avoid getting dependent of a single donor - regardless if official or private 
- in terms of goodwill and funds (2004: 318; quoted in McGuire 2006: 26). 
Woods found in her very comprehensive survey that on average 58 per cent of 
NGO budgets are filled by non-official sources (2000: 15). In addition she states 
that due to data mining difficulties16 it would be difficult to say whether there is 
some form of dependency or not (2000: 16). Although the distribution is 
unknown, Woods introduces some interesting country figures that are presented 
to the reader below. The country order follows the percentage of income derived 
from official sources. It can be expected that a similar pattern is valid for NGO 
funding sources in relation to donor institutions.  
                                                 
16
 “The Development Centre’s database is unable to disaggregate the various possible components of each 
income source.” (Woods 2000: 16) 
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Country Percentage of 
income from 
official sources 
Percentage of 
income from 
private sources 
Percentage of 
income from self-
financing  
sources 
Hungary 97.8 1.4 0.8 
Greece 71 17 12 
Denmark 65 10 25 
Sweden 58 30 12 
Belgium 53 38 9 
Czech Republic 49 28 23 
United Kingdom 47 36 17 
Netherlands 47 22 31 
Norway 46 25 29 
Ireland 46 41 13 
Switzerland 42 46 12 
Luxembourg 41 45 14 
Portugal 40 35 25 
Spain 39 26 35 
France 38 42 20 
Finland 32 41 27 
Germany 32 59 9 
Italy 29 67 4 
Turkey 29 11 60 
Austria 23 66 11 
Slovak Republic 20 55 25 
Poland 6 93 1 
 
Figure 20: Distribution of NGO Funding Sources in European Countries                                               
(based on Woods 2000: 17) 
 
3.4.2.4. Location Decisions of NGOs 
Location decision is an important issue in NGO work with important 
consequences for pool sharing17. Of special interest, thereby, is the fact that there 
are so-called ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’ – countries that receive 
disproportionately high respectively disproportionately low aid. Koch and Van 
Laan showed in their study of 50 of the largest development NGOs significant 
agency concentration in 2005 (2007: 2). The map below illustrates this pattern 
and displays the NGOs’ per country-per capita expenditures in euros.  
 
                                                 
17
 For more information see 4.5.2 Competition. 
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Figure 21: Agency Concentration in Development Aid (Source: Koch and Van Laan 2007: 2) 
 
The figure highlights that there are darlings and orphans in country comparison. 
The aim of this subchapter is to explain the reasons behind this pattern. 
Regarding the Central African Republic (CAR) – a donor orphan (at that time) – 
Hidalgo states:   
 
“The crisis in CAR is less visible because of the country’s relatively small 
population and the small number of people who are affected, scattered 
throughout the north, Chad, Cameroon, and Sudan. As a result, the population in 
need is dispersed, less visible, and harder to reach than people accommodated in 
camps. The international neglect can also be explained by the proximity and 
magnitude of other major crises, such as those in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and, more recently, in Chad and Darfur….CAR lacks a champion on the 
international scene, such as the UK for Zimbabwe, the United States for Liberia, 
or Belgium for the DRC. France, the former colonial power, has a long list of 
more populated and troubled former colonies in which it has greater vested 
interests.” (2008: 143) 
 
The most comprehensive work on location decisions from NGOs to date comes 
from Dirk-Jan Koch. In his work Aid from International NGOs: Blind Spots on 
the Aid Allocation Map, his PhD-thesis at Radboud University in Nijmegen, 
Koch not only confirmed spatial concentration of NGOs and the resulting 
existence of donor darlings and donor orphans, but also delivered some profound 
explanations. For his research he used data of 61 of the world’s biggest 
6  to 14.1  (14)
2.9 to 6   (18)
1.5 to 2.9  (28)
0.5 to 1.5  (25)
0  to 0.5  (41)
NGO aid per 
capita (Euros) 
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international NGOs and applied for-profit concentration theories in the non-profit 
context (Koch 2009: 7). Now his research will be presented in detail. 
 
There are so-called ‘donor darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’ – countries that receive 
disproportionately high respectively disproportionately low aid. 
 
Figure 22: Donor Darlings and Donor Orphans 
 
The sample NGOs of Koch show a diverse spectrum of agenda, but exclude 
organizations whose activities are “mainly triggered by exogenous shocks” like 
the Red Cross Movement or Medicines sans Frontières (2009: 26). In order to be 
representative, 61 of the largest international NGOs18 were chosen that together 
account for a budget of €6.9 billion in 2005. Per recipient country an average 
allocation of €30.4 million was recorded (Koch 2009:7). Thereby big distribution 
discrepancies were registered by Koch who states that “the top recipients receive 
more than 20 times more on a per capita basis than the so-called donor orphans” 
(2009: 7). This phenomenon is already well-known regarding official donors – 
may they be bilateral or multilateral (Koch 2009: 24). Following Koch possible 
reasons in this sphere include common heritage (e.g. colonialism), common 
language or common faith (2009: 25). But what is with the other sphere – the 
NGO country choices? Do they show resemblance with the choices of back 
donors? If yes, why do they? If not, what can be other reasons for this behavior? 
Using the data of the humanitarian actors mentioned above Koch came to this 
initial conclusion (2009: 31):  
 
“At the 1 per cent level19, NGOs are more likely to be active in countries (i) 
which receive higher levels of bilateral official aid from the donor country in 
which the NGO is based, (ii) where more other NGOs are engaged, (iii) which 
share the same religion, and (iv) which have larger populations.”   
                                                 
18
 Inter alia CARE Canada, CARE, France, CARE Norway, CARE USA, Caritas Switzerland, ADRA 
(USA), Brot für die Welt (Germany), Broederlijk delen (Belgium), Church of Sweden Aid, Concern 
Worldwide (Ireland), German Agro Action / DWHH (Germany), Goal (Ireland), Hivos (Netherlands), 
Misereor (Germany), Norwegian Peoples Aid, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Belgium, Oxfam Novib 
(Netherlands), Oxfam USA, PLAN International (UK), Save the Children USA, Swissaid (Switzerland), 
Terre des Hommes (Switzerland), World Vision Australia, World Vision Canada and World Vision USA 
were part of the sample (2009: 174). 
19
 99 per cent of variance explained by factor 
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Thereby he interestingly identified the strongest factors to be (ii) and (iii) – 
namely the presence of other NGOs and shared faith (2009: 31).  
 
The strongest promoters of NGO activities are the presence of other NGOs and 
shared faith. 
 
Figure 23: Main Promoters of NGO Activities with Regard to Country Choice 
 
In addition he recorded three phenomena on the 5 per cent level20. First, the 
sample organizations supposedly preferred activities in more democratic 
environments (2009:31). Second, the more trade recorded between countries, the 
less bilateral NGO aid (2009: 34). And third, a voting of the United Nations 
General Assembly turned out to be important for the location decision of NGOs 
(Koch 2009: 34). 
 
In this thesis point (ii), the concentration of NGOs, is of utmost importance21. In 
order to understand this phenomenon better Koch applied evolutionary economic 
geography. This approach and its findings are now presented to the reader. 
 
First, we will make a short reminiscence to the Central African Republic (CAR) 
and further introduce Tanzania. The CAR is a country of four million inhabitants 
in Central Africa with 75% of the population living below the poverty line (3 
million persons in total). Tanzania, on the other hand, lies in Central East Africa 
and has 38 million inhabitants with 29% of the population living below the 
poverty line (11 million persons in total) (Koch 2009: 67). Matching received 
funds with people in need of aid Koch discovered:  
 
“Accordingly, one would expect Tanzania to receive greater support[…]in 
equivalent terms, about three times as much. The real difference, however, is 
much greater. 61 of the world’s largest non-governmental development 
organizations spend only around €1 million a year in the Central African 
Republic, compared with around €70 million a year in Tanzania.” (2009: 67)  
 
                                                 
20
 95 per cent of variance explained by factor 
21
 For more information see 4.5.2 Competition.  
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On a per-capita basis, poor people in Tanzania get around 15.5 times more aid 
than their counterparts in the Central African Republic.  
 
Figure 24: Central African Republic and Tanzania – Donor Orphan, Donor Darling 
 
Field research of Koch in those countries (2009: 12) showed that 37 out of the 61 
NGOs are present in Tanzania (€68 million or €6.18 per poor), but only four are 
active in the Central African Republic (€1.2 million or €0.40 per poor) (2009: 74-
75). Another interesting finding is the strong concentration of aid agencies in 
Tanzania (2009: 75). In this context Van Laan discovered inter-regional 
differences: whereas some Tanzanian regions showed proportionally low NGO 
density, others – especially the Arusha region – record proportionally high NGO 
density (Van Laan 2007: 32). The following figure shows these inter-regional 
differences; thereby the numbers stand for ‘citizens per NGO’:   
 
 
Figure 25: Regional NGO Density in Tanzania (Source: Van Laan 2007: 49) 
 
Consequently Koch was looking for location theories that potentially could 
explain these patterns, namely the existence of donor orphans/darlings and 
agency concentration on country and region level. Thereby he found that current 
‘non-profit location theories’ like supply and demand analysis are too static as 
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they “do not pay attention to dynamic processes at work in non-profit clustering” 
and as “they refrain from explaining current patterns of inequality” (2009: 68). 
Economic geography, on the other hand, is a promising field regarding dynamic 
location decisions. Koch was searching for an approach that fits to NGOs and 
accounts for “explicit choices with respect to underlying assumptions, the 
importance of contextual factors and the conceptualization of time”22 (2009: 69).  
 
For-profit location theories are used to explain non-profit patterns. 
 
Figure 26: Economic Geography in the Non-Profit World 
 
Out of three basic approaches described by Boschma and Frenken, namely the 
neo-classical, the institutional and the evolutionary approach (2006), Koch 
choose the third one and adapted it for location decisions of NGOs (2009: 69). 
The basic determinants of this adapted evolutionary economic geography 
approach were taken from for-profit work of Arthur (1994) and Boschma and 
Frenken (2003), namely increasing returns to scale (1), labour mobility (2), and 
path dependence (3) (Koch 2009: 68). These determinants are now briefly 
presented:  
 
1. Increasing returns to scale arise from two types of economies of scale, namely 
internal and external ones. The former is intra-organizational, whereas the latter 
is inter-organizational. Internal economies of scale emerge when it is reasonable 
– with respect to economics or service level – to cluster an organization’s 
activities. A practical example delivers Koch who argues that it would be 
efficient for a field-office running NGO to reduce the number of countries in 
which it operates as globally not only fewer initial investment is needed, but also 
fewer overhead costs are recorded (2009: 72). Additionally - from the author’s 
point of view – it should be mentioned that transaction costs23 are reduced too. 
Altogether these cost reductions speak for concentration on specific target 
                                                 
22
 Based on work of Koch and Van der Laan (2007: 3-4).  
23
 Search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs 
(Watkins 2009). 
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countries. External economies of scale, on the other hand, “arise when a group of 
organizations can achieve more of their aims when they combine their activities” 
(Koch 2009: 72). Bielefeld and Murdoch, two economic geographers, list some 
of these benefits:   
  
“They include such factors as (a) shared infrastructure, which will reduce 
transportation, communication, and supply costs; (b) access to a pool of labor or 
specialized inputs; (c) knowledge spillovers between organizations as a result of 
contacts between firms and people; (d) information about demand or the 
feasibility of production at a particular location, which can be obtained by 
observing other successful organizations at that location; and (e) a reduction of 
consumer search costs, which will lead to increased demand at a particular 
location.” (2004: 224) 
 
2. Labour mobility is another determinant of NGO location. Its influence is 
explained very well by Koch who reports that “labour mobility contributes in two 
ways to concentration of NGOs; (1) qualified labour tends to move towards 
incipient concentrations since salaries and living conditions are better and (2) 
labour tends to be more mobile between organizations within incipient 
concentrations” (2009: 73). 
 
3. Path dependence constitutes the phenomenon that a system evolves out of its 
history. It is self-reproducing over time and past investments are honoured in the 
present/future. Regarding NGO location a manifestation of path dependence 
would be the self-reinforcing networks of international NGO staff that lead to 
spatial cluster-building (Koch 2009: 74). Country images also belong to this 
category. Koch, for instance, shows that the country images of the Central 
African Republic (CAR) and Tanzania considerably differ, the former being 
associated by individuals active in humanitarian aid as representing “all the vices 
of Africa”, while the latter standing for “all its virtues” (2009: 79). As Tanzania 
receives far more aid on a per-capita basis than CAR, its better country image 
may have its influence over this outcome. 
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Another example would be the funding pattern of (Northern-) governments. The 
U.K. and France are very illustrative in this matter, two countries that both 
predominantly support their former colonies but that show a very different 
funding pattern. The U.K. has historically channelled a high share of its aid 
through (local-) non-governmental organizations (Koch 2009: 79). Many NGOs 
have been geared to the choices of this back donor and consequently are active in 
target countries of the U.K. France, on the other side, has always channelled the 
major share of its aid through governments. These diverging patterns have led to 
the fact that “the ten largest international development NGOs all have their head 
offices in the Anglo-Saxon world, and eight of the ten largest recipients of aid 
from NGOs are former English colonies” (Koch 2009: 79)24. Eventually coming 
back to our initial comparison of the Central African Republic and Tanzania – 
the latter receives around 15 times more aid on a per-capita basis than the former 
- it should be stated that following the determinant path dependence a possible 
reason would be the fact that Tanzania is a former British, while CAR is a former 
French colony. 
 
The basic determinants of this adapted evolutionary economic geography 
approach were increasing returns to scale, labour mobility, and path dependence. 
 
Figure 27: Determinants of Economic Geography Applied to NGO Location Decision 
 
The résumé of these findings could be that increasing returns to scale, labour 
mobility and path dependence trigger NGO concentration. Anyway, Koch lists 
them not as the only possible explanation of NGO concentration (2009: 79). 
Other factors that could lead to this situation were mentioned before, namely 
sharing the same religion, large country populations, democratic country 
structures (Koch 2009: 31) or a voting of the United Nations General Assembly 
                                                 
24
 This is some evidence for NGO dependency as non-governmental organizations mimic the country 
choices of their back donor. Anyway, this is only valid for a high degree of dependency. The more 
competitive a NGO is, the more diverse their sources are, the more it is likely that they “do not shy away 
from operating in countries where few other actors are active, nor from intervening in the poorly 
performing countries” (Koch 2009: 123). 
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(2009: 34). Democratic country structures, for instance, are a potential reason for 
the differences in our example of Tanzania and the Central African Republic as 
in that sense the former outperformed the latter (Koch 2009: 87). 
 
3.5. Humanitarian Logistics  
A lot of background information has been introduced to the reader by now. It 
delineates a picture of humanitarian aid in general, its triggers and principles, its 
actors and NGOs as primal subject of analysis of this thesis. Now humanitarian 
logistics are scrutinized. To understand the special characteristics of this 
discipline is a prerequisite for pool sharing. Before presenting the structure of 
this chapter some basic information is delivered. Reasons why this discipline is 
central to emergency response are illustrated by Thomas and Kopczak: 
 
“Humanitarian Logistics is central to disaster relief for several reasons. First, it is 
crucial to the effectiveness and speed of response for major humanitarian 
programs, such as health, food, shelter, water, and sanitation. Second, with 
procurement and transportation included in the function, it can be one of the most 
expensive parts of a relief effort. Third, since the logistics department handles 
tracking of goods through the supply chain, it is often the repository of data that 
can be analyzed to provide post-event learning. Logistics data reflects all aspects 
of execution, from the effectiveness of suppliers and transportation providers, to 
the cost and timeliness of response, to the appropriateness of donated goods and 
the management of information. Thus, it is critical to the performance of both 
current and future operations and programs.” (2005: 2) 
 
Eventually it is necessary to state that Trunick estimates logistics to account for 
80 per cent of the costs associated with emergency response (2005: 8). With this 
basic information in mind the author would like to present the agenda of this 
chapter: the general structure of humanitarian logistics will be explained briefly 
in 3.5.1. ‘Briefly’ because of the fact that there are many works that cover this 
craft in general like Humanitarian Logistics of Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
(2009b) or Logistics Management in humanitarian crisis – with a focus on supply 
pipeline logistics of Mayr (2006). Other important papers are from Kovacs and 
Spens (2007 and 2009) as well as Thomas and Kopczak (2005). The topics 
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addressed by this subchapter can be divided into three categories. The first one 
delivers basic information about humanitarian logistics and includes the sections 
definition and characteristics. The second category is about obligatory logistical 
activities and includes situation analysis, resource analysis, means of distribution 
and personnel. The last one - critical success factors - also deals with logistical 
operations, but the portrayed types of activities are not obligatory, but make the 
difference between a goodish humanitarian supply chain and an outstanding one. 
Then, in 3.5.2, the direct switch to chapter four is introduced to the reader. With 
the help of literature and praxis examples of the coordination and cooperation 
problems in the Central African Republic, Angola, Mozambique and after the 
2004 Asian Tsunami, challenges in this field are presented in order to lay the 
basis for their remedy, pool sharing, that is elaborated in the next chapter.  
 
80 per cent of emergency response costs can be traced back to logistics. 
 
Figure 28: The Share of Logistics Costs in Total Costs of Crisis Relief 
 
3.5.1. General Structure of Humanitarian Logistics 
It is appropriate to start with a definition of humanitarian logistics and its 
characteristics. Then two very important parts of emergency logistics, situation- 
and resource analysis, are described. These aspects are followed by means of 
distribution, the dynamics of personnel and – eventually - critical success factors. 
 
Definition 
There are manifold definitions of humanitarian logistics. The author would like 
to present two of them, a very brief and a more detailed one: 
 
• ”It consists of all activities associated with procurement, storage, transport 
and distribution of relief goods and equipment.” (Mayr 2006: 1)  
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• “Humanitarian Logistics is defined as the process of planning, implementing 
and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and 
materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin to the point 
of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable 
people. The function encompasses a range of activities, including 
preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and 
tracing, and customs clearance.” (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 2) 
 
Figure 29: Definition of Humanitarian Logistics (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 2) 
 
The latter is more comprehensive and supposedly the most often quoted 
definition of the scientific community dealing with emergency logistics. It is also 
the one used in this thesis. Additional interesting insights into the matter are 
delivered by Gustavsson and Mayr on the operational side as well as Thomas and 
Mizushima on the strategic side. Gustavsson, a practioner, defines components of 
humanitarian logistics like “procurement, transportation, warehousing, inventory 
management, trace and tracking, bidding and reverse bidding, reporting and 
accountability” (2003: 7). Similarly, Mayr calls relief-specific logistical 
measures to be “evacuations, search & rescue, requirements/resource 
assessments, procurement, warehousing, transport and distribution” (2006: 27). 
Thomas and Mizushima on the other side argue logistics to be the “bridge 
between disaster preparedness and response, between procurement and 
distribution and between headquarters and the field” (2005; quoted in Van 
Wassenhove 2005: 476). But besides these superficial descriptions it is of interest 
to know more details about humanitarian logistics and its circumstances which 
will be presented in the following section. 
 
Characteristics 
This section is the core of this subchapter. It is all about what makes 
humanitarian logistics special and challenging. Before analysing the 
characteristics it is opportune to distinguish emergency logistics from business- 
and military logistics. Business logistics typically works with a stable network of 
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suppliers and manufacturing sites as well as predictable demand – all of which 
are not known to emergency logistics (Cassidy 2003). Likewise Balcik and 
Beamon identify inter alia unpredictability of demand, sudden occurrence of high 
demand combined with short lead times for a wide variety of goods and services, 
and lack of resources in terms of supply, people, technology, transportation 
capacity, and money as main differences to business logistics (2008: 102; quoted 
in Kovacs and Spens 2009: 507). With regard to the military it has to be said that 
this organisational form usually coordinates its efforts from one special and 
predetermined command post. This is not the case in emergency logistics as a 
high number of relief agencies are involved that usually coordinate their efforts 
from different command centres (Özdamar et al. 2004; Roosevelt 2005). Or as 
Kovacs and Spens put it: “The involvement of many different aid agencies in 
relief operations renders many distribution centre-based planning techniques 
obsolete.” (2007: 103)  
 
Humanitarian logistics are different to business- and military logistics due to 
sudden occurrence of high demand respectively different coordination structures. 
 
Figure 30: Difference of Humanitarian Logistics to Business- and Military Logistics 
  
The following categorisation of humanitarian logistics’ characteristics is obtained 
from Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009b: 9-11):    
 
• Ambiguous objectives means that it is difficult to assess overall response 
capacity as the “level of commitment” of the various actors as well as “their 
relationship to one another” differs considerably (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 9). Following Tomasini and Van Wassenhove this is 
because of the “large numbers of stakeholders (donors, agencies, media, and 
beneficiaries)” and results in humanitarian actions often being 
“uncoordinated, spontaneous, unsolicited, and disparate” (2009b: 9).  
 
• Limited resources are classified by Tomasini and Van Wassenhove as human, 
capital, and infrastructure (2009b: 9-10). Thereby human resources are 
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characterised by “high turnover, heavy physical and emotional demands” as 
well as a “limited pool of qualified and readily deployable personnel” (2009b: 
9). Capital, on the other side, is also crucial when it comes to emergency 
logistics. Unfortunately field managers on the spot are often challenged by 
insufficient, delayed or cancelled funds. Thus “liquidity, as well as good 
credit terms for new suppliers, is an issue for managers on the ground” 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 9). Infrastructure is necessary too 
when it comes to logistical measures. Unfortunately it is normally damaged 
as well as typically insufficient and from time to time literally inexistent 
(Long and Wood 1995: 225). Tomasini and Van Wassenhove explain this by 
an extraordinary magnitude of demand that typically focuses on a relatively 
small area (2009b: 10). A classical example of limited resources with regard 
to infrastructure would be the necessity to use airplanes in the immediate 
after-phase of disasters as roads and harbours may be impassable, non 
utilizable or even destroyed (Bock 2006: 58).  
 
In addition to Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, Auf der Heide mentions two 
other aspects of limited resources, namely their specificity (e.g. satellite 
communications, search & rescue units or field hospitals) and their atypical 
origin, the latter indicating that “resources in disasters arrive from many 
atypical sources…which…makes it difficult to tell what resources are present, 
where they are, what they are doing” (1989: 63). In that sense information 
about resources is limited. This kind of limitation is of extraordinary 
importance as there are situations where more resources are disposable than 
needed, a fact that possibly leads to communication and coordination 
problems between aid agencies (Quarantelli 1983: 78-80; quoted in Auf der 
Heide 1989: 104). Eventually a statement that defines the framework for 
resource use comes from Wood et al. who state that “in famine relief efforts, 
first- and third-world logistics meet” (2002: 389). 
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• High uncertainty is typical for management in catastrophes (Lipok 2007: 17) 
and consequently a major characteristic of humanitarian interventions. Supply 
chains have to be set up at times when information and knowledge is scarce 
(Long and Wood 1995; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2004: 437). This 
uncertainty manifests itself in abrupt, but necessary changes of organizational 
structures and responsibilities, the exigency to share tasks and capacity, the 
not-known number and spatial distribution of volunteers as well as unclear 
jurisdictional boundaries (Auf der Heide 1989: 53). Likewise Beamon and 
Kotleba call irregularity “in terms of size, timings and locations[…]a 
characteristic feature of demand patterns for relief items” (2006a: 187). 
Similar findings come from Cassidy (2003: 16) and Murray (2005; quoted in 
Kovacs and Spens 2007: 100). Consequently we talk about push supply 
chains in the aftermath of an emergency. Only later – as more information 
and knowledge is available – the supply chain is able to apply a pull-approach 
(Long and Wood 1995: 218).  
 
• Urgency: The need for relief after or within a crisis is usually urgent. 
Consequently the intensity level is considerably high, measured by Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove as being “the number of tasks to be executed divided by 
the product of time and available resources” (2009b: 10). 
 
• Politicized environment: Internationally active humanitarian actors must 
respect national sovereignty and thus have to deal with the national 
government of the affected country. The result of this is humanitarian action 
being “highly political throughout the supply chain, from donations to 
distribution in the field” and an environment in which it is “quite difficult to 
maintain and protect a so-called humanitarian space in which humanitarians 
can do their relief job independently from outside pressures” (Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove 2009b: 10). Consequently it is a big challenge to 
depoliticize humanitarian space (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2004: 447). 
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• Speed: The abovementioned urgency requires a very short lead time. Thus its 
reduction is an important goal of humanitarian actors. As there are different 
types of agencies with different organizational structures the individual 
response time varies. Kovacs and Spens state that “national chapters are thus 
involved in the first wave of relief in the immediate response phase[…]while 
agencies with no presence in the affected country need to wait to be officially 
invited in order to enter the country” (Kovacs and Spens 2009: 511). In this 
matter aid agencies supposedly can learn a lot from private business due to 
the latter’s manifold experiences in supply chain operations (Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove 2009b: 11).    
 
Characteristics of humanitarian supply chains are ambiguous objectives, limited 
resources, high uncertainty, urgency, politicized environment, and speed. 
 
Figure 31: Characteristics of the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
Additionally communication25 is an important issue not mentioned above. 
According to the crisis lifecycle there is a development from time-sensitive to 
routine operations. McGuire speaks of a cycle “from independent, simple, 
effective standalone and paper-based (emergency phase) to public, complex, 
efficient, integrated and electronic (development phase) communication and 
information infrastructure” (2006: 135). Eventually it also has to be said that the 
‘last-mile’ of relief is usually gone by local partners of international NGOs. 
Thomas and Kopczak state that “in most cases, it is these partners closest to the 
affected population and of the same culture that provide the relief services to the 
affected populations” (2005: 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 “Exchange of information with a value statement equals communication.” (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 119) 
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Situation Analysis 
Following Auf der Heide a proper situation analysis requires the elaboration of 
present conditions, expected conditions and the impact of expected conditions 
(1989: 117-118).  
 
• Present conditions are defined by Auf der Heide as important information 
with regard to “location and severity of damage; existing threats (fires, 
explosions, chemical spills…); numbers, locations, types, and severities 
of[…]victims” (1989: 117). Similarly Mayr argues that “essential information 
include an estimation on the actual size of the disaster, the number of affected 
persons, their dispersion, data on the logistics infrastructure and basic country 
data” (Mayr 2006: 41). 
 
• Expected conditions are influenced by and estimated with help of factors like 
“rate of fire spread; rate of river rise; seismic aftershocks; tsunami (tidal 
wave) or seiche (earthquake-generated wave in a lake or other closed body of 
water); hazardous spills due to earthquake; duration of the incident; weather 
influences; and downed power lines after storms” (Auf der Heide 1989: 118). 
 
• Impact of expected conditions: it manifests itself in need for “evacuation 
areas; public shelter and feeding…need for replacement personnel and 
reinforcements; need for feeding, sleeping, and sanitation facilities; need for 
fuel; and vehicle and equipment maintenance or replacement” (Auf der Heide 
1989: 118). The need for feeding, for instance, is calculated by multiplying 
the estimated number of nutrition-lacking persons with specific ration sizes 
which are based on “a) norms by WFP, b) logistical reasons and c) reasons of 
food aid history of the agency” (Feldbrügge 2001: 141)26. In addition 
humanitarian actors must respect the documentation and labelling 
requirements of recipient countries. Long and Wood mention that “Ethiopia 
                                                 
26
 To avoid fraud even “non-nutrition related aspects such as possible selling of food rations are included 
into the determination of ration sizes” (Feldbrügge 2001: 142). 
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required a certificate of nonradioactivity after the Chernobyl incident. 
Moslem nations sometimes require proof that cargo meets their religious 
standards: no pork or alcohol in the shipment” (1995: 225). Thus an effective 
crisis response “requires an understanding of context – particularly the socio-
economics of affected communities” (Mayr 2006: 41).  
 
Situation analysis identifies present conditions, expected conditions and the 
impact of expected conditions. 
 
Figure 32: Situation Analysis 
 
Resource Analysis  
After the situation is assessed, this type of analysis takes place. In our example 
mentioned above – the need for nutrition – the humanitarian actors in question 
now have to scrutinise food providers and conduct procurement. Based on the 
calculated need – number of persons multiplied with a specific ration size – 
logistics personnel procures the goods and ships them to the recipients. Thereby 
it is important to know “what resources are present and/or assigned, and what 
resources are available” (Auf der Heide 1989: 118) as well as what packaging is 
needed.  
 
Packaging is of utmost importance in humanitarian aid and stands for protection, 
utility, and communication (Robeson and Copacino 1994: 444). Regarding 
protection the World Food Programme (WFP) mentions the ability to mitigate 
respectively eliminate the risk of climatic hazards (humidity, light, 
temperature…), mechanical hazards (handling, transport, sampling…), biological 
hazards (insects, moulds, bacteria…) and other hazards (pilferage, customer 
appeal…) (2003; quoted in Mayr 2006: 51). Utility is another important function. 
Goods whose proportions, weight and materials fit with, inter alia, the 
requirements of trucks, aeroplanes, warehouses and people, directly benefit the 
productivity and efficiency of logistical activities (WFP 2003; quoted in Mayr 
2006: 51). The last function of packaging – communication – provides the proper 
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identification and counting of goods (via name, brand, size, colour or code) as 
well as specific information regarding shipping and storing (WFP 2003; quoted 
in Mayr 2006: 51).  
 
Generally resource sources can be classified as the own organisation, other 
organisations27, donors or - local, regional and international – markets (Mayr 
2006: 46). In addition Mayr gives some insight into the procurement strategy of 
globally active aid agencies: 
 
“Due to their international presence, larger humanitarian organisations do not 
have a fully centralized or decentralized procurement strategy. They rather split 
the procurement function according to the type of relief items.” (2006: 49) 
 
This splitting according to relief items results in frequent centralized purchasing 
of vehicles (plus fleet management and spare parts inventory) and office 
materials due to economies of scale (Mayr 2006: 49). Thereby the demand of 
different projects is pooled in order to enhance buying power. A praxis example 
of this strategy delivers the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, where one National Section is responsible for the 
procurement of non-food items like vehicles for all Member Societies (Mayr 
2006: 50). Decentralised purchasing, on the other hand, is often applied when 
food or other relief-specific needs are required. Therefore goods and services are 
usually faster at the end beneficiaries as well as more adapted to local needs, may 
they be cultural or religious (Mayr 2006: 49). Eventually there is a trend towards 
long lasting relationships as more and more framework agreements and even 
vendor-managed inventory projects are set up (Mayr 2006: 52). This is especially 
valid for humanitarian actors and commercial suppliers. 
 
                                                 
27
 Resources can be bought, borrowed or leased from other humanitarian actors (Mayr 2006: 46), 
depending on the type of resource in question.  
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Resource analysis identifies assigned and available resources as well as what 
packaging is needed. Sources can be classified as the own organisation, other aid 
organisations, donors or - local, regional and international – markets. 
 
Figure 33: Resource Analysis 
 
Means of distribution 
As one can imagine, the means of distribution in humanitarian logistics are 
manifold and include sea, air, rail and road. Typical transport methods include 
vessels, aeroplanes, trains, trucks cars, motorcycles, bicycles and the like. In 
mountainous regions there are often pack animals used to transport goods 
necessary (Long and Wood 1995: 225). In coastal and flooded regions 
amphibious craft is used by aid agencies (Pettit and Beresford 2009: 457). In 
addition it is possible that immediately after a disaster the only transport method 
is by air as roads and harbours may be impassable, non utilizable or even 
destroyed (Bock 2006: 58). Thereby we can distinguish between transport via 
own aeroplanes or helicopters - as the WFP does - or charter, split charter and 
combined shipment (Kummer 2006: 84). Likewise it is important to use airplane 
space efficiently as its capacities are limited (Mayr 2006: 61). Additionally it is 
interesting to notice that containers are of minor importance to humanitarian 
logistics. Wood et al. trace this back “to the fact that containers require special 
infrastructure that is often not present/demolished in disaster-affected countries” 
(Wood et al. 2002; quoted in Mayr 2006: 52).  
 
Personnel 
Generally it has to be said that following a study presented by Oloruntoba and 
Gray only 45 out of 100 logisticians of humanitarian organizations have a 
university degree or any other formal qualification in areas like transport or 
logistics (2003:4; quoted in McGuire 2006: 33). Similarly Pettit and Beresford 
state that “the availability of trained logistics experts to facilitate effective HA 
responses is of paramount importance but there is often a shortage of people who 
have the relevant training” (2009: 459). In addition there is a lack of 
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organizational learning due to an emergency response environment characterised 
by high intensity, high employee turnover and perpetual crisis orientation 
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 6). Thus Pettit and Beresford state that oftentimes 
“the level of logistics expertise within aid agencies is low and those that are 
employed operate some way down the organisational structure” (2009: 459). 
Furthermore there may be a difference between large, usually globally operative 
aid agencies and small, predominantly local ones. Whereas actors like the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the military or the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies have a lot of logistics staff or even a logistics department, small NGOs 
often do not even have personnel exclusively dedicated to logistics (Bock 2006: 
18). 
 
Critical success factors 
The framework of critical success factors (CSF) is obtained from Pettit and 
Beresford (2009: 453-462). These researchers defined strategic planning, 
inventory management, transport and capacity planning, information 
management and technology utilisation, human resource management, 
continuous improvement and collaboration and supply chain strategy as essential 
for a well-conducted emergency operation. These CSF are now briefly presented. 
 
• Strategic planning: A successful humanitarian aid operation in every aspect 
requires strategic planning. Thereby it must be long-term oriented and located 
at the highest level of an organisation, namely senior management (Pettit and 
Beresford 2009: 453). Following Pettit and Beresford strategic planning 
should include “corporate strategy (e.g. transport and warehousing), location 
of distribution centers (e.g. centralised or localised), outsourcing of non-core 
activities, the size of the business and budgets, acquiring capital, deployment 
of resources and the effective use of the organisations skills” (2009: 455). In 
addition they state that “the strategic sourcing and centralised purchasing of 
aid will also be fundamental to successful delivery” (2009: 455). 
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• Inventory management: Urgency is what makes humanitarian inventory 
management special. “The time values of commodities are much greater than 
the inventory carrying costs” (Long and Wood 1995: 221). Thus the concept 
of pre-positioning is of utmost importance and humanitarian depots are often 
set up near areas where crises regularly occur (Pettit and Beresford 2009: 456; 
Balcik and Beamon 2008; quoted in Kovacs and Spens 2009: 509)28. These 
strategically located warehouses reduce lead time. Usually - the UN 
Humanitarian Resource Depot Network being an exemption - humanitarian 
actors run their own networks (Roh et al. 2008; quoted in Pettit and Beresford 
2009: 456) and thus cause a certain duplication of efforts.  
 
• Transport and capacity planning addresses means of distribution, “utilisation 
of capacity, scheduling, and maintenance in such circumstances” (Pettit and 
Beresford 2009: 457). In addition the mapping of logistical infrastructure is 
very important. Kovacs and Spens even mention the construction of transport 
infrastructure as part of disaster relief and list road constructions by UNJLC 
in South Sudan as example (2009: 509).  
 
• Information management and technology utilisation are essential to 
humanitarian aid. Following Long information systems are “arguably the 
single most important factor in determining the success of an emergency 
logistical operation” (1997: 27-28). An example of a decision support system 
would be the International Food Aid Information System developed by the 
WFP that “tracks movements of food aid, including origin, destination and 
stockpiles, traffic lanes, and logistical infrastructure used” (Long and Wood 
1995: 217). 
 
• Human resource management is another topic of extraordinary importance. It 
tackles the problems elaborated above (in the personnel section) by goal-
                                                 
28
 Thus “in a multi-echelon supply network the inventory control policy of the most downstream stock 
needs to be given the greatest attention as it generates the demand signal for the supply network and any 
distortion will adversely affect all of its upstream tiers” (McGuire 2006: 153).    
 59 
oriented qualification schemes for employees. Furthermore it lays the 
institutional foundations for knowledge sharing of personnel and thus 
organizational learning.  
 
• Continuous improvement and collaboration deals with issues like intra- and 
interorganizational cooperation or organizational learning. In general, 
“disasters often create the need for different organizations to share resources 
(personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and facilities)” (Auf der Heide 
1989: 63) and knowledge. It is an integral part of pool sharing and thus 
elaborated in chapter four.   
 
• Supply chain strategy constitutes the conceptual framework of humanitarian 
logistics and is the advocate of the other critical success factors described 
above. In today’s literature researchers demand a proper supply chain strategy 
to be consumer-oriented, agile and lean (Pettit and Beresford 2009: 462). 
 
At the end of the subchapter General Structure – after we have defined 
humanitarian logistics, and described its characteristics and analysed its activities 
- it has to be mentioned that this holistic view of logistics is still new. It was not 
until recently that aid agencies’ view of logistics centred on procurement. 
Chomilier, Samii and Van Wassenhove state: 
 
“Traditionally IFRC's logistics and resource mobilisation unit's activities were 
centred on the purchasing function. Over recent years, however, the role of the 
unit expanded to include all relevant supply chain activities from planning and 
warehouse management to training and reporting” (2003: 15). 
  
What remains, though, is insufficient coordination and cooperation between 
humanitarian actors. This problem is addressed in the following subchapter 3.5.2. 
-  The fundamental problem of humanitarian logistics. 
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3.5.2. The Fundamental Problem of Humanitarian Logistics  
As it is today, humanitarian logistics will be an important topic in the future. 
Thereby the big challenge is to close the gap between tomorrow’s crisis 
requirements – following Thomas and Kopczak “both natural and man-made 
disasters are expected to increase another five-fold over the next fifty years” 
(2005: 1) – and a state of humanitarian logistics that researchers compare to the 
commercial counterpart in the midst of the 1980s (Rickard 2003: 9; Thomas and 
Kopczak 2005: 7; Van Wassenhove 2005: 476). This part of the thesis elaborates 
why the assumption that humanitarian actors are cooperative by definition does 
not hold ground (Van Wassenhove 2005: 483). Significantly are two statements 
of McGuire and Long and Wood:   
 
“Generally, a striking gap can be noted between academic literature, which rarely 
considers supply chain management of humanitarian assistance goods and 
humanitarian organizations, which rarely consider commercial supply chain 
management concepts which are well established in academic literature.” (2006: 
11)  
 
“Ironically, interorganizational relations are usually a challenge to the relief 
effort instead of a source of support. Each organization has its own operating 
methods and goals, and it is only with great effort that they coordinate their plans 
and share resources.” (1995: 216) 
 
This subchapter deals with problems of humanitarian actors – such as NGOs or 
the UN – to coordinate and cooperate in crisis relief. It starts with the lack of 
supply chain thinking in the humanitarian world and describes the coordination 
and cooperation problems on a general level (3.5.2.1). Then in 3.5.2.2 the origins 
of this situation are elaborated. Section 3.5.2.3 follows with diverse country 
examples that should illustrate the abovementioned problems on a practical level. 
The subchapter closes with a presentation of recent developments in this matter 
(3.5.2.4) and thus constitutes the optimal transfer to the pool sharing concept in 
chapter four.  
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3.5.2.1. An Organizational Coordination and Cooperation Problem 
As indicated in the statement of McGuire today’s humanitarian actors lack 
supply chain thinking. Private business already converted logistics “from a 
peripheral to a strategic” function (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 6). Hence Pettit 
and Beresford – based on Power et al. 2003 – argue that “collaboration29 is seen 
as being a key differentiator in supply chain best practice and in achieving 
integration and efficiency in logistics networks” (2009: 461). Actors in aid – on 
the other side - usually lack a certain holistic and continuous improvement 
perspective to fulfil end customer’s30 demand (Power et al. 2001; quoted in Pettit 
and Beresford 2009: 460). Consequently research of Thomas and Kopczak has 
evidenced the common assumption that only a very limited number of 
humanitarian agencies use the abovementioned approach in order to conduct 
outstanding logistical operations (2005: 1). This is especially true with regard to 
information technology as aid agencies still rely on a lot of manual processes in 
their logistical operations (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 6). Thomas and Kopczak 
state:       
 
“The inability of IT staff at headquarters to understand the imperatives of the 
field, the primacy of financial managers in decisions about software used in 
organizations, and the need to keep networks secure are the main reasons that 
humanitarian logisticians cite as the cause of the slow evolution of IT.” (2005: 6)  
 
Similarly argues Gustavsson who mentions that “very little capital[…]has been 
invested in the development and implementation of modern management 
information systems (MIS), information technology (IT) or logistics systems” 
(2003: 7). Furthermore – as mentioned in 3.4 - the humanitarian sector lacks any 
industry standard with regard to IT, a fact that not only tackles the own 
organization, but also cooperation with other actors in the field (Gustavsson 
2003: 7). This all leads to a type of cooperation that manifests itself only after a 
crisis unfolds (Pettit and Beresford 2009: 461).  
 
                                                 
29
 Collaboration is a synonym for cooperation.  
30
 In humanitarian logistics this end consumer is usually called end beneficiary.  
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Hence we can state that there is a coordination and cooperation problem in the 
humanitarian world. As we know, best practices of the private sector have not 
made their way into the humanitarian one. Now it would be of interest how these 
problems manifest themselves. They do this in a lack of joint information, joint 
logistics training, joint media relations, joint assessment as well as joint use of 
space in aeroplanes or trucks, and joint personnel. Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove, for instance, conducted a study and came to the conclusion that 
“there is a lack of peer collaboration to jointly address the media” (2009b: 108) 
as well as no information sharing regarding cargo consolidation (2009b: 126). 
Thus aid agencies often miss important economies of scale as they use less-than-
truckload capacity. Stephenson explains this by the observation that the involved 
actors show de-central structures and usually are driven by the fierce desire to be 
independent of other agencies (2005; quoted in Oloruntoba and Gray 2009: 496). 
What is also characteristic is the occurrence of individual attempts to get through 
customs clearance, a phenomenon recorded by Kovacs and Spens in Ghana 
(2009: 518). With regard to the lack of joint assessment Auf der Heide states: 
 
“When assessment of the disaster situation is carried out, it is generally done 
independently by a number of individual organizations. Often each agency limits 
its assessment to those observations of direct consequence to that particular 
organization. In many cases, the information obtained by these individual 
organizations is not shared or pooled.” (1989: 63) 
 
Similar to Wenger, Quarantelli and Dynes (1986: 24-33) Auf der Heide reports 
about the outcome of these coordination failures:  
 
“Without this coordination, resources may not be shared or distributed according 
to need. Disaster-related activities, such as search and rescue, traffic control, 
medical care, and transportation of casualties, may be carried out in a loosely 
structured, spontaneous manner, with insufficient communication and control. 
The result can be duplication of efforts, omission of essential tasks, and even 
counterproductive activity.” (1989:74) 
 
Proper planning and conduction of emergency responses thus needs an inter-
organizational perspective that is “tied to resources, and is known and accepted 
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by the participants” (Auf der Heide 1989: 35). Following Auf der Heide a 
systems perspective is required (1989: 39). A prerequisite for this approach with 
manifold names (inter-organizational-, systems- and supply chain perspective) is 
inter-actor communication. Thereby the focus is on both communication 
hardware and communication procedures (Auf der Heide 1989: 64). Ideally 
“persons having information[…]know who needs it[…]how to get it there[…]use 
mutually understood terminology” (Auf der Heide 1989: 64).  
 
Humanitarian actors lack supply chain thought and practice. But emergency 
responses need an inter-organizational perspective. 
 
Figure 34: Lack of Supply Chain Thought and Practice 
 
3.5.2.2. Origins 
After this general description of coordination and cooperation problems it is 
opportune to state some reasons behind them, the most important being the 
characteristics of humanitarian supply chains. They are the reason behind an 
“industry” that is fragmented and characterised by an extraordinarily high 
number of unclear linkages between actors (Kovacs and Spens 2007: 107). 
Kovacs and Spens put it like that:  
 
“Yet the mere knowledge of which other humanitarian organizations are present 
in a region poses a challenge to humanitarian logisticians. Regional maps of 
organizational presence have been developed for development aid, but who will 
respond to a particular sudden-onset disaster is less clear[…]Relating back to the 
phases of disaster relief, the question in the humanitarian aid supply network is 
not only which other organizations are present, but also in which of the phases of 
relief they are present.” (2009: 512) 
  
It seems that because of the ubiquitous uncertainty and unpredictability of crises, 
the resulting high employee-turnover rates31, few organizational learning, the 
lack of regulation (services, IT) and the use of obsolete working methods (e.g. 
certain manual processes) humanitarian agencies do not work as efficient and 
                                                 
31
 Regarding logistics field personnel Thomas and Kopczak speak of up to 80% (2005: 6). 
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effective as possible (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 1). Other reasons may be time 
pressure – often resulting in congestions of hubs – or inadequate competitive 
behaviour – frequently the trigger of commodity and service price rises in the 
affected region (Thomas 2003: 6). Besides these fundamental challenges there 
are also home-grown failures: 
 
“At their creation, the UN agencies lacked an effective mechanism to foster inter-
agency dialogue or help coordinate operations, let alone a mechanism that could 
break down the silos that existed in field operations. Coordination, as such, 
became an orphan issue in the humanitarian system, leading to substantial 
inefficiencies, including the wasteful duplication of efforts.” (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 66) 
 
In addition necessary homework with regard to complementarities is not done 
within the humanitarian sector. Even if today’s aid agencies are aware of the fact 
that project A influences project B, “much cost data that would be needed for 
valuing trade-offs between several potential projects is not collected” 
(Feldbrügge 2001: 84). Eventually these fundamental constraints have found 
their expression in the manifold logistics practices of humanitarian actors. 
Already in the 1980s aid agencies have developed their own frameworks, 
manuals and software (Beamon and Kotleba 2006a: 188). Examples would be the 
Pan American Health Organization (Humanitarian Supply Management and 
Logistics in the Health Sector) and Médecins Sans Frontières (Freight and 
Transport Management, Logistic Guideline with a focus on the cold chain; and 
Warehouse and Stock Management, Logistic Guideline with a focus on storage) 
(Beamon and Kotleba 2006a: 188-189). All these works have their merits – but 
they are rather organization-specific and thus always just the second-best 
solution for the end beneficiaries.  
 
The fundamental characteristics of humanitarian logistics and home-grown 
failures of aid agencies lead to emergency responses that are not effective and 
efficient as possible.  
 
Figure 35: Origins of the Fundamental Coordination and Cooperation Problem 
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3.5.2.3. Country Examples 
This section now introduces some country examples. Thereby the ones of the 
Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and Angola will be very brief and 
presented in statements. The description of the 2004 Asian Tsunami emergency 
response, on the other side, will be elaborated in more, but reasonable detail. The 
main cause for the latter is on the one side that the tsunami was a disaster of 
extraordinary magnitude that even aggravated coordination and cooperation 
problems of actors and - on the other side – the very good documentation of the 
relief efforts by researchers as Fritz Institute (2005a), Mashni et al. (2005), Van 
Wassenhove (2005), Trunick (2005), Lipok (2007) and Perry (2007).    
 
Central African Republic 
The drought in the Central African Republic was already mentioned in 
subchapter 3.4.2.4. Lanzer, a senior UN official in CAR, reports:  
 
“By the first quarter of 2008, aid agencies had carried out some 200 different 
assessments in the northwest and northeast of the country. A mass of information 
existed, but much of it was disconnected or difficult to process. There was no 
database or baseline to speak of, and the government’s ability to monitor the 
situation – for example, via disease surveillance systems – was very weak.” 
(2008: 109) 
 
Mozambique 
For the emergency response in Mozambique’s 1998 flooding Feldbrügge stated 
in his 2001 dissertation Economics of emergency relief management in 
developing countries: 
  
“For example, one staff member felt uncomfortable with unclear orders of how to 
distribute the food aid and delayed its provision. A major information problem 
stated was the missing clarity on distribution procedures and registration of 
beneficiaries.” (2001: 123)  
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Angola 
Angola’s 1998 drought emergency response showed coordination and 
cooperation problems of two of the world’s biggest humanitarian actors, namely 
the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (DWHH) 
or German Agro Action. The decision-basis and decision-procedures regarding 
the granting of nutrition relief considerably differed and led to a situation where 
the nutrition-provider (WFP) decided not to grant relief as immediate needs were 
questionable. Feldbrügge reports: 
 
“In the case of the drought relief, the relief agency’s32 information – derived from 
experience, personal communication with local key informants and direct 
observation – differed from the formalised information collection by WFP and 
did not meet their information needs. On the other hand, WFP’s procedures of 
data collection (random sampling) were not well communicated to the 
emergency agency.” (2001: 143) 
 
Consequently the WFP denied supply, a fact that leads Feldbrügge to the 
following consideration: 
 
“If it is assumed that the drought had a major nutritional impact, then the costs of 
not collecting data (in the specified and requested form) consisted in the 
consequences of non-delivery of food aid by WFP to DWHH. The costs would 
then include the impact of acute under-provision of food, probably even acute 
malnutrition, in particular of children, and potentially the increased child 
mortality. These costs[…]could potentially be very high and their integration 
could greatly change a decision[….]WFP took the suspicious side of a principal 
that seeks control.” (2001: 144-145) 
 
2004 South-East-Asian Tsunami 
Due to the sheer magnitude of the natural disaster, coordination problems were 
more obviously evidenced. Needs assessment and planning, for instance, were 
insufficient – a fact that hindered a proper emergency response (Fritz Institute: 
2005b; quoted in Pettit and Beresford 2009: 455; Beresford and Pettit: 2005: 
329). Pettit and Beresford, for example, speak of “considerable inter-agency 
‘squabbling’” in the immediate post-disaster phase (2009: 461). A possible 
                                                 
32
 DWHH or German Agro Action 
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reason behind these coordination problems might be the organizational structure 
of humanitarian actors. Many of them are organised in a multi-country network. 
Thus first coordination efforts are geared towards its own network rather than 
towards other actors on the scene. Perry reports: 
 
“Owing mainly to the magnitude of the tsunami damage and relief requirements, 
some of the responding organizations experienced an initial delay in involvement 
in the relief effort while they obtained information, determined priorities, 
negotiated with global parts of their networks and obtained appropriate 
supplies.[…]Following such initial delays, it is apparent that poor coordination 
amongst different parties was a major obstacle during the tsunami disaster.” 
(2007: 421) 
 
An additional observation comes from Thomas and Kopczak who revealed in 
their survey of big humanitarian organizations that in 42% of the cases no 
logistician was part of the needs assessment team and that this lack of logistical 
perspectives results in situations where “some of the logistics bottlenecks are not 
anticipated and planned for causing unnecessary delays in delivering relief” 
(2005: 5). Another finding of this study is the lack of skilled logistics personnel 
in the emergency response triggered by the 2004 tsunami. Thomas and Kopczak:    
 
“Also, as the operations of international humanitarian organizations expand to 
simultaneously include multiple geographies, organizations are struggling to find 
people who can manage the complex supply chains of relief. For example, in 
order to effectively respond to the Tsunami, 88% of large aid agencies surveyed 
had to pull their most qualified staff from the ongoing humanitarian operations in 
Darfur.” (2005: 5) 
 
In 42% of the cases no logistician was part of the needs assessment team. 88% of 
aid agencies had to temporarily withdraw senior logisticians from ongoing 
missions in Sudan in order to meet demands. 
 
Figure 36: Tsunami Crisis Relief: Lack of Logistics Expertise 
 
The abovementioned lack of logistics personnel addresses a quantitative 
problem. As the 2004 South-East-Asian tsunami was an extraordinarily big 
disaster, one might speak of a temporary problem rather than of a constant one. 
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Anyway, other findings of Thomas and Kopczak’s study are qualitative ones and 
thus hold true for every crisis response. Regarding the use of software in 
operations they report that only 26% of the responding organizations used 
tracking and tracing programs, whereas the big majority still worked with Excel 
spreadsheets and/or manual records (2005: 6)33. Another qualitative problem is a 
general lack of sense of coordination and cooperation. Following Thomas and 
Kopczak “just over half the logisticians (56%) reported working with other 
agencies in setting up their supply chains” (2005: 6). Thereby the roots of this 
problem can be found long before an actual relief effort. In this so-called 
preparedness phase the tendency of humanitarian actors to work on their own is 
even stronger. Thomas and Kopczak state:  
 
“For example, we found that several of them were thinking of deploying a 
regional warehouse structure for faster response. Coincidentally, three were 
actually talking with warehouse providers in the same city. Similarly, two others 
had commissioned expensive analyses to select a fleet management system and 
three were wrestling with the idea of a training program for field logisticians. 
None knew that their counterparts had the same objectives and, therefore, there 
was little collaboration or resource sharing.” (2005: 6) 
 
Only 56% of the logisticians involved in the Tsunami response worked together 
with other organizations’ crew. Only 26% use tracking & tracing programs. 
 
Figure 37: Tsunami Crisis Relief: Lack of Cooperation and Use of Technology 
 
In certain places of the tsunami relief effort this behaviour even culminated in a 
veritable chaos. An example would be Sumatra, where far too many actors 
intended to start operations. The result of that lack of regulation of both the 
Indonesian government and the UN was ensued chaos (Van Wassenhove 2005: 
486). Information dissemination was a problem, especially in the severely 
affected province of Banda Aceh. Hubs were blockaded, warehouse space 
                                                 
33
 Thomas and Kopczak also speak of 58% of respondents stating that “they received accurate and timely 
information of what was in the pipeline”, but do not reveal the allocation between T&T software users 
and ‘old-school’ users (2005: 6). 
 
 69 
occupied by the false goods and the like. In addition many efforts were 
undertaken twice like the needs assessment for a specific region (Lipok 2007: 
78). On the other side, Perry speaks of “incoming agencies arriving at ‘hotspot’ 
locations across Southeast Asia were basing their initial assessments on 
uninformed guesses” (2007: 421). It is likely that organizations found themselves 
in a situation with manifold needs assessments for region A, but not even one for 
region B. Eventually one very positive aspect of the relief efforts should be 
mentioned, namely the quick setting up of internet-based communication 
structures. Pettit and Beresford state:    
 
“During the early stages of the Asian Tsunami response, 83 percent of 
organisations communicated by cellular or satellite phone and it was not until a 
week into the crisis that 50 percent were using e-mail systems”. (2009: 459) 
 
3.5.2.4. The Way to Pool Sharing 
As research has shown the cooperation of different humanitarian actors – on the 
executive as well as one the field level - is of utmost importance for proper 
emergency relief (Kovacs and Spens 2007: 109; Kovacs and Spens 2009: 512). 
Anyway, as our examples in this subchapter have revealed, the degree of actual 
cooperation is low. The characteristics of humanitarian logistics and some 
historical origins may be the case for this. But research also shows a tendency 
towards management improvement and professionalization which constitute a 
basis for working together. Lewis, for instance, attaches development NGOs a 
strong interest “to improve management practices both within their 
agencies[…]and in the relationships which they pursue with other development 
actors” (2007: 23). Similar findings come from Mashni et al. who showed strong 
collaboration intentions of well-known NGOs in their multi-agency reports 
(2005; quoted in Perry 2007: 415). Manifestations of these intentions were 
recorded by Appel who reports that there is a trend in the British NGO sector to 
strategically cooperate with each other respectively with government institutions 
and companies (2009: 114). Tomasini and Van Wassenhove come to the same 
conclusion and add supply chain management as best practice to achieve high 
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performance in humanitarian logistics (2009b: 1). Pooling resources is an 
important aspect of this supply chain perspective. Also in that sense, research 
records agency initiatives “to pool resources, prevent operational overlap and 
boost efficiency” (Fenton 2003: 24). A minor step towards this goal would be, 
for example, the joint use of UN warehouses by UN organizations, NGOs and 
other humanitarian actors in Ghana (Kovacs and Spens 2009: 518). A major step 
in this direction may be ‘transport asset coordinating platforms’ like the United 
Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) (Oloruntoba and Gray 2009: 496), 
further elaborated in chapter four.  
 
Regarding the handbooks mentioned in the origins section, it can be argued that 
major institutions like the PAHO and the UNDP now ask for more 
standardization, a situation that has led to more comprehensive publications like 
Davis and Lambert’ Engineering in Emergencies, A Practical Guide for Relief 
Workers (2002), and the Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA/AID)’ Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessments and Response 
(Beamon and Kotleba 2006a: 189). In addition minimum standards have been 
developed by Sphere Project and Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA). 
 
There is a tendency towards management improvement and professionalization 
which constitutes a basis for working together. Pooling resources is an important 
aspect of this perspective. 
 
Figure 38: Recent Developments in Humanitarian Logistics 
 
At the beginning we have outlined that the state of humanitarian logistics 
resemblances the state of commercial logistics in the 1980s. Thus it could be 
possible that the humanitarian sector will undergo the same changes the private 
sector has experienced: more cooperation, more outsourcing, and more 
concentration on core competencies. Whereas the latter two are not addressed by 
this thesis, cooperation is its heart and further elaborated in the following 
chapters. The next chapter is about pool sharing, the sharing of capacity in any 
form like information, personnel, equipment and the like. 
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4. Pool Sharing  
This constitutes an attempt to define pool sharing of civil actors. Thereby it is 
important to state that with ‘civil’ neither private (business) nor public 
(government/military) actors are included. It is called ‘attempt’ as basically there 
is no common definition of it yet. 
 
When we talk about humanitarian actors in the remainder of this thesis always 
civil actors are meant. The same is valid for pool sharing – only pool sharing of 
civil actors is addressed in the following chapters.   
 
Figure 39: Limitation on Pool Sharing of Civil Actors 
 
Pool sharing addresses the influence sphere of an organization and belongs to the 
general term cooperation which delineates a “joint operation or action” 
(Princeton University 2009)34. Cooperation usually involves the sharing of 
capacity like information, human resources, inventory space, distribution, and 
relief goods and equipment. The term pool sharing should fulfil two purposes. 
On the one side it indicates a form of cooperation where capacity is always 
shared in some form and on the other side the word ‘pool’ stands for capacity 
that is available to all members of that pool.  
 
Pool sharing is the capability of pool members to share capacity in any form like 
information, human resources, inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and 
equipment.  
 
Figure 40: Definition of Pool Sharing 
 
This should guarantee a distinction to cooperation in general. Whereas actions 
like joint fundraising or joint training centres for staff belong to cooperation, they 
do not directly constitute pool sharing. Pool sharing rather provides the 
fundamental structure on which these activities are based upon. In our case of 
                                                 
34
 Another definition would be: “Collaboration is when knowledge is equally shared and the parties are 
able to align their incentives to produce action.” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 120) As 
mentioned before collaboration is a synonym for cooperation. 
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joint training centres it is the shared capacity of information, personnel and space 
that constitutes the basis for joint action. Nevertheless, when we speak of pool 
sharing these activities will always be mentioned as they constitute this concept’s 
outcome. Scrutinising pool sharing from an entrepreneurial perspective it could 
be seen a process rather than a product innovation.    
 
Pool sharing can be seen as process innovation and is the fundamental structure 
on which joint activities are based. 
 
Figure 41: Pool Sharing as Process Innovation 
 
Up-to-now this topic is scarcely researched and hence no works exist about a 
specific type of pool sharing like a relief goods pool or an equipment pool. 
Consequently there is hardly any information about system specifics, standards 
or a pool regulator. Similarly this thesis follows an explanatory approach to pool 
sharing. In 4.1 thoughts about and types of cooperation as well as pool sharing 
approaches with regard to information, human resources, inventory space, 
distribution, and relief goods and equipment are presented. In 4.2 practical 
examples of institutions that apply the pool sharing concept – namely the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United 
Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the Humanitarian Logistics 
Association (HLA) - are introduced to the reader. The remaining chapters deal 
with pool sharing on a very general basis. Subchapter 4.3 deals with the costs and 
4.4 with the benefits of pool sharing. The latter are categorised into decrease of 
costs, decrease of risk, increase of service level, and increase of income. 4.5 
names obstacles to pool sharing that fall into categories like donor orientation, 
competition, organizational culture, and lack of strategic thinking. 
 
4.1. Pool Sharing of Civil Actors 
The subchapter deals with thoughts on cooperation and five areas of pool sharing 
that mirror the types of capacity mentioned above: information, human resources, 
inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and equipment. Thereby general 
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thoughts are subdivided into the sections Why do organizations cooperate?, 
levels of cooperation, and fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship.   
 
4.1.1. Why do Organizations Cooperate? 
Cooperation - joint operation or action (Princeton University 2009) – stems out 
of a certain relationship between actors. Before defining this relationship (section 
fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship) it is opportune to explain the 
reasons behind cooperation, namely interdependence, supply chain management 
and donor requirements. Interdependence is a very important issue. It denotes 
that humanitarian actors are dependent on others with regard to capacity or 
specialisation. McGuire states with regard to complex emergencies:     
 
“Finally, the scope of many complex political emergencies clearly exceeds the 
capacity, resources and expertise of any single humanitarian organization. The 
increasing complexity of humanitarian assistance and developed technologies 
encourages specialization by humanitarian organizations on certain services. This 
in turn requires coordination and cooperation with other humanitarian 
organizations to provide people in need with the whole range of required goods 
and services.” (2006: 27) 
 
Capacity problems have their origins in the ever-increasing number of crises. At 
the end of September 2009, for instance, three large natural disasters occurred in 
South East Asia within a couple of days35. Thomas and Kopczak state: 
 
“Two main external factors impinge on the growth and operations of 
international humanitarian relief organizations. First, the number of disasters and 
the number of simultaneous operations around the world are increasing, 
stretching the existing resources of the humanitarian community. It is clear that 
the sector as a whole has to find ways to become more efficient in order to be 
able to respond to the needs of ever-increasing numbers of people.” (2005: 4)  
 
The World Food Programme (WFP), for example, delegates distribution often to 
other UN organizations, NGOs or government institutions (Mayr 2006: 38). The 
other factor that creates interdependence is specialisation. Due to their origins 
                                                 
35
 A typhoon hit the Philippines, a tsunami the island of Samoa and an earthquake hit Indonesia (Sumatra) 
 74 
humanitarian actors are usually specialised in “different types of disasters, relief 
phases, or items they deliver” (Kovacs and Spens 2009: 519). The WFP, for 
instance, is specialized in providing nutrition, whereas Medicines Sans Frontières 
have their core competence in providing basic healthcare services and goods. 
Similarly within the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) there are member societies specialised in specific areas. The 
Austrian Red Cross, for example, in international disaster relief regularly deals 
with water & sanitation, telecommunications and search & rescue (Lipok 2007: 
47). Within the IFRC these special tasks are standardised and thus a Finnish field 
hospital fits with an Austrian drinking water purification station 
(Österreichisches Rotes Kreuz 2005; quoted in Lipok 2007: 54). These 
specialisations may lead to a situation of ‘sequential interdependence’ in which 
one agency’s capacity to fulfil its assigned mission depends on another agency’s 
execution of a prior mission (Drabek 1986: 178; quoted in Auf der Heide 1989: 
123). 
 
The next influence factor of humanitarian cooperation is supply chain 
management. As already mentioned in 3.5.1 General structure of humanitarian 
logistics, today’s state of humanitarian logistics shows parallels with the one of 
commercial logistics 20 years ago. Parker states:          
 
“Increasingly a world with fewer boundaries calls for organizations able to 
transcend vertical and horizontal boundaries and create hybrids that are both cost 
effective and responsible to local, regional, domestic, international and global 
communities of interest.” (Parker 1998: x; quoted in Lewis 2007: 132) 
 
These fewer boundaries combined with a higher number of crises and NGOs 
“have highlighted the need for NGOs to coordinate more effectively with each 
other” (Lewis 2007: 183). The supply chain perspective is likely to get 
momentum in present times. Managers of humanitarian organizations thereby 
study authors like Bowersox, Closs and Cooper who state: 
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“Supply chain management consists of firms collaborating to leverage strategic 
positioning and to improve operating efficiency. For each firm involved, the 
supply chain relationship reflects a strategic choice.” (2007: 4) 
 
The supply chain perspective increases the pressure on aid agencies to cooperate. 
Oxfam’s former head of logistics, Donald Chaikin, states:     
 
“Even in unexpected emergencies, Oxfam can activate charter flights within 24 
hours and get emergency equipment from its warehouse near Oxford to any 
location within 2-3 days. If necessary, however, could agencies make use of the 
prepositioning units of WFP, IFRC and World Vision, for example?” (2003: 10) 
 
Chaikin describes the fundamental idea behind cooperation in a supply chain 
sense: You can share investment costs and operating costs, thus decrease the cost 
of each NGO while enhancing the response’s service level. This new paradigm 
also has influenced the third influence factor, donor requirements. Several supply 
chain studies36 have convinced donors of encouraging aid agencies to cooperate. 
Thomas and Kopczak report: 
 
“Further, donors are becoming less tolerant of obvious and expensive duplication 
of effort and are strongly encouraging aid agencies to collaborate around the 
creation of common services. As a consequence, aid agencies have become more 
aware of the need to strategically use their resources.” (2005: 4) 
 
The importance of donor requirements is further shown in chapter five, 
Conclusion and outlook. 
 
Cooperation is triggered by interdependence, supply chain management and 
donor requirements.  
 
Figure 42: Triggers of Cooperation 
 
                                                 
36
 Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, for example, report that in disaster relief “significant amounts of time 
and resources (sometimes up to 95%) are wasted waiting for goods to arrive on the scene (at customs, in 
warehouses, etc.)” (2009b: 49). 
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4.1.2. Levels of Cooperation  
The now presented classification scheme was created by Koch and helps us to 
understand which benefits organizations address with cooperation. Koch defined 
three levels of cooperation (2009: 130):  
 
• Level 1 cooperation is characterised by high selective benefits for individual 
NGOs, but not for the target group (end beneficiaries). A classic example of 
this level would be cooperation that aims at the funding supply constraint like 
joint fundraising via websites, joint project proposals or joint appeal for 
funding by mechanisms like the United Nations Central Emergency Response 
Fund (CERF). Another example would be joint bargaining respectively 
purchasing where negotiations/orders are conducted for several humanitarian 
actors from a common body. 
 
• Level 2 cooperation stands for general benefits for both individual NGOs and 
the target group. It usually aims at operational quality like joint training 
centres for staff or a mutual quality control system. Koch describes an 
example where “organizations that provide training to individuals may lose 
them to other organizations, but quality rises among all the organizations as a 
group, not just for their own” (2009: 130)37.  
 
• Level 3 cooperation delineates high benefits for the target group, but not for 
the individual NGOs. Activities like the coordination of regional and thematic 
priorities fall into this level. Following Koch “these types of activities are 
good for the target group because the overlap between organizations is 
reduced and resources are more equitably distributed” (2009: 130).   
 
                                                 
37
 Following Koch and Van der Laan a vast majority (90%) of 47 questioned NGOs “claim to benefit 
from personnel that previously worked for another NGO and now work for them” (2007: 8). 
Consequently it is likely that the dynamics of joint training would reinforce cooperation as processes are 
enhanced by the capabilities of more than one single organization. Nevertheless, only 19% of Koch and 
Van der Laans’ sample conducted joint training (2007: 8).   
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In his work Where Do You Get Your Orphans? The Clustering of NGOs in the 
Arusha Region, Tanzania Van Laan conducted a survey of 47 structured 
interviews with local NGOs in the Arusha region of Tanzania. Thereby 69% of 
respondents state to cooperate on level 1, 57% on level 2 and only 9% on level 3 
(2007: 39). These facts and the levels of cooperation in general will be reviewed 
in 4.5.2 Competition. As we will see the degree of agency concentration in a 
specific area constitutes an important influence factor.    
 
4.1.3. Fundamentals of a Pool Sharing Relationship 
Following the author of this thesis pool sharing is characterised by the sharing of 
risk, the free exchange of information and process integration. Thereby these 
characteristics are obtained from literature on partnerships. Lewis, for instance, 
defines risk sharing and free information exchange between cooperating partners 
as prerequisites for efficiency, innovation and creativity as well as for learning 
within the partnership (2007: 185-186). In addition Pettit and Beresford - who 
state continuous improvement and collaboration as a critical success factor of the 
humanitarian aid supply chain - define successful cooperation to be characterised 
by “a vested interest in sharing benefits and costs through process integration” 
(2009: 461-462). Process integration is at the heart of a pool sharing relationship 
as capacity is shared. In the ideal case organization A - which has more inventory 
capacity than needed, but that lacks air assets - and organization B - which has 
more air assets than needed, but is in need of inventory capacity - come together 
to create a pool. Hence pool partner A is able to use air assets from B and B is 
able to use inventory capacity from A. The pool sharing agreement thereby has to 
include the number and characteristics of resources as well as the processes by 
which resources are transferred from resource-owning partners to resource-
inquiring partners. Herborg, for instance, who elaborated similar thoughts for 
crisis management (2001: 27), names heuristics like shortest path algorithms as 
resource allocation procedure (2001: 96).  
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In addition a pool sharing relationship can be temporary – e.g. the first 3-9 
months after a crisis occurs – or stable. Today’s pool sharing relationships like 
the OCHA’s Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC) and the UNJLC are rather 
temporary. Others – like the Humanitarian Logistics Association – have a longer 
time horizon. All these examples are further elaborated in the next subchapter.  
 
Pool sharing is characterised by the sharing of risk, the free exchange of 
information, and process integration. 
 
Figure 43: Fundamentals of a Pool Sharing Relationship 
 
Based on these fundamental requirements – sharing of risk, free exchange of 
information and process integration – pool sharing relationships are characterised 
by a part-standardized organizational structure. This thought is obtained from 
Auf der Heide’s Disaster Response, Principles of Preparation and Coordination 
which deals with the needs of public disaster relief. It is thus analogously seen as 
essential for pool sharing by the author of this thesis. Following Auf der Heide 
“the organizational structure must be adaptable to a wide variety of emergencies 
(i.e., fire, flood, earthquake, rescue)” but simultaneously “must have basic 
common elements in organization, terminology38, and procedures39” (1989: 137). 
Eventually it is opportune to secure a pool sharing relationship with memoranda 
of understanding (MoU) or legally-binding documents.   
 
4.1.4. Information 
This section deals with the sharing of information. Basically it would be correct 
to distinguish between data, information and knowledge. Data is a symbol or fact 
without comment or relational connection (‘It snows’). Information is edited data 
– it has a relational connection and thus meaning like ‘The temperature dropped 
                                                 
38
 An example of standardized terminology constitutes colour-coding for relief goods like red for nutrition 
and blue for clothing (Murray 2005; quoted in Kovacs and Spens 2007: 103). 
39
 Like standard deployment procedures in human resource sharing (Scott-Bowden 2003: 18).  
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under zero degrees and it started to snow’ (Ackoff 1989; quoted in Bellinger, 
Castro and Mills 2004). And information becomes knowledge “when know-how 
and staff expertise have been used to interpret it and make decisions” (Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 120). Hence knowledge is the meaningful 
collection of information (Ackoff 1989; quoted in Bellinger, Castro, and Mills 
2004). In our example it would be ‘In the mountains due to cold temperatures 
precipitation occurs in the form of snow’ (Birkeland and Mock 1996).  
 
Type Data Information Knowledge 
Definition Fact without 
relational 
connection 
Fact with 
relational 
connection 
Meaningful 
collection of 
information 
Example ‘It snows’ ‘The temperature 
dropped under 
zero degrees and it 
started to snow’ 
‘In the mountains 
due to cold 
temperatures 
precipitation 
occurs in the form 
of snow’ 
 
Figure 44: Data, Information and Knowledge (based on Bellinger, Castro, and Mills 2004) 
 
However, data, information, and knowledge are subsumed under the term 
information as many authors do not distinguish between them. 
 
Pool sharing of information is the pool partners’ sharing of data, information and 
knowledge. Due to conceptual differences of researchers these types of facts are 
subsumed under the term information.  
 
Figure 45: Pool Sharing of Information 
 
The sharing of information is essential due to the importance of information and 
its network effect. The importance of information is postulated by a lot of 
researchers in the (humanitarian-) field. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove – active 
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in humanitarian logistics research - state that “information is the foundation upon 
which the humanitarian supply chain is designed, formed, and managed” (2009b: 
90). Wood et al. – active in commercial logistics research - call the management 
of information “the single greatest determinant of success” during a crisis 
operation (2002: 394). Similarly argues King with regard to disaster 
management. The researcher argues that the effectiveness of an emergency 
response depends on the velocity with which critical information is elaborated 
and distributed by humanitarian actors (King 2005; quoted in Perry 2007: 412).  
 
The second trigger of information sharing is its network effect. It is common 
sense that coordination and cooperation respectively the prevention of 
duplication of effort rely “on information sharing, knowing who will be involved 
in the disaster response, in what capacity (lead agency, implementing partner, 
inter-agency coordinator, etc.)” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 49). The 
same researchers state that “sharing data is difficult and yet essential” (2009b: 
105). The reasons for these statements address the network effect of information 
sharing. Similar to the division of labour the sharing of information provides a 
surplus value. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove report:     
 
“Knowledge is created not only within the organization, but also between 
organizations as they interact in the field. In fact, the maximum value of 
knowledge is produced only when it is captured and shared among the different 
stakeholders.” (2009b: 115) 
 
The sharing of information is essential due to the importance of information and 
its network effect. 
 
Figure 46: Triggers of Information Sharing 
 
The management discipline that addresses the sharing of information is called 
information management and ought to reduce a supply chain’s uncertainty and 
thus complexity (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009a: 556). Feldbrügge lists: 
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“Information management includes the collection and assessment or 
interpretation of information, decision-making and the dissemination of 
decisions.[…]The basic role of information in emergency relief management 
is[…]problem identification, prioritisation and allocation of relief aid.” (2001: 
64) 
 
In praxis information systems collect data, information, and knowledge with 
regard to - inter alia - country disaster profile, national policies, objectives and 
standards, government disaster structures, other relief organizations, disaster-area 
base-line data (e.g. local food habits, climatic conditions), material and human 
resources to be mobilised in-country, and logistics systems and facilities 
(Feldbrügge 2001: 171-172). The pool sharing principle adds a surplus to this 
information as pool partner 1 profits from information of pool partner 2 and vice 
versa. Basically it can be said that the following approaches to pool sharing start 
where pool sharing of information ends. The latter being a prerequisite for the 
former, cooperation enters a new stage.    
 
4.1.5. Human Resources 
Manifestations of this approach are common projects where persons from 
different agencies come together in order to work on a specific topic, or even the 
sharing of persons in the sense of an agency for temporary work. Whereas the 
former type is about working together on a joint project, the latter is about 
sharing human resources exclusively for an organization’s own purposes. In 
praxis the former type – persons coming together from different actors to work 
on common projects – is the rule. Mashni et al. – for example – postulate multi-
agency human resources solutions that comprise cooperating “centers of 
expertise” made up of logistics experts (2005: xii; quoted in Perry 2007: 413). 
An example of the latter would be the World Food Programme (WFP). To 
augment its logistics performance it uses stand-by partners like governmental 
entities, NGOs or private donors that contribute with cadres of specialists to 
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logistical operations (Scott-Bowden 2003: 18)40. The IFRC runs a similar 
approach with its Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT):  
 
“In order to build and maintain a core pool of about 200 experts from which 
FACT staff can be drawn, IFRC conducts FACT training sessions around the 
world. These sessions aim to impart a consistent methodology and build team 
spirit and a common pool of expertise. The training programmes are supported 
by on-the-job training.” (Chomilier, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 16)  
 
Several organizations profit from a single person’s efforts. 
 
Figure 47: Main Benefit of Pool Sharing of Human Resources 
 
The outcome of pool sharing in human resources can be manifold. An inter-
agency working group of players like the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) created a camp management toolkit that incorporates a holistic 
approach to camp management and is more than just minimum standards 
(Birkeland 2003: 54). A possible project would be the joint generation of a 
transport module in order to enhance standardization and lower costs of handling 
respectively gaining economies of scale. Another would be the joint branding of 
relief goods or the elaboration of a manual that specifies how different means of 
distribution are optimally used. For distribution by air, for instance, this register 
would include specifications and ‘how-to-pile-up-the-plane’ instructions for 
many types of aircraft. The participating organizations could reduce the time 
spent on the loading procedure and thus save costs respectively enhance service 
level.  
 
4.1.6. Inventory Space   
Pool sharing of inventory has already been introduced in fundamentals of a pool 
sharing relationship. It is about sharing storage volume where relief goods and 
                                                 
40
 Examples of these partners would be the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action – with whom WFP worked 
together in Iraq - and CARE Canada – which in Afghanistan kept mountainous supply routes free of 
avalanches (Scott-Bowden 2003: 18).  
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equipment can be stored. Either organizations provide it to other agencies in 
exchange of another form of capacity like distribution or pool partners set up an 
inventory centre together and thus share investment- and operating costs. 
Regarding the former type of inventory pool sharing Bock recommends an online 
platform that allocates free space to other humanitarian actors in a fast and 
efficient way (2006: 57). Whereas this is still unrealized, joint inventory centres 
are already established. The UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in 
Southern Italy, for instance, is commonly operated by the UN, the Italian 
government and diverse partner agencies41 (Mayr 2006: 54). Eventually both 
types of pool sharing reduce costs (e.g. due to simplified customs procedures) 
and make global pre-positioning42 – important with regard to an agency’s 
emergency response time – more reasonable.      
 
4.1.7. Distribution 
Pool sharing of distribution has already been mentioned in fundamentals of a 
pool sharing relationship. It is about sharing distribution capacity in the form of 
free volume in aircrafts, trucks, ships, trains, cars, and the like. With the help of 
this approach excess capacity can be avoided and thus costs reduced respectively 
end beneficiaries faster served. Analogous to the former section it would be 
opportune to set up an information system that works like a distribution capacity 
exchange. Following Bock all major national and international NGOs should be 
part of this exchange that works with resource providers - that state specifics of 
the means of distribution in question like dimensions and suitability – and 
resource enquirers – whose demand is based on specific needs like preservation 
of the cold chain (Bock 2006: 59). 
 
                                                 
41
 In this case also a public actor – the Italian government - forms part of the enterprise. Its actor with 
general responsibility is the WFP (Mayr 2006: 54). The mentioned partner agencies include international 
NGOs like Cooperazione Italiana, WVI (World Vision International), Intersos, the IFRC, and Oxfam as 
well as diverse national NGOs (Mayr 2006: 54-55)   
42
 “Global pre-positioning is a relatively new approach, and currently only a few NGOs can support the 
large expense of operating a warehouse that serves the international community.” (Beamon and Kotleba 
2006b: 4) 
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4.1.8. Relief Goods and Equipment 
Eventually also relief goods and general equipment can be shared. Relief goods 
include a wide variety of products like medicines, shelter materials, nutrition and 
the like. General equipment refers to things like special tools that are necessary 
to set up a camp or repair a generator. The WFP again uses this approach with its 
standby partners that deploy service packages which - inter alia - comprise relief 
goods and equipment (Scott-Bowden 2003: 18). 
 
All these pool sharing approaches are accompanied by the extensive 
development and use of information technology. Thereby it is self-evident that 
investment costs are likely to be shared by pool partners. Eventually it is 
important to mention that the pool sharing concept deals per definition with the 
critical success factors of Pettit and Beresford. These researchers defined 
strategic planning, inventory management, transport and capacity planning, 
information management and technology utilisation, human resource 
management, continuous improvement and collaboration and supply chain 
strategy as essential for a well-conducted emergency operation (2009: 454). All 
these critical success factors are tackled by pool sharing.  
 
4.2. Status Quo – Types of Relationships and Practical Examples 
This subchapter presents an insight into pool sharing praxis. After an 
introduction OCHA, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(4.2.1), UNJLC, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (4.2.2), and the HLA 
– the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) (4.2.3) are introduced to the 
reader. Before switching to these organizations the author would like to illustrate 
the basic context of pool sharing initiatives. As already mentioned in 4.1 (section 
fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship) pool sharing is characterised by the 
sharing of risk, free exchange of information, and process integration. As there is 
neither a specified definition of pool sharing nor a defined framework of its 
characteristics, the author has applied thoughts of business partnership literature 
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as well as his own thoughts on pool sharing in order to close this gap. Pool 
Sharing is defined by the author as being a partnership – a specific form of 
relationship within a supply chain. Thereby the degree of cooperation with regard 
to activities, time horizon, and scope of activities can be very diverse. Activities 
range from longer-term contracts to the exchange of information and even to 
joint planning and supply chain integration (Harrison and Van Hoek 2002: 226). 
The time horizon can be short- or long-term. The scope of activities includes a 
single functional area, multiple functional areas and even the whole functional 
spectrum of the member firms (Harrison and Van Hoek 2002: 226). Regarding 
the establishment of a partnership it is essential to first “determine where the 
most appropriate point along this path is for your relationship with another 
company” (Harrison and Van Hoek 2002: 235). In addition it is important for 
humanitarian actors to make this decision at headquarters in order to be free of 
bias and the short-term perspective commonly applied in ongoing emergency 
responses. 
  
4.2.1. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)  
In this subchapter, structure, tasks and services, as well as a country mission 
(Central African Republic) of the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs are presented. The OCHA is based in Geneva and has the 
mission to coordinate humanitarian relief provided by a high number of actors.  
   
4.2.1.1. Structure 
The OCHA has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and employs an 
estimated 860 people in New York, Geneva, and in the field (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 68). In 2006 its budget was US$ 128 million – thereby the 
regular UN budget accounted for 10 per cent and extra-budgetary sources like 
member states and donor institutions for the remaining 90 per cent of the volume 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 68). OCHA “carries out its coordination 
function primarily through the IASC, which is chaired by the ERC” (Tomasini 
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and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 68). IASC stands for Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee and constitutes a 1992-founded coordination body comprised of 
actors like UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and three international NGO consortia (Lipok 
2007: 33). ERC is the abbreviation of the Emergency Relief Coordinator who 
heads both the IASC and the OCHA and who reports directly to the secretary 
general (OCHA 2009c). Consequently both bodies share a common secretariat 
and the activities of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs are 
triggered by the IASC working group which holds four regular meetings a year 
(Lipok 2007: 33). The head of an OCHA country mission is the Humanitarian 
Coordinator who is the most senior UN official in a country affected by a 
humanitarian crisis and who is instated by the ERC (OCHA 2009c). 
 
4.2.1.2. Tasks and Services 
The main task of OCHA is to coordinate humanitarian relief provided by a high 
number of actors. The two main fundamentals that enable this position are the 
“political support and the recognition of the UN system” (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 66) as well as the fact that the Humanitarian Coordinator is 
– per definition – the most senior UN official in an affected country or region. 
OCHA approaches its objectives by different means. Regarding large scale 
emergencies it works via its Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC). These 
institutions spread information like detailed country maps or NGO contact details 
to all relief-providing actors in order to coordinate regional and thematic 
priorities of aid (Perry 2007: 421). Thereby the time horizon of the specific HIC 
can be short-term (up to nine months) or long-term (up to three years). The 
former is likely when the specific Humanitarian Information Centre deals with 
sudden-onset emergencies like natural disasters. That was the case in Pakistan 
(earthquake), Sri Lanka (tsunami), Indonesia (tsunami) and Myanmar (cyclone) 
(OCHA 2009a). Long-term endeavours – on the other side – usually occur in 
slow-onset crises like complex emergencies. These were recorded in Iraq (war), 
Liberia (civil war) and Sudan (civil war) (OCHA 2009a). 
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OCHA is deployed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and 
coordinates relief provided by a high number of actors. In large scale 
emergencies it works via its Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC). These 
institutions spread information like country maps or NGO contact details to all 
relief-providing actors in order to coordinate regional/thematic priorities of aid. 
 
Figure 48: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Structure, Tasks and 
Services 
 
Besides Humanitarian Information Centres OCHA also triggers respectively 
operates programs that last for an indefinite time. It, for instance, triggered in 
2002 the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) whose main 
objective is the building of government information management capacity and 
that is now primarily operated by other actors like the Afghan government43.  
 
A second example of projects that have a long-lasting effect is the Inter Agency 
Working Group (IAWG) for Central and East Africa. The regional OCHA in 
2002 set up this project which today has more than thirty members including UN 
agencies, the world’s largest NGOs and other international organizations44 
(OCHA 2009b). Its goals comprise regional coordination and information 
exchange, increased understanding of the partner organizations’ roles and 
capacity and the sharing of technical information and best practices (OCHA 
2009b). To achieve this aim the IAWG works in specialized groups, namely 
Logistics, Training, Information Management & Technology, and Emergency 
Preparedness & Response, that are steered by the so-called Core Group (OCHA 
2009b). The objectives of the Logistics sub-group that holds meetings on a (bi-) 
monthly basis include pool sharing of information, human resources, distribution, 
and relief goods and equipment (OCHA 2009b). Following OCHA the 
participation of the world’s largest humanitarian actors “offers the opportunity to 
                                                 
43
 Inter alia the European Commission (EC), The Asia Foundation (TAF), the United States Aid Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and UN agencies like the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) (OCHA 2009a). 
44
 With the military, for example, OCHA cooperates via the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) 
located at the OCHA headquarters in Geneva (OCHA 2008). 
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connect the regional logistics network to emerging global trends in areas such as 
fleet management and supply chain management” (2009b).  
 
Another tool of OCHA is the Inter Agency Working Group (IAWG) for Central 
and East Africa. This project works in specialized groups like Logistics or 
Information Management/Technology. These groups conduct pool sharing of 
information, distribution, relief goods and equipment, and human resources. 
 
Figure 49: OCHA’s Inter Agency Working Group (IAWG) for Central and East Africa 
 
4.2.1.3. OCHA Central African Republic 
A more recent single-country mission of the OCHA has taken place in the 
Central African Republic (CAR). Silvia Hidalgo of Development Assistance 
Research Associates (DARA), a Madrid-based NGO, reports the situation within 
the CAR as of September 2008:  
   
“There is, in fact, a perpetual state of insecurity, as law and order in the north has 
collapsed. Gangs of bandits in the north-west, known as zaraguinas, spread 
terror, cause massive displacement (approximately 100,000 people) and kidnap 
both children and adults for ransom. According to different sources, the bandits 
come mainly from Chad and, to a lesser extent, Niger. Ethnic rivalry, previously 
insignificant, is a new element in the conflict which has arisen from political 
misrule along ethnic lines. The latest ceasefire was signed on 9 May 2008. But it 
is still too early to know whether the truce will lead to peace and improve 
people’s living conditions.” (2008: 142) 
 
As mentioned above the crisis in the Central African Republic is about 
approximately 100,000 displaced people. This situation - existent since 2003 - 
has its roots in political instability and has even aggravated as in 2006 the 
number of affected persons was ‘only’ 50,000 (IRIN 2006). In this special case 
the displaced “are not accommodated in camps, but are scattered throughout the 
north and are difficult to find and reach” – a situation that makes “effective, 
timely, and appropriate humanitarian relief” very challenging (Hidalgo 2008: 
143-144).  
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To make things worse the emergency response was hindered by funding 
difficulties - only Medicines Sans Frontières and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross provided large-scale relief before 2006 (Hidalgo 2008: 143-144). 
With regard to per-capita-spending the CAR was a donor orphan (Koch 2009: 
67). Then, in 2006, the UN started to show more presence and set up an office of 
OCHA as well as appointed a Humanitarian Coordinator (Hidalgo 2008: 145).  
 
The main functions of OCHA have been fundraising and coordination. Important 
in the former matter are diverse funding mechanisms of the UN system like the 
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) located at OCHA45. Within a year 
the OCHA’s Financial Tracking System registered a 214 per cent rise of total 
humanitarian aid – from US$ 25.8 million in 2006 to US$ 81.1 million in 200746 
(Hidalgo 2008: 144). The major share of these funds has been channelled through 
NGOs that generally still do the majority of ‘front-line’ crisis relief (Hidalgo 
2008: 145). With regard to coordination OCHA largely fulfilled its role as 
coordinator within the Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team 
(HDPT) that was established and has been managed by this UN institution. 
Hidalgo states:      
 
“The array of challenges facing humanitarian actors in CAR has meant that the 
response is in many ways unique. There is close collaboration among aid 
implementing agencies and many instances of good practice. Ensuring 
partnerships between UN agencies and NGOs requires constant effort, sustained 
by the work of both OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator. The 
Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team (HDPT), managed by OCHA, 
brings together all humanitarian and development organizations as a new form of 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) country working group.” (2008: 
146) 
                                                 
45
 CERF is a funding mechanism that pre-positions monetary sources for humanitarian activities and 
channels these funds – if required – through UN organizations like the United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (CERF 2009b). In 2008 CERF gave grants of nearly 
US$ 300.5 million to 53 countries and more than US$ 128.3 million to so-called underfunded 
emergencies in 20 countries. Altogether it has contributed to more than 400 humanitarian projects in 2008 
(CERF 2009a). 
46
 The main providers of funds were the United States (US$ 18.4 million),  the European Commission 
Humanitarian Office (US$ 10.4 million),  the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (US$ 7 million), 
Sweden (US$ 6.8 million), and Ireland (US$ 5.5 million) (Hidalgo 2008: 144).  
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This Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team (HDPT) – led by the 
Humanitarian Coordinator – set up the Coordinated Aid Programme (CAP) for 
the Central African Republic whose features comprise a joint appeal mechanism 
and a joint tool to “plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor HPDT activities” 
(Hidalgo 2008: 146). Similarly argues Lanzer – the Humanitarian Coordinator in 
the CAR – who states that the CAP “is a tool that helps aid agencies work 
together to analyse the political context and its humanitarian consequences, agree 
about the priority needs of the population, draw up a plan to meet them, and 
advocate for funding” (2008: 106). Regarding the initiatives described above the 
Humanitarian Coordinator also delivered more transparency of and accessibility 
to information than had existed before:     
 
“Accessible information is needed if people are to become aware of a situation. 
Before arriving in CAR, I was surprised at how difficult it was to obtain 
information about the country in any language other than 
French.[…]Accordingly, one of my top priorities upon arrival in Bangui 
was[…]to get the word out, in English. By January 2007, a weekly newsletter 
was being issued, a blog and web site were up and running, an intranet was 
established so that humanitarian and development practitioners could exchange 
and classify information by region or sector, and Google Earth was used to map 
key issues. These Web-based tools made information instantly available to 
potential users inside and outside CAR.” (Lanzer 2008: 107) 
 
OCHA’s main functions in the Central African Republic have been fundraising 
and coordination. Coordination has been achieved with the OCHA-triggered 
Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team (HDPT). Within this body UN 
agencies and NGOs coordinate their actions and cooperate in needs assessment, 
joint standards and the like.    
 
Figure 50: OCHA Central African Republic: Tasks and Services 
 
Within the HDPT a cluster system47 was installed. Thereby “an agency is 
designated as the lead for a specific sector, with the presumed aim of improving 
                                                 
47
 In September 2005 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) – the primary UN mechanism for 
coordination of UN- and Non-UN-humanitarian actors – endorsed the Cluster Approach that features nine 
clusters that represent major tasks in humanitarian work. Each cluster comprises many aid actors as well 
as an UN-specified lead agency (GLC 2009).   
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quality and accountability for programming in that sector” (Solé-Arqués 2008: 
155). The CAR cluster system – in charge since August 2007 - included sectors 
like protection, water and sanitation, food security, and logistics (Hidalgo 2008: 
143; Lanzer 2008: 110). Thereby the performance of clusters has varied – 
especially food security and logistics have achieved outstanding results.  Due to a 
seriously cooperative approach of UN agencies and NGOs both clusters showed 
“a sense of ownership and added value” (Lanzer 2008: 110). Generally OCHA 
has managed it to create an ‘atmosphere’ where pool sharing of information and 
human resources is conducted by the main relief providers in the Central African 
Republic. 
  
Altogether the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
has managed it to trigger pool sharing. However, as logistics – only one sector of 
OCHA’s cluster approach – accounts for approximately 80 per cent of the costs 
associated with emergency response (Trunick 2005: 8), the UN decided to set up 
“a specialised form of inter-agency coordination mechanism to deal exclusively 
with logistics issues in increasingly complex operational environments” 
(Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 11) – the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Centre (UNJLC) which is presented in the following subchapter.  
 
4.2.2. United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) 
In this subchapter, structure, tasks and services, as well as a country mission 
(Afghanistan) of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre are presented. The 
UNJLC is an inter-agency platform whose mission it is to coordinate the logistics 
capabilities of cooperating humanitarian agencies during large-scale emergencies 
(Van Wassenhove 2005: 484).  
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Since the beginning of 2009 the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre’s 
operational integration into the structures of the United Nations Logistics 
Cluster48 has begun. With the completion of this endeavour the UNJLC will be 
re-named Global Logistics Cluster. As this mainly constitutes a re-labelling with 
only minor organizational changes, and in order to honour source validity – by 
November 2009 virtually 100 per cent of researched field missions ran under the 
UNJLC name - we will further use the term United Nations Joint Logistics 
Centre. Future primary literature, however, will use the term Global Logistics 
Cluster.     
 
Figure 51: UN Joint Logistics Centre or Global Logistics Cluster? 
 
4.2.2.1. Structure 
The UNJLC has its headquarters in Rome and is an inter-agency platform for 
logistics coordination in crises. Thus it is an UN common service that “seeks the 
widest possible participation among all humanitarian logistics actors (UN and 
NGO alike)” (GLC 2009).  
 
The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre is rooted in the relief efforts in the 
1996 Eastern Zaire crisis which - in order to give shelter to 1.1 million refugees 
in the area (Buckley 1996) – made necessary the urgent, but complex 
coordination and pooling of aircrafts among diverse UN agencies (Kaatrud, 
Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 11). The discussions that followed resulted in 
the March 2001 endorsement (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2005: 13) and the 
March 2002 institutionalization of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre by 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) – the project 
development framework of the most senior UN inter-agency coordination body49 
(Van Wassenhove 2005: 484).  
                                                 
48
 In September 2005 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) endorsed the Cluster Approach. 
Regarding the logistics cluster World Food Programme (WFP) is the lead agency (GLC 2009).   
49 “The IASC-WG is composed of the directors of the Emergency Programs of the IASC agencies or 
their equivalent counterparts. It is a unique forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian 
partners.” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 69) 
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Itself being no agency, the UNJLC is dependent on “a high level of voluntary 
cooperation from the participating agencies in terms of staff (secondments) and 
information sharing” (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 13). The 
platform is currently staffed from UN agencies like WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR and 
IOM as well as private business and NGOs (UNJLC 2009). Generally the 
“UNJLC presence is designed to be light and flexible, with organizational 
structures kept to the minimum” (GLC 2009). Thereby every organization 
maintains its logistics system as Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove state: 
 
“The UNJLC approach underlines the need to preserve and respect each and 
every agency’s logistics system. By viewing the humanitarian effort as a 
‘modular’ system, it seeks to enhance and strengthen individual logistics 
systems, develop synergies across agencies and improve efficiency for the 
humanitarian community as a whole.” (2003: 11) 
 
The leading agency of the UNJLC is the World Food Programme - the UNJLC is 
“under its custodianship for legal, finance and administration matters” (GLC 
2009). This is due to the fact that the WFP is the leading logistics organization of 
the UN’s cluster system (GLC 2009). Its logistical capability – always disposable 
– includes 30 vessels, 70 aircraft, and 5,000 trucks (WFP 2009). The World Food 
Programme’s budget consists exclusively of voluntary donations and in 2008 the 
agency managed to raise US$ 5 billion in funds (WFP 2009). WFP’s field 
officers exclusively conduct activities in the target country, whereas the 
headquarters in Rome are responsible for worldwide logistical coordination 
(Mayr 2006: 36). 
 
The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) is staffed from UN agencies 
like WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR and IOM as well as private business and NGOs. 
Thereby every organization maintains its logistics system. The leading agency of 
the UNJLC is the World Food Programme (WFP). 
 
Figure 52: UNJLC Structure 
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The activation of the UNJLC is done through the IASC which acts upon request 
from the Humanitarian Coordinator (OCHA country head) and the United 
Nations Country Team (UNCT) (GLC 2009). Tomasini and Van Wassenhove:       
 
“A decision to activate the UNJLC is made within 24 hours on the basis of the 
scale of the crisis, existing agency capabilities, the extent of bottlenecks, possible 
use of MCDA (Military/Civil Defense Assets), and situation assessments by the 
UNJLC Unit.” (2009: 69) 
 
Following activation, deployment will be initiated within 48 hours – this process 
includes briefing of the agencies and authorities concerned and the recruitment of 
UNJLC staff (GLC 2009). Following specific tasks and services (4.2.1.2) are 
conducted at headquarters as well as in the field50 as long as they are demanded 
by the most senior UN representative of the area. UNJLC’s operations are – 
however – usually short-term: 
  
“UNJLC’s operations are envisaged as a temporary bolster during the response 
phase of an emergency. After this initial relief phase, humanitarian activities will 
focus on rehabilitation and/or re-settlement. Hence, no UNJLC is activated 
without a clearly defined exit strategy.” (GLC 2009) 
 
UNJLC’s activities take place in the immediate period of time after a crisis’ 
outbreak51. Within the crisis lifecycle it does not deal with the aftermath, the so-
called reconstruction or rehabilitation phase. Accordingly - within the 
coordination framework of Donini (see 3.3.4 Crisis Lifecycle) - the UNJLC falls 
into the categories coordination by command52 (centralized) and coordination by 
consensus (joint). Since its formal founding in 2002 the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Centre has been active in large-scale emergency responses in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, Indian Ocean Tsunami Response, Pakistan 
                                                 
50 “To best fulfil its coordination mandate, the UNJLC sets up a host of temporary satellite offices 
around a regional coordination office established for the duration of the emergency.” (Kaatrud, Samii and 
Van Wassenhove 2003: 11) 
51
 The UNJLC operation triggered by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 – for instance - started on 30 
December 2004 and predominantly lasted until the end of September 2005 (Elzinga and Folmer 2005: 3-
8). 
52
 Coordination by command is – e.g. – used in negotiating agreements with governments (landing rights, 
transport corridors, visas, customs clearance) and usually occurs in the initial stages of an emergency 
response (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 81).  
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Earthquake Response, Lebanon and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (GLC 
2009). In addition it has contributed relief to minor humanitarian crises – namely 
floods - in Mozambique, Pakistan, Uganda and Bangladesh (GLC 2009). 
 
4.2.2.2. Tasks and Services 
Management in crisis relief is very challenging due to the amount of information 
that must be processed and its ever changing status. No single organization is 
capable of constantly monitoring all relevant facts about issues like 
“infrastructure, accessibility, availability and prices” (Kaatrud, Samii and Van 
Wassenhove 2003: 12). And even if an agency would have this information – e.g. 
of logistical bottlenecks caused by activities of neighbouring states, recipient 
governments, military forces or private logistics providers that are in control of 
assets like warehouses or fuel depots – individual organizations “usually do not 
have the resources to engage in simultaneous negotiations in multiple locations 
with different actors” (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 12-13). But 
only then – with proper information processing- and bargaining capabilities - 
agencies can “optimise their activities in terms of response, cost and stock pre-
positioning[…]and help avoid wasteful competition among and duplication 
within humanitarian organisations” (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 
12). In order to enable this situation the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre’s 
mandate is to make multi-agency logistics as effective and efficient as possible.  
 
The UNJLC provides information processing- and bargaining capabilities in 
order to optimize inter-agency coordination and cooperation. 
 
Figure 53: UNJLC Tasks and Services 1 
 
To address the first challenge - information processing - the UNJLC assumes the 
role of an “information manager” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 90). 
This manager gathers material of its participating agencies and collates, analyzes, 
and disseminates information in order to improve decision-making of 
humanitarian actors (GLC 2009). These activities not only include the provision 
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of basic logistics information53 in the form of data, information, and knowledge, 
but also the development/implementation/running of information sharing tools 
(e.g. websites, mailing lists, field meetings), the mapping of areas with the help 
of Geographic Information Systems (GIS)54 and the consequent provision of 
maps to UN agencies and NGOs, the running of a Custom Information Guide 
(CIG)55 to evaluate and benchmark customs clearance, and Joint Supply Tracking 
(JST)56 in order to prioritize and consolidate cargo movements (GLC 2009). The 
accessibility to these types of information is essential. A good example of this 
paradigm is the UNJLC website. In order to reach the target group – field 
logisticians – the web-portal’s design must be as simple as possible due to low 
bandwidth and lack of sophisticated software in the field (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2005: 6). Another feature is password-protected intranet that allows 
UNJLC team members to upload files rapidly and to share information with a 
higher degree of privacy (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2005: 8).  
 
UNJLC gathers material of its participating agencies and collates, analyzes, and 
disseminates information with regard to logistics procedures, logistical maps 
(GIS), customs, as well as provides tracking and tracing.  
 
Figure 54: UNJLC Tasks and Services 2 
 
In addition to this information-centred pool sharing model, the UNJLC on 
demand also provides asset brokering57 (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 
                                                 
53
 General logistics information like transport procedures/schedules or infrastructure assessments (GLC 
2009; for more information and a logistical map see Appendix I)  
54
 As of November 2009 91 countries are logistically mapped under the normative guidance of the UN 
Spatial Data Infrastructure for Transport (UNSDI-T) 2.0 (GLC 2009). The Global Logistics Cluster’s 
Map Centre is available at: http://www.logcluster.org/tools/mapcentre.    
55
 The CIG is a ‘country-by-country content management system’ based on information sharing and is 
compiled with the help of the international logistics provider TNT who deploys staff to the UNJLC (GLC 
2009). It can be reached at http://cig.unjlc.org/.   
56
 Needs are assessed via the so-called Cargo Movement Request (CMR; see Appendix II) and reports 
issued that tackle both the global (all agencies) and the individual supplies picture (GLC 2009). In 2010 
the JST will be replaced by RITA, the web-based Relief Item Tracking Application (GLC 2009). 
57 In contrast to asset management, asset brokering is coordinative, not operational – the operational 
management of assets like inventory centres, trucks, or aeroplanes usually – as was the case in 
Afghanistan - remains in the hands of the participating organizations (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
2009b: 71). Anyway, this separation can be difficult as Elzinga and Van Randwijck recorded in 
Afghanistan (2003: 8). 
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2003: 11). Asset brokering helps to tackle the second challenge, negotiation 
capability, and constitutes pool sharing of means of distribution like aircraft, 
vessels, and trucks, or inventory space. With regard to air assets Kaatrud, Samii 
and Van Wassenhove state: 
 
“The UNJLC – without interfering in an agency’s established air chartering 
arrangements – can facilitate the pooling of limited airlift capacity with the aim 
of matching eventual excess capacity with outstanding demand.” (2003: 11) 
 
Another example would be pool sharing of inventory space. Again, Kaatrud, 
Samii and Van Wassenhove recorded: 
 
“To address this, the UNJLC often brokers exchange agreements between 
agencies in need of storage facilities and those who have them, coordinates 
sharing of storage space and liaises with military or local civil authorities in 
possession of these assets in order to speed up their transfer to humanitarian 
organisations.” (2003: 13) 
 
Asset brokering includes pool sharing of distribution and inventory space. 
 
Figure 55: UNJLC Tasks and Services 3 
 
Compared to OCHA the UNJLC - with its information processing-, asset 
brokering-, and bargaining capabilities - supposedly applies the pool sharing 
approach in a more detailed and sophisticated way. This is shown in the next 
subchapter with help of UNJLC’s Afghanistan country mission.  
 
4.2.2.3. UNJLC Afghanistan 
As we have elaborated in the former subchapter the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Centre applies pool sharing of resources and thus is both information 
manager and asset broker. As mentioned before, activities with regard to 
information are the provision of basic logistics information, information sharing 
tools, spatial maps (GIS), a Custom Information Guide (CIG) and a Joint Supply 
Tracking (JST) system. In addition assets like means of distribution are pooled. 
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For further understanding the author would like to present these endeavours in 
detail. Thereby UNJLC’s operations in Afghanistan are used. 
 
In Afghanistan the UNJLC applied its ‘headquarter – regional office – satellite 
offices’ organizational structure. Besides the Rome-centred headquarter and the 
Islamabad-based regional office, UNJLC operated temporary satellite offices58 in 
cities like Termez, an Uzbek city on the border to Afghanistan (Kaatrud, Samii 
and van Wassenhove 2003: 12). In the regional and satellite offices staff was 
compiled of around 20 international and 30 local logisticians (Elzinga and Van 
Randwijck 2003: 10). UNJLC Afghanistan had two phases – period 1 from 
October 2001 to March 2002 (humanitarian relief) and period 2 from April 2002 
to March 2003 (capacity building) (Elzinga and Van Randwijck 2003: 5). The 
structure of this country example follows the abovementioned activities59. 
Thereby mainly the UN-NGO context is taken into account60.  
 
Basic logistics information included contact details of organizations active in 
the region or requirements regarding visas, customs, housing, and security 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2005: 2). Elzinga and Van Randwijck also name 
airlift schedules and information on infrastructure, availability and prices of 
transport, and weather forecasts as supply of information (2003: 7). 
 
                                                 
58
 Basically – especially in the first phase of UNJLC Afghanistan – UNJLC Rome concentrated on 
strategic issues like the transport of relief goods and equipment into the crisis region, UNJLC Islamabad 
coordinated regional tasks like the transport of supplies from the region into Afghanistan, and UNJLC’s 
satellite offices (e.g. in Termez) did the field work (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 71). 
59
 Except Joint Supply Tracking (JST) and pool sharing of inventory space 
60
 As there has been war in Afghanistan since October 2001 humanitarian space has been considerably 
defined by the US-led coalition forces and thus also civil-military coordination is a main task of the 
UNJLC in this country (Elzinga and Van Randwijck 2003: 5). The UNJLC negotiated, for instance, on 
behalf of all humanitarian actors (coordination by command) with the military in order to “streamline and 
hasten the transit and movement of humanitarian cargo and personnel from Afghanistan’s neighbours” 
(Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 12). One part of these negotiations is the de-conflicting of 
“the use of common logistics assets such as airspace and airfields with military forces” (Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove 2009b: 73). 
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Information sharing tools: In Afghanistan UNJLC operated a website61 and a 
newsletter service as well as produced CD-ROMs in order to distribute basic 
information to agencies in the field (Elzinga and Van Randwijck 2003: 9). 
Following Tomasini and Van Wassenhove “these bulletins served to monitor the 
division of tasks in the field, anticipate and communicate solutions to problems 
of common interest’’ (2005; quoted in Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009a: 
556). These ‘problems of common interest’ include, inter alia, fuel, rates of 
transport and infrastrucure. Regarding fuel, a commodity which is outside the 
mandate of a single agency, Van Wassenhove states: 
 
“If a central body such as the UNJLC anticipates fuel shortages in a certain 
region because of cartel formations which are raising prices, humanitarian 
organizations would probably appreciate this information being posted on a 
website and be ready to discuss how they can collectively solve the issue.” 
(2005: 484) 
 
The second issue are local logistics service providers. They possibly hinder 
effectiveness and efficiency as Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove report: 
 
"During the Afghan crisis humanitarian agencies unknowingly engaged in 
wasteful competition by bidding up the price of transport to secure access to 
truck capacity[…]The cargo transport cartel resulted in a 300% price increase 
over a six-month period. After conducting a technical study on the Afghan 
transport sector, the UNJLC presented a transport price proposal intended for use 
by all agencies. By threatening to bring in a UN trucking fleet in the event of 
non-agreement and publishing agreed rates on its website, it put an end to the 
price hike. Overall, millions of the humanitarian community’s dollars were 
saved.” (2003: 13) 
 
The third matter of interest – infrastructure – does not only mean the provision of 
logistical maps, but also the active development of infrastructure funding 
                                                 
61
 When the Afghan crisis stroke the UNJLC was not even formally institutionalized though already 
existent. Thus its website for Afghanistan was locally programmed at high speed and showed some 
failures like lacking support for browsers other than the Microsoft Internet Explorer or the user’s 
dependence on the right Java version installed on his or her computer. Anyway, three months after the 
start it got 2,500 users and by May 2003 this number increased to 7,500 (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
2005: 3).  
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proposals on behalf of and with the humanitarian community (Kaatrud, Samii 
and Van Wassenhove 2003: 13). Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove report: 
 
“The UNJLC’s coordinating role has expanded to encompass various 
stakeholders including the donor community. For example, to help the 
development of a common UN strategy for the vital rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan’s road network, the UNJLC embarked on a number of infrastructure 
survey projects. After assessing Afghan road conditions and traffic capacity, it 
helped the humanitarian community develop proposals for donor and Coalition 
funding.” (2003: 13) 
 
Spatial maps (GIS): Logistical maps were jointly made by UNJLC and OCHA’s 
Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) “with HIC providing the GIS layer 
database and UNJLC adding the layers with logistic information” (Elzinga and 
Van Randwijck 2003: 12).  
 
Custom Information Guide (CIG): UNJLC Afghanistan did not only provide 
information about customs issues, but also negotiated on behalf of the 
humanitarian community with the US-led coalition (Kaatrud, Samii and Van 
Wassenhove 2003: 12) and local authorities (Van Wassenhove 2005: 483). 
 
Pool sharing of distribution: In this matter UNJLC Afghanistan acted as 
coordinator. Especially airlift capabilities and capacities – of military aircraft or 
civil planes chartered by either UN agencies or donors – were recorded and 
matched with the needs of humanitarian actors (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
2009b: 71). Then UNJLC staff took into account humanitarian priorities and 
“assigned assets to agencies or advised them on pooling of assets for long-range 
airlifts” in order to “achieve synergies and efficiency” (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 71-72). A similar approach had been applied with regard to 
barge capabilities and capacities. At the outbreak of the Afghan crisis bottlenecks 
occurred in Termez – an Uzbek city bordering Northern Afghanistan along the 
Amu Darya river (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 12). As Uzbek 
authorities initially refused to re-open the river-crossing bridge, UNJLC Termez 
“speedily negotiated an agreement with the Uzbek authorities for the transport of 
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humanitarian cargo by barge to Afghanistan and established a system to prioritise 
and schedule barge cargo” (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 12). 
   
UNJLC Afghanistan provided basic logistics information, information sharing 
tools, spatial maps (GIS), a customs information guide (CIG), and pool sharing 
of distribution. 
 
Figure 56: UNJLC Afghanistan: Tasks and Services 
 
UNJLC Afghanistan managed pool sharing. Now we have seen already two 
promoters of this concept, OCHA and UNJLC. It is time to present pool sharing 
in software development62. This issue is the focus of the next chapter that deals 
with the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) and its software - HELIOS.  
 
4.2.3. Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) 
The Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) has its roots in the Humanitarian 
Logistics Conferences that are hosted by the Fritz Institute – an US-based NGO – 
since 2003. This subchapter presents the structure and tasks/services of the HLA 
and the associated HELIOS software project.     
 
4.2.3.1. Structure 
The founding body of the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) is the San-
Francisco based Fritz Institute, a NGO “whose mission is to strengthen the 
infrastructures of humanitarian relief organizations by mobilizing logistics and 
technology expertise and resources from the corporate and academic 
communities” (Thomas 2003: 2). Since 2003 the Fritz Institute holds meetings 
regarding the key challenges of humanitarian logistics which it calls: 
 
                                                 
62
 Applications like tracking and tracing. The IFRC's Logistics and Resource Mobilisation Department 
(LRMD), for instance, managed it to reduce the amount of unsolicited goods in the Gujarat earthquake 
emergency response to 5% with its commodity tracking system (Chomilier, Samii and Van Wassenhove 
2003: 15). 
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“(a) the lack of recognition of the strategic role of logistics by top managers and 
donors; (b) the shortage of skilled and experienced logistics professionals in the 
sector; (c) the limited amount of collaboration between organizations relative to 
the logistics function; (d) the inability to build a strong business case for logistics 
through metrics; and (e) the insufficient leveraging of technology to assist 
logisticians in the execution of a complex array of tasks they are charged with in 
an operation.” (2006)  
 
Thereby it brings together key logistics representatives in the humanitarian world 
“with the aim of encouraging collaboration, integration, standardisation, synergy 
and joint product development” (Gustavsson 2003: 8). The participants - the 
partners of the Fritz Institute - comprise the world’s main humanitarian actors - 
inter alia OCHA and UNJLC - as well as government agencies, private business, 
academic institutions and foundations63 (Fritz Institute 2009b).  
 
One project that was triggered by these conferences is the Certification in 
Humanitarian Logistics (CHL) which started in 2006 with 26 pilot candidates 
and constitutes “a flexible distance-learning course based on a competence 
model, linking on-the-job experience with learning” (Fritz Institute 2006).  
 
A second endeavour was the 2005-foundation of the Humanitarian Logistics 
Association (HLA) with the goal to be a professional association with individual 
membership – a community of practice as “a group of people united by a 
common effort that interact and share knowledge” (Thomas 2003: 9) and as 
“representative body of logisticians in the humanitarian community” (Fritz 
Institute 2006). This second institution – located at the Fritz Institute - is 
presented in the next subchapter.  
 
The Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) is a community of practice 
formed by logisticians in order to share knowledge and benefit from synergies.  
 
Figure 57: Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) 
                                                 
63
 Inter alia Care International, Catholic Relief Services, IFRC, Medicines Sans Frontières, Oxfam, 
People in Aid, Save the Children, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, World Vision (humanitarian actors), 
European Commission Humanitarian Office, USAID (government agencies), Intel, KPMG (private 
business), Columbia University, Erasmus University, Georgia Institute of Technology, INSEAD, Harvard 
University, Kenyatta University, MIT, Stanford University (academic institutions), Bernard Osher 
Foundation, Stanley S. Langendorf Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (foundations) 
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4.2.3.2. Tasks and Services 
Parallel to the founding of the Humanitarian Logistics Association Anisya 
Thomas – then managing director and actual member of the board of directors of 
the Fritz Institute – and Laura Kopczak set up a very important position paper. 
They defined five strategies to improve humanitarian logistics. These are now 
presented – thereby words in parentheses indicate the scope of them: 
 
(a) Establishment of a professional logistics community (knowledge sharing), 
(b) Investment in standardized training and certification64 (setting of standards), 
(c) Focus on metrics and performance measurement (communication of                                               
effectiveness), 
(d) Communication of logistics’ strategic importance (awareness creation), and 
(e) Development of flexible technology solutions (increase of service level) 
(2005: 7).        
 
All of these strategies are applied by the Humanitarian Logistics Association 
(HLA). Of these strategies some affect pool sharing more than others. Thereby 
especially (a) professional logistics community and (e) flexible technology 
solutions are of importance to this thesis’ main object of observation. The first 
one due to its clear link to pool sharing of information and the second one owing 
to the fact that IT issues have not yet been addressed by this work. Accordingly 
the focus of the author is on HLA activities that approach one of these two 
strategies. Following the Fritz Institute pool sharing of information65 constitutes a 
main goal of the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA):  
    
“Collaboration among organizations and among functional groups within 
organizations has helped increase recognition of logistics as a strategic function. 
However, to develop scale as in other sectors, there must be greater interaction 
and cooperation among organizations. As logistics gains visibility, part of the 
                                                 
64
 This is done via the abovementioned Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL). It is the goal of 
the CHL - compiled by humanitarians, private business and academics - to be an “externally recognised 
certification program” that overcomes the lack of institutional knowledge in the humanitarian sector by 
formalizing this knowledge (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 9-10). 
65
 Again ‘information’ refers to data, information, and knowledge as explained in 4.1. 
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new responsibility is to share lessons learned and find out how other 
organizations have addressed challenges.” (Fritz Institute 2007b) 
 
The same is valid for flexible technology solutions. Members of the HLA work 
on them as proper IT systems supposedly provide considerable benefits. Pettit 
and Beresford, for instance, speak of “inventory savings and supply chain 
control” (2009: 459). Similarly Thomas and Kopczak argue that IT solutions 
feature “visibility of the materials pipeline” and thus “create the infrastructure for 
knowledge management, performance measurement and learning” (2005: 7). 
These individuals – with leading efforts from the Fritz Institute - created 
HELIOS. The development and distribution of this software are presented in the 
next subchapter. 
 
4.2.3.3. HELIOS Supply Chain Software 
It is common sense in the humanitarian community that flexible IT is an 
important issue. Accordingly Thomas and Kopczak state: 
 
“Humanitarian relief organizations have a common need for integrated 
information technology (IT) solutions that support procurement, distribution 
through a pipeline, tracking and tracing of goods and funds, flexible and robust 
reporting, and connectivity in the field.”(2005: 12) 
 
Given the catalogue of relief goods and equipment of the International Federation 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) that alone comprises 6,000 
items ranging from cranial drills for surgery at field hospitals to plastic sheeting 
for temporary shelter, the implementation of functions like tracking and tracing is 
an enormous challenge to IT specialists (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 12). 
Thereby the number of items has to be multiplied with the diverse supply chain 
partners like global, regional, and local suppliers of relief goods66, providers of 
commercial transportation and third-party logistics, aircraft charter companies or 
                                                 
66
 “The UNICEF warehouse in Copenhagen includes an inventory of US$22 million in relief supplies at 
any given time; these supplies are procured from over 1,000 vendors worldwide.” (Thomas and Kopczak 
2005: 12) 
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local transport firms that provide trucks, cars or even mules and donkeys 
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 12).  
 
Adding to this complexity researchers compare the state of humanitarian logistics 
to the commercial counterpart in the midst of the 1980s (Rickard 2003: 9; 
Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 7; Van Wassenhove 2005: 476). Hence it is not 
surprising that – in a study conducted by Thomas and Kopczak - only “26% of 
the responding organizations used tracking and tracing programmes, whereas the 
big majority still worked with Excel spreadsheets and/or manual records” (2005: 
6). This fact in combination with another, namely that logistics accounts for 80 
per cent of the costs associated with emergency response (Trunick 2005: 8), asks 
for proper software development and IT implementation. Therefore the Fritz 
Institute started to work on new logistics software. Before actual development it 
conducted two major studies regarding agencies’ needs (requirements) and 
current distribution of software in the humanitarian world.  
 
The first analysis was done in collaboration with the IFRC and twelve other 
humanitarian relief organizations (HRO). Anisya Thomas – then managing 
director of the California-based NGO – reports:      
 
“Our team spent over 3,000 hours interviewing the entire logistics team, as well 
as key functions that interact closely with logistics such as desk officers, 
operations managers, finance and IT at the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as part of a requirements gathering exercise 
for the development of a new logistics information software. Subsequently we 
visited 12 leading humanitarian relief organizations[…]at their headquarters and 
in the field, to understand and map their relief logistics processes. Finally, we 
brought the heads of logistics of these and other HROs together with leading 
supply chain professors at a Humanitarian Logistics Conference for two days to 
discuss the research, validate our results about their pain points, and give input to 
the path forward.” (2003: 2)  
 
The second study analysed the current usage of software in the humanitarian 
world. Even before the analysis, it was known that the variety of programs would 
be enormous. Lee, Wally, and Zbinden reported in 2003: 
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“The technology landscape in the humanitarian sector is often extremely 
fragmented, limiting the availability of timely and accurate information. 
Organisations either buy large off-the-shelf commercial packages that need 
extensive customisation or create small in-house solutions for each field location. 
In the former instance, the dynamic variables and context of relief are not 
captured. Customisation to address this problem is very expensive and inhibits 
absorption of routine upgrades. Attempts to scale up home-grown solutions are 
rarely effective and are often dependent on the transient expertise of the 
organisation’s IT staff.” (34) 
 
Consequently the Fritz Institute scrutinized several IT solutions with regard to 
system strengths and weaknesses. Thereby especially commodity tracking 
systems (CTS) were of interest. The screened systems are now listed with 
applying agency in parentheses. They included SUMA (Pan-American Health 
Organization), Microsoft FACTS (Save the Children / Mercy Corps), CTS 2000 
(World Vision), CTS (Save the Children), Purchase Plus PALMAS (Oxfam / 
International Rescue Committee), and Log 6.5 (Medicines Sans Frontières) (Fritz 
Institute 2004). Strengths and weaknesses were listed with regard to functions 
like ‘process coverage’, ‘planning’, ‘inter-modular and inter-version workflow’, 
‘food item suitability’, ‘context sensitivity’, ‘logistics management’, ‘reporting’, 
and ‘standard and non-standard item categorization’ (Fritz Institute 2004).  
 
This knowledge resulted in the project of developing “a basic standard system as 
a foundation” which should constitute a common platform with “modular 
flexibility to add and subtract” (Fritz Institute 2004). Especially the modular 
design is supposed to be essential as it enables “to connect existing systems and 
introduce new ones to provide visibility and information about the entire relief 
supply chain” (Lee, Wally, and Zbinden 2003: 34).  
 
Studies about needs assessment and current distribution of software resulted in 
the objective to create a modular system based on a common platform. 
 
Figure 58: Objectives of Software Development 
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The project was called HELIOS and should be a platform for many humanitarian 
agencies. Under the slogan “Action: Bringing Information and Visibility to the 
Field” the Fritz Institute, other members of the Humanitarian Logistics 
Association (HLA), and IT firms developed the HELIOS supply chain software 
that is based on modules67 and features extensive monitoring functions like 
reports and dashboards that provide a high degree of supply chain visibility68 
(Fritz Institute 2006; Fritz Institute 2009a).  
 
The pilot program started in Kenya in August 2006 with three initial field users 
of HELIOS 1.0 – namely Kenya Red Cross, Merlin and World Vision 
International (Fritz Institute 2006). The last one already had collaborated with the 
Fritz institute since several years (Gustavsson 2003: 8). World Vision’s former 
logistics information software was partly Microsoft-Access, partly paper-based 
and tracking and tracking (T&T) thus difficult (Fenton and Wachiuri 2007: 5). 
Consequently World Vision appreciated HELIOS to provide improved 
commodity T&T, more accurate information, individual reporting, easier 
variance analysis, enhanced standardization of relief goods and equipment, the 
ability to import and export data, the capability of online processing, and the 
saving of resources like time (Fenton and Wachiuri 2007: 13). Further World 
Vision was very active to promote the benefits of joint software development, 
namely shared costs of investment, implementation, and training (Fenton and 
Wachiuri 2007: 17)69.  
 
These thoughts were shared from many HLA logisticians and thus the HELIOS 
Users Group (HUG) was founded in 2008 (Blansjaar et al. 2008: 10). It is headed 
by the Fritz Institute and is defined as open source project (Blansjaar et al. 2008: 
                                                 
67
 For the modular structure and technical specifications of HELIOS see Appendix III respectively 
Appendix IV. 
68
 This is not only valid for the agencies themselves, but also for “donors, colleagues, countries, field 
locations and teams” as Helios provides “macro and micro views from a variety of angles” (Fritz Institute 
2009). 
 
69
 Even joint operation of the software would be possible – up to now users ‘only’ share implementation 
information.    
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4-5) with an own support website where “documentation is being gathered, 
software releases are published and the user community can communicate via an 
issue tracker, forums, wikis and shared document spaces” (Fritz Institute 2009a).  
 
The main goal of HUG is to establish a sustainable HELIOS community by 
sharing costs, best practices and input/output as well as by creating standards, 
benchmarks, and development priorities (Blansjaar et al. 2008: 8)70. In 2008 the 
group included Oxfam GB, World Vision International and International Medical 
Corps (IMC) which started using HELIOS in Somalia and Zambia (World 
Vision) respectively Sudan and Indonesia (Oxfam) (Blansjaar et al. 2008: 8) and 
developed HELIOS 1.1 and 1.2 (Fritz Institute 2009a). In September 2009 
Oxfam intended to start implementation of HELIOS in 20 countries – that would 
mean that it has covered 75% of its supply chain within 18 months (Fritz Institute 
2009a). In addition the HUG shares data, information, and knowledge with all 
members of the Humanitarian Logistics Association (Fritz Institute 2008a).  
 
As we have seen the development of HELIOS comprises pool sharing of 
information and human resources. With regard to this software and its recent 
development it is opportune to say that there is a chance for HELIOS to become 
the standard supply chain application in humanitarian logistics. 
 
HELIOS supply chain software is defined as open source project and is based on 
modules that feature extensive monitoring. The HELIOS Users Group (HUG) 
was founded in 2008 and aims at sharing costs, best practices and input/output as 
well as creating standards, benchmarks, and development priorities. In 2009 the 
group included Oxfam GB, World Vision International and International Medical 
Corps. Oxfam intended to cover 75% of its supply chain within 18 months. 
 
Figure 59: HELIOS Supply Chain Software: Project Characteristics 
 
                                                 
70
 This may be promoted by the fact that competition regarding the use of new IT is “of less importance” 
(Pettit and Beresford 2009: 459). 
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Before switching to the costs and benefits of pool sharing, the extraordinarily 
important role of donors for the implementation of this concept is illustrated. 
Donors appreciate capacity building and standardization and thus may promote – 
e.g. through their funding criteria – efforts to apply pool sharing. European 
Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), for instance, is such a donor whose 
funding objectives comprise capacity building and standard operating procedures 
(Fritz Institute 2007b). Thereby it primarily funds activities of UN agencies and 
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
and from 2002-2007 committed more than € 115 million71 (ECHO 2008: 4).  
 
An example of funded projects would be IFRC’s regional logistics units for pre-
positioning – called Humanitarian Procurement Centres – whose job it is to 
provide professional and harmonised services to both the RC movement and 
other partners (ECHO 2008: 6-7). Another project would be WFP’s regional UN 
Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD) whose main task is it to strengthen the 
relief efforts of UN, international, governmental, and non-governmental 
organizations (ECHO 2008: 8). Analogous to the in 4.1 already presented 
UNHRD in Brindisi (Italy) access is granted to all the abovementioned 
organizational types in other UNHRD in Accra (Ghana), Dubai (United Arab 
Emirates), Panama City, and Subang (Malaysia) (ECHO 2008: 8). The only 
requirement for the use of UN depots is to be an ECHO partner72 – a relationship 
that is stipulated in a standard Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (ECHO 
2008: 9). A third project is the Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL) 
headed by the Fritz institute (which is also involved in HELIOS). ECHO 
supports this certification based on a distance-learning course that links job 
experiences with theory (ECHO 2007: 7). 
 
                                                 
71
 This figure is only about the thematic funding ‘capacity building”. In 2006, for example, ECHO spent a 
total of € 671.3 million (ECHO 2007: 2). By its own account ECHO is “one of the largest single donors 
of humanitarian assistance in the world” and accounts for approximately 25% of total global humanitarian 
aid (ECHO 2007: 2).  
72
 In total there are more than 200 implementing partners (Fritz Institute 2007b).  
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Donors that appreciate capacity building and standardization are important for 
the implementation of pool sharing. The European Commission Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO), for example, funds such activities of the UN and the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 
 
Figure 60: Capacity Building: The Importance of Donors 
 
After the presentation of the status quo of pool sharing and the associated donor 
importance, costs and benefits of pool sharing are now presented. 
  
4.3. Costs of Pool Sharing  
Calculating the costs of pool sharing is challenging. This is valid for the whole 
humanitarian sector as full costs are difficult to obtain. Feldbrügge reports with 
regard to relief efforts of GTZ, a development agency owned by the German 
state, in Mozambique’s flooding emergency in 1998 that “with the exception of 
relief items, most of the costs for a full cost calculation were not available” 
(2001: 125). Anyway, the author would like to briefly present expenses that 
accompany pool sharing. Pool sharing is a form of cooperation and thus – per 
definition – includes coordination. As Minear found out coordination usually 
goes with considerable expenditures (2002; quoted in Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 85). Accordingly “sometimes parties are unwilling to share 
because they do not want to assume the cost or invest in the resources needed” 
(Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2009b: 105).  
 
Generally we can speak of direct and indirect costs. The former comprise – inter 
alia – “salaries, travel costs to the field for those coordinating, time and money 
for travelling to meetings for those being coordinated” (Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove 2009b: 85). Indirect costs occur especially at headquarters. It is 
usually at the senior level where pool sharing agreements are stipulated, 
concluded and approved. These negotiations constitute significant transaction 
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costs73. The same is valid for expenses that go with the preparing of reports and 
the salaries of those in charge of negotiating, evaluating, reporting and the like. 
In addition it can be argued that the “time-consuming review processes for joint 
reports, which are likely to be longer the more agencies are involved, cannot be 
taken lightly” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 85). Consequently it is 
always important to monitor the cost/benefit ratio. As Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove argue: 
    
“If those involved cannot reap additional benefits from the coordinated efforts 
compared to what they could have achieved in going it alone, then the investment 
in time and money will have been a waste” (2009b: 85). 
 
Benefits of pool sharing are now presented in subchapter 4.4. 
 
4.4. Benefits of Pool sharing 
As always the cost/benefit ratio should determine if organizations cooperate or 
not. Pool sharing – or better – the proper implementation and running of it can 
reap significant benefits. These are now presented with regard to cost, risk, 
service level, and income. Thereby the first three benefits match the humanitarian 
supply chain evaluation framework of McGuire that comprises “cost (resources), 
risk (insecurity) and reduction of suffering (customer service)” (2006). 
 
4.4.1. Decrease of Costs 
Similarly to the difficulty of calculating the costs of pool sharing, it is 
challenging to determine its cost reductions in numbers. Hence the presented 
examples are both rather conceptual and evidenced by praxis. The structure 
follows the categorization of different types of pool sharing introduced in 4.1.  
 
 
                                                 
73
 Search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs 
(Watkins 2009).  
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Pool sharing of information 
Sharing of information can decrease costs of virtually all logistics activities. For 
this section the author compiled three tasks of humanitarian logistics: needs 
assessment, procurement, and distribution. 
 
Regarding needs assessment it is essential to estimate the actual number of 
affected persons as precisely as possible. But this is often not the case. In the 
2004 Asian tsunami, for instance, many organizations assessed needs like 
nutrition on basis of registered persons within a community (Perry 2007: 420). 
As Perry argues that turned out to be a miscalculation as the actual number of 
victims was considerably lower due to the high degree of casualties caused by the 
natural disaster’s impact (2007: 420). If agencies had systematically shared data, 
information, and knowledge, they would have been able to calculate correctly 
and thus save money.  
 
Another important fact regarding this issue, constitute the costs that accompany 
the registration of victims. With regard to refugee populations, for example, 
Telford estimates the ‘cost of periodic registrations or revalidations’ to be 
approximately one dollar per person in Africa (Telford 1997; quoted in 
Feldbrügge 2001: 92). And in this figure indirect costs like travel expenses and 
working time are not even included (Telford 1997; quoted in Feldbrügge 2001: 
92). Here we have an economies-of-scale effect. The more organizations share 
their information respectively contribute personnel and equipment to this 
endeavour, the cheaper registration costs are per agency.  
 
Procurement is another activity whose costs can be decreased by pool sharing of 
information. Humanitarian agencies could share information regarding common 
high-frequency and/or high-cost items. Thereby participating organizations get a 
clearer picture of the market and thus a better bargaining position - a situation 
that eventually leads to decreased expenses. Even better – of course – is the 
foundation of a consortium in order to aggregate demand. Gustavsson speaks of 
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“higher purchasing-power discounts and framework agreements”74 (2003: 7). 
Similarly argues Soin (2004; quoted in Pettit and Beresford 2009: 461). This is 
valid for all types of civil humanitarian actors like UN agencies and NGOs of all 
sizes. Another important issue are currency exchange rates. Procurement of 
humanitarian actors is often conducted locally. But especially in developing 
countries official exchange rates may differ from unofficial exchange rates. 
Hence information sharing with regard to reasonable sources of domestic 
currency indirectly reduces local purchasing costs.       
 
The third activity – distribution – is often characterised by competition on the 
buyer side. Pettit and Beresford state: 
 
“In emergency relief situations, however, aid agencies are likely to be competing 
with each other for the same transport capacity and this will increase the cost as 
local transport sources react to market forces and increase prices as demand 
outstrips supply.” (2009: 457) 
 
In certain cases prices of distribution will be subject to price-rigging as well. In 
Afghanistan, for instance, competitive patterns of aid agencies combined with 
scarce resources resulted in a cargo transport cartel that increased prices by 300% 
within six months (Kaatrud, Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 13). This is 
where pool sharing of information comes into play. Some organizations may 
know the ‘true’ prices respectively the rates charged before the humanitarian 
crisis. Anyway, as they negotiate with a cartel they are not able to get a 
reasonable deal. But if they share this information with the majority of agencies 
and agree with them on an equal bidding behaviour, prices are likely to fall. That 
was also the case in Afghanistan. The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 
(UNJLC) – the main logistics coordinator for UN agencies and NGOs in that 
relief effort – conducted a study on the domestic transport market (Kaatrud, 
                                                 
74
 With regard to nutrition: if members of the consortium share inventory space too, the decrease of costs 
has even two layers. The first layer is represented by lower purchase prices at every time of the year. The 
second layer refers to the fact that during the harvest season prices are lower than during the rest of the 
year. By buying food supplies in advance and commonly storing them, agencies profit a second time. Of 
course this is only valid if individual storage costs are low. 
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Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003: 13). The findings of the survey resulted in the 
following actions of the UNJLC:            
 
“After conducting a technical study on the Afghan transport sector, the UNJLC 
presented a transport price proposal intended for use by all agencies. By 
threatening to bring in a UN trucking fleet in the event of non-agreement and 
publishing agreed rates on its website, it put an end to the price hike. Overall, 
millions of the humanitarian community’s dollars were saved.” (Kaatrud, Samii 
and Van Wassenhove 2003: 13) 
 
Altogether we could say that the individual searching costs for any crisis-related 
information can be reduced by applying the pool sharing concept. Forecasts, for 
instance, integral part of any decisions with regard to logistics, profit from data 
matching and aggregation and thus from pool sharing. 
 
Pool sharing of information can decrease costs of virtually all humanitarian 
logistics activities, examples being needs assessment, forecasting, procurement, 
and distribution.  
 
Figure 61: Pool Sharing of Information: Cost Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of human resources 
Personnel accounts for the largest share of overall costs in the humanitarian 
sector (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 145). Manifestations of pool 
sharing of human resources are common projects where persons from different 
agencies come together in order to work on a specific topic, or even the sharing 
of persons in the sense of an agency for temporary work.  
 
An example of the former would be the development and implementation of 
software by multi-agency teams. This has been the case in the HELIOS project – 
presented in 4.2.3 - where staff from various organizations has been working 
together on a common supply chain software platform. Oxfam – the lead agency 
with regard to implementation – in September 2009 intended to start operations 
of HELIOS in 20 countries – that would mean that it has covered 75% of its 
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supply chain within 18 months (Fritz Institute 2009a). It supposedly would not 
have been able to do this without a software platform already tailored to 
humanitarian logistics and shared implementation know-how. Hence it can be 
said that due to the common use of personnel the participating organizations 
saved costs and time.  
 
The second type of pool sharing of human resources – the temporary deployment 
of staff from one organization to another and vice versa – is applied by actors 
like the WFP which uses stand-by partners like governmental entities, NGOs or 
private donors that contribute with cadres of specialists to logistical operations 
(Scott-Bowden 2003: 18). Similarly, WFP deploys staff to its partners on request. 
Following Mayr this helps organizations to “extend geographical reach and keep 
personnel costs down” (2006: 24). 
 
Due to the common use of human resources - the most expensive factor in 
humanitarian logistics - the partner agencies save costs and time as well as 
extend the geographical range of their operations. 
 
Figure 62: Pool Sharing of Human Resources: Cost Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of inventory space 
There are manifold examples of pool sharing of inventory space reaching from 
commonly operated inventory centres to reserve capacity one organization has in 
the storage facilities of its partner. Both types provide not only more flexibility, 
but also reduce costs. In the former case capital expenditure is distributed 
according to the actor’s reserved capacity and thus shared. In addition there may 
be the possibility to profit from economies of scale. The latter case especially 
addresses aid agencies that either start operations in a country or are active there 
at irregular intervals. They are able to rapidly ship goods to the storage facility of 
their partners and distribute them further. An example of this type would be the 
UN Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD) in Brindisi (Italy), Accra 
(Ghana), Dubai (United Arab Emirates), Panama City, and Subang (Malaysia) 
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(ECHO 2008: 8) Eventually both types make global pre-positioning – a trend in 
the humanitarian world – feasible and, cheaper.        
 
Pool sharing of distribution 
It is about sharing distribution capacity in the form of free volume in aircrafts, 
trucks, ships, trains, cars, and the like. Regarding ‘cost reduction potential’ this 
approach is of importance. Vehicle fleet management, for instance, has the 
second largest share of overall costs in the humanitarian sector, only 
outnumbered by personnel (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 145). 
 
With the help of pool sharing of distribution excess capacity can be avoided and 
thus costs reduced. An example would be the charter of aircraft. As this means of 
distribution is a very expensive one, it is important to use 100% of capacity in 
order to spread cost over a maximum of relief goods and equipment. Anyway, 
aid agencies often do not use all of this capacity due to time restrictions. This 
excess capacity could have been sold to another humanitarian actor who is in 
need of it. 
 
Another issue tackled by pool sharing of distribution is the trade-off between 
transport costs and transport frequency respectively supply chain responsiveness. 
This relation is critical to transport planning (Chopra and Meindl 2004: 451). In 
order to guarantee a responsive supply chain, humanitarian organizations should 
consolidate their cargo heading for the same destination. Thus they would be able 
to ship goods in a flexible way while paying reasonable transport rates. McGuire 
states with regard to health care goods: 
     
“Transport efficiency as well as transport frequency can be increased by 
consolidation of health care goods with other humanitarian assistance goods such 
as food or shelter material, requested by the same destination. Another possibility 
is consolidation of health care goods from different humanitarian organizations 
but for the same destination into one shipment.” (2006: 189) 
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Hence it would be rational to share capacity. A systematic approach to this issue 
is an Internet-based distribution capacity exchange like the UNJLC website. 
Following Bock as many international NGOs as possible should be part of this 
exchange that works with agencies being resource providers - which state 
specifics of the means of distribution in question like dimensions and suitability 
– and resource enquirers – whose demand is based on specific needs like 
preservation of the cold chain (Bock 2006: 59). Alternatively also institutions 
like the Fleet Forum75 could be used to consolidate cargo. These initiatives 
“allow humanitarian organizations and the private sector to interact via a broker 
for best results” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 145). An advantage of 
this solution would be to work with an already existent exchange. The proper 
exchange of excess capacity would reduce costs significantly. Even the 
transaction costs inherent in any exchange could be offset by reduced 
paperwork76 and thus time spent on bureaucracy that usually accompanies 
international transportation (Mayr 2006: 58).   
 
With the help of pool sharing of distribution excess capacity can be avoided and 
thus costs reduced. In addition it enables to ship goods in a flexible way while 
paying reasonable transport rates. It works via an internet-based distribution 
exchange like the UNJLC website.    
 
Figure 63: Pool Sharing of Distribution: Cost Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of relief goods and equipment 
Similarly to the other approaches pool sharing of relief goods and equipment can 
decrease overall costs. Thereby especially transaction costs are reduced. The 
following explanation should help to understand this. It is valid for two 
scenarios. They feature an agency that is in immediate need for a certain relief 
good or equipment due to the fact that (a) its normal supplier(s) are not able to 
deliver in time or (b) it does not have a source of supply because of unexpected 
                                                 
75
 For more information on the Fleet Forum see Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2006. 
76
 Paperwork occurs due to customs clearance, insurance policies, or significant inter-modal activity 
(Mayr 2006:58) 
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demand. Hence this organization usually searches global-, regional, or local 
markets in order to find an adequate supplier. This involves considerable 
expenses like the cost equivalent of the time staff members need to find a proper 
offer and to negotiate and stipulate agreements (indirect costs) or travel expenses 
of employees (direct costs). These transaction costs can be mitigated by the use 
of pool sharing. By having a standby agreement regarding specific items with 
another humanitarian actor in place, the challenge described above could be 
overcome not only faster, but also cheaper. The immediate request for capacity 
does not incur extraordinary transaction costs. 
 
In this sense pool sharing functions best when participants act strategically. An 
organization is likely to agree on stand-by capacity that it either needs at irregular 
intervals or that it is impossible to get in proper quality. Thereby organizations 
can concentrate on their core supplies (and thus competences) while sometimes 
relying on others and vice versa. As the author’s literature review has shown, this 
form of pool sharing respectively specialization has yet been very rare. An 
example would be WFP that has agreements with standby partners to deploy 
service packages which comprise relief goods and equipment (Scott-Bowden 
2003: 18). 
 
Pool sharing of relief goods and equipment reduces transaction costs and works 
best with specialized agencies that manage differing items.  
 
Figure 64: Pool Sharing of Relief Goods and Equipment: Cost Factors Addressed 
 
To summarize this chapter the following quote of UNJLC Afghanistan’s 
achievements with regard to cost reductions is presented:   
 
“While there is no quantitative evidence to assess the magnitude of the cost 
reduction, it is clear that in this case the humanitarian community benefited from 
consolidating their purchasing power to obtain better deals with their service 
providers, maximizing the use of space in aircraft, keeping their inventory low, 
improving their planning and forecasting throughout the supply chain, 
minimizing competition for resources among partners, increasing their service 
level since the UNJLC prioritized cargo based on beneficiary needs.” (Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 72) 
 119 
4.4.2. Decrease of Risk 
Crises trigger situations full of risk that humanitarian logistics has to deal with. 
Kovacs and Spens even state that “humanitarian supply chains are specialized in 
managing large-scale risks” (2009: 507). On the one side risks occur for the 
affected population. The remedy of these problems is the main goal of aid 
agencies. On the other side they constitute an important challenge to the relief 
organizations themselves as these regularly are active in environments that pose 
security challenges or funding constraints. Security, for example, is a major issue 
in humanitarian work. Following Bickley traffic and vehicle-related accidents 
alone are responsible for the major share of humanitarian workers that are either 
injured or killed (2003: 60; quoted in McGuire 2006: 187). Thus it can be argued 
that the second type of risk affects the basis for crisis relief as the solution of an 
organization’s own problems must have priority over the solution to the problems 
of end beneficiaries77. This subchapter only deals with the second type of risk 
that addresses the humanitarian actors themselves. The risks of the affected 
population are directly addressed by the service level provided by aid agencies 
and are thus elaborated in 4.4.3, Increase of service level.       
 
This thesis exclusively deals with the risk for the humanitarian actors themselves, 
namely security challenges and funding constraints. 
 
Figure 65: Limitation of the Term ‘Risk’ 
 
Pool sharing of information 
The sharing of data, information, and knowledge is of big importance to risk 
reduction. Due to time pressure and other obstacles aid agencies regularly are not 
able to adequately process information, a situation that usually leads to incorrect 
decisions with regard to meeting an organization’s needs. Following Feldbrügge 
this lack of capacity has its “roots in high time pressure, size and complexity of 
the decision-making situation and the choice of an inappropriate decision-making 
                                                 
77
 Medicines sans Frontières, for example, withdrew staff for five years from Afghanistan (June 2004-
June 2009) due to security concerns (MSF 2009). 
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model” (2001: 64). As the preferences of the organization and the type of 
available information define the decision-making parameters (Königsperger 
1997: 4; quoted in Feldbrügge 2001: 64), the probability of decisions based on 
biased respectively fragmentary information is high. This can be remedied by 
pool sharing of information. As partners share data, information, and knowledge, 
they are able to match their preferences and mitigate asymmetric information. 
The refined decision-making parameters contain the drawing of false 
consequences and thus the risk for organizational staff, assets, or funding is 
reduced. Regarding staff and assets, for example, sharing information about 
necessary security preparations, cultural issues, dangerous routes, military 
checkpoints, reliable middlemen, and more, helps to reduce risks. Funding, on 
the other side, is made easier with help of agencies sharing information about 
access to donors, formal requirements, joint appeals, and coordination of 
proposals.     
 
Pool sharing of information about necessary security preparations helps to reduce 
risks. Funding is easier with help of agencies sharing information about access to 
donors, formal requirements, joint appeals, and coordination of proposals.     
 
Figure 66: Pool Sharing of Information: Risk Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of human resources 
From an organization’s view it is a challenge to overcome security problems and 
funding constraints. Personnel from different agencies can work together in order 
to decrease the risk that emanates from these problems. Regarding security, for 
instance, humanitarian actors regularly put together personnel in order to form 
convoys of vehicles. The latter “allow one to assist the other in rough spots, 
where a single vehicle would be rendered helpless and vulnerable” (Mayr 2006: 
66). Bickley, for instance, recommends that every vehicle heading for a 
dangerous passage must be accompanied by at least one other means of transport 
(2003: 69; quoted in McGuire 2006: 188). Especially in environments 
characterised by (civil-) war, this decreases the risk of getting kidnapped, injured, 
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or even killed. Another – totally different - issue tackled by pool sharing of 
human resources are funding constraints. An example of this would be the joint 
generation of funding appeals and project proposals that address public funding 
mechanisms like the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). 
Another example would be joint fundraising via commonly operated websites or 
social network groups in order to reach private individuals.   
 
In order to reduce security risks humanitarian actors put together personnel in 
order to form convoys of vehicles. Funding risks are addressed by joint appeals. 
 
Figure 67: Pool Sharing of Human Resources: Risk Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of inventory space 
This approach to pool sharing reaches from commonly operated inventory 
centres to reserve capacity one organization has in the storage facilities of its 
partner. Especially the latter version can help to reduce funding risks. Today aid 
agencies compete for donor funding. Donors, on the other side, are likely to 
choose actors that have a special core competence. One of these core 
competencies would be to provide basic shelter everywhere in the world at 
record speed. Pool sharing of inventory space supports this as the applying 
agency is able to rapidly start operations even in countries where it does not have 
warehouses through its ability to ship goods to the storage facilities of its local 
partners. The communication of this capability – often under the name of global 
pre-positioning – helps to avoid funding constraints and thus secures activities.        
 
Pool sharing of distribution 
This variation of the pool sharing concept mitigates security risks. As was 
elaborated before traffic and vehicle-related accidents alone are responsible for 
the major share of humanitarian workers that are either injured or killed. The 
reasons behind this fact are dangerous routes with regard to road conditions 
and/or possible ambushes of insurgents or driver fatigue. Therefore it is 
opportune in such circumstances to reduce shipments to the absolutely necessary. 
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The pooling of asset capacity of trucks or ships is thus an adequate means to 
reduce an organization’s risk to the minimum. McGuire states: 
 
“The ‘economies of risk’ requires using larger vehicles, consolidating 
consignments into full car or truck loads and reducing delivery frequency and 
flexibility if necessary. For the driver and the assets, the risk of travelling through 
a dangerous area is the same whether the vehicle is empty or full. Consequently 
two deliveries with a half full vehicle will double the risk for the driver. Likewise 
two deliveries of full car loads incur twice the risk of a single delivery with a 
truck which can carry the same load as two cars.” (2006: 187) 
 
In dangerous circumstances it is opportune to reduce shipments to the absolutely 
necessary. The pooling of asset capacity is an adequate means to achieve this. 
 
Figure 68: Pool Sharing of Distribution: Risk Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of relief goods and equipment 
Analogous to pool sharing of inventory space this approach underscores the 
organization’s capability of starting operations anywhere at record speed. This is 
possible through the rapid availability of special goods or equipment through 
partner agencies. The risk of funding is thus supposedly reduced as the 
humanitarian actor in question is able to show a distinguishing core competence 
that attracts donors. 
4.4.3. Increase of Service Level 
The pool sharing concept not only has the possibility to reduce costs and risks, 
but also to enhance an agency’s service level. Sharing capacity adds flexibility as 
well as operational and geographical range, and thus makes an organization more 
capable and beneficiary-oriented.  
 
Within the humanitarian world, though, there is often a different understanding 
of who these beneficiaries are. Many NGOs, for instance, would call their donors 
‘customers’ and the people they help ‘victims’ or ‘affected population’. These 
organizations primarily feel responsible to their funding sources (Oloruntoba and 
Gray 2002; quoted in Oloruntoba and Gray 2009: 490). Anyway, the majority of 
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aid agencies supposedly define the affected people as customers. Following 
Oloruntoba and Gray – who adopt the commercial customer service perspective 
to the emergency response context - these customers, not the sources of funds, 
“should be the focus of emergency relief chains because they[…]may be affected 
by injury, illness, hunger, thirst, homelessness, and so forth” (2009: 489). 
Similarly argues McGuire who states that “customer satisfaction[…]also applies 
to humanitarian organizations” (2006: 126).  
 
Through this adoption of commercial customer service perspective to the 
humanitarian context, the definition of service level changed. Whereas the 
former notion provides supreme customer service to the most profitable products 
and services (Christopher 1998: 59; quoted in McGuire 2006: 132), the latter 
provides supreme customer service to the most critical goods and services 
(McGuire 2006: 132). Generally the notion of customer service in a relief context 
- that is non-repetitive, non-routine, and non-profit - is scarcely researched 
(Oloruntoba and Gray 2009: 486-489). 
 
Anyway, important things to notice when talking about customer service in this 
context are that - besides the unpredictability of demand in crisis relief - (a) end 
users of goods are normally no clients of the vendor, transport-provider, or donor 
(Long and Wood 1995: 213), (b) end users usually do not have any formal claims 
against ‘sponsors’ of funds, goods, and services (Long and Wood 1995: 226), 
and (c) emergency relief chains are characterised by a high number of volunteers 
that lack training (Oloruntoba and Gray 2003; quoted in Oloruntoba and Gray 
2009: 490).        
 
Sharing capacity makes an organization more capable and customer-oriented. 
Customers of aid actors are the beneficiaries. Applying the commercial customer 
service perspective on humanitarian logistics is difficult due to the characteristics 
of humanitarian affairs.   
  
Figure 69: Customer Service Perspective on Humanitarian Logistics 
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Aid agencies have to deal with these circumstances. Anyway, some of them 
supposedly have the false indicators of a proper customer service in crisis relief 
as Oloruntoba and Gray argue: 
 
“For example, NGOs have such internal measures of customer service 
performance as tones delivered on-site damage-free, number of containers 
arriving on-site on time, number of aid-users fed per day, or number of relief 
staff arriving promptly in the disaster zone.” (2009: 494) 
 
These indictors are too technical and neglect the perspective of beneficiaries: 
McGuire states: 
 
“Logistics services of humanitarian organizations need to develop a general 
customer service policy but also need to tailor services to the context, constraints 
and requirements of individual humanitarian assistance programmes as well as to 
the needs of the respective end-users.” (2006: 131) 
 
Pool sharing, on the other side, demands incorporation of this view as it is all 
about how to reach more beneficiaries in less time, how to promote cooperation 
in order to add service complementarities, how to promote different skills and 
ways of reaching people, and the like. The remaining subchapter presents 
examples of this outcome, thereby again following the familiar categorization of 
pool sharing types. 
 
Pool sharing of information 
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove state that “information is the foundation upon 
which the humanitarian supply chain is designed, formed, and managed” (2009b: 
90). Anyway, as already elaborated in 4.4.2 Decrease of risk, due to time 
pressure and other obstacles aid agencies regularly are not able to adequately 
process information. This situation leads to incorrect decisions with regard to 
meeting beneficiaries’ needs. In order to reduce the probability of decisions 
based on biased respectively fragmentary information, both preferences and 
available information of a humanitarian actor must be taken to a higher level. 
The way to reach this goal is pool sharing of information. As partners share data, 
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information, and knowledge, they refine their decision-making and thus the 
service level of aid. Especially knowledge is of utmost importance to more 
customer service. Thereby the following is valid: “The maximum value of 
knowledge is produced only when it is captured and shared among the different 
stakeholders” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 115) or ‘The higher the 
knowledge level, the higher the service level’.  
 
Practical examples of pool sharing of information with regard to an increase of 
service level would be needs assessment, demand forecasting, and food 
distribution. These intertwined tasks are of essential importance for crisis relief. 
Unfortunately, they are often conducted rather separately than together. Perry, for 
instance, reports that in the 2004 Asian tsunami emergency response “the 
majority of the needs assessments were made separately by the international aid 
agencies for their own particular requirements” (2007: 420). Hence it would be 
opportune to work together and share information.  
 
With reference to needs assessment pool sharing of information is key as today’s 
emergencies are very complex, making joint analyses a factor in increasing 
service level. Similarly forecasting based on pool sharing of information delivers 
better results with respect to precision as demand is aggregated. The better data, 
information, and knowledge are, the better the forecast will be. Indeed, if two 
humanitarian agencies share needs and forecasting information, this reduces not 
only the bullwhip effect and thus the cost of inventory, but also increases service 
level as recipients get aid in time and at the right amount.  
 
Another example of this approach to pool sharing would be food distribution. 
Regarding the equal distribution of nutrition the proper update of beneficiary lists 
is of extraordinary importance (Mayr 2006: 76). If aid actors share information 
relating to this matter, this leads to more flexible and accurate registers and thus 
enhanced customer service as unequal food distribution is prevented. Further 
organizations often agree on ration cards that make the fast identification of 
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groups of beneficiaries easier (Mayr 2006: 76). These are often colour-coded and 
enable the instant determination of groups like ‘Families with children under five 
years’, ‘New arrivals’ ‘Locals’, or ‘Internally displaced persons’ (OHA 2003; 
quoted in Mayr 2006: 76).  
 
As partners share information they refine their decision-making and thus the 
service level of aid. Practical fields of application would be needs assessment, 
demand forecasting, and food distribution. 
 
Figure 70: Pool Sharing of Information: Service Level Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of human resources 
This approach to pool sharing leads to flexibility and specialization and thus 
enhances agencies’ service level. As argued in 4.1. Pool sharing of civil actors, 
pool sharing of human resources starts where pool sharing of information ends. 
The latter being a prerequisite for the former, cooperation enters a new stage. An 
example of this relationship would be needs assessment and demand forecasting 
that were elaborated in the section above from the ‘pool sharing of information 
view’. The ‘pool sharing of human resources view’, on the other side, is based on 
information sharing, but further incorporates the notion that personnel from 
different aid actors comes together in order to work on joint needs assessments 
and joint forecasting. This supposedly makes reports about end user demand and 
planning documents even more precise, a service level-increasing factor.  
 
Another example would be the HELIOS open source software developed and 
implemented by NGOs active in humanitarian aid as well as research and policy 
making. This joint project resulted in a successful common supply chain software 
platform whose functions presumably could not have been specified without the 
countless working hours of people coming from diverse NGOs. These functions 
alone increase the service level of HELIOS-applying organizations78. In addition 
                                                 
78
 Inter alia tracking and tracing (T&T). In relation to T&T Pettit and Beresford, for example, speak of a 
“potential to significantly improve the effectiveness of aid delivery and minimise waste” (2009: 458). 
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the software can be customized, a fact that lays the ground for more flexibility in 
the field, which is – vice versa – a trigger of service level improvement. Another 
benefit is speed. Oxfam, for instance, has covered 75% of its supply chain with 
HELIOS within 18 months (Fritz Institute 2009a). From this speed – possible due 
to open source software and information sharing with developers and 
implementers – current and future beneficiaries profit.  
 
Another example with regard to specialization provides the World Food 
Programme (WFP). This agency uses stand-by partners that contribute with 
cadres of specialists to logistical operations (Scott-Bowden 2003: 18). This helps 
to increase service level as demand for special services79 is satisfied in a flexible 
and fast manner under the umbrella of WFP’s field operations.   
 
In order to get more precise and faster results personnel from different aid actors 
comes together in order to work on joint needs assessments, joint forecasting, 
joint software development, or joint research and policy making.  
 
Figure 71: Pool Sharing of Human Resources: Service Level Factors Addressed 
 
Pool sharing of inventory space 
The main advantage of this approach is global pre-positioning. As sharing 
inventory space with partners around the globe is possible, agencies elevate the 
service level as they can respond faster and operate more flexible. This is 
especially valid for small niche actors like providers of special health care. An 
example with regard to fast response would be the UN Humanitarian Response 
Depot (UNHRD) in Southern Italy which is commonly operated by the UN, the 
Italian government and diverse partner agencies (Mayr 2006: 54). As the relief 
goods and equipment stored in the warehouse are already cleared through 
customs, participating actors can start operations at an adequate speed. More 
flexible operations, on the other side, are guaranteed through a worldwide 
                                                 
79
 These include not only special capabilities in logistics, but also in terms of languages and cultural 
competence (Mayr 2006: 24).   
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network of inventory space sharing partners that make an organization’s 
geographical range of operations more comprehensive.   
 
Pool sharing of distribution 
It is about sharing distribution capacity in the form of free volume in aircrafts, 
trucks, ships, trains, cars, and the like. Due to the consolidation of relief 
shipments more beneficiaries can be served in time and existing ones more 
frequent. The first goal is attained as excess capacity is avoided and thus more 
relief goods and equipment find their way to victims in time. Especially in the 
immediate post-disaster phase this is of utmost importance. Also the second 
objective – more frequent shipments – is achieved through more consolidation of 
cargo heading for the same destination. As organizations pay reasonable prices 
while shipping small amounts, a high transport frequency is feasible. This is 
essential particularly for slow-volume shippers like health care providers 
(McGuire 2006: 189).  
 
Pool sharing of relief goods and equipment 
This type of pool sharing provides flexibility and a time advantage similar to the 
ones elaborated above. As participating actors are able to use supplies from 
partners, their range of potential operational activity widens. If necessary, for 
example, organization A is able to request a water and sanitation unit from B and 
vice versa. From a service level perspective this concept is especially valuable 
when the participating agencies are specialized and need the requested supplies 
only occasionally or for short periods of time. Then, the transaction costs80 and 
thus time are relatively low – the population affected by a crisis can be 
extensively sheltered even by specialized actors within a short period of time. 
The WFP again uses this approach with its standby partners that deploy service 
packages which - inter alia - comprise relief goods and equipment (Scott-Bowden 
2003: 18).    
 
                                                 
80
 For more information, see 4.4.1, section pool sharing of relief goods and equipment. 
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4.4.4. Increase of Income    
The last benefit of pool sharing constitutes the increase of income. As the 
humanitarian actors portrayed in this thesis are non-profit organizations, income 
stands for funds of sponsors like private individuals, business, government 
agencies, foundations, academic institutions, and many more. In 2005 the annual 
budget of international NGOs was estimated to be US$ 26.9 billion (Gatignon 
2007; quoted in Koch 2009: 1). As many actors involved in humanitarian work 
compete for funding, it is important for an agency to be outstanding with regard 
to quality, quantity, speed, or flexibility. It is important to have a core 
competence that distinguishes one from another. Oloruntoba and Gray state with 
regard to NGOs: 
 
“Efficient emergency relief chain performance has implications for NGO 
business continuity.[…]Consequently, only those international NGOs that can 
leverage emergency relief chain management as a differentiator and competitive 
tool in the ‘crowded’ humanitarian sector are likely to possess a sustainable 
competitive advantage in the competition for donor funds, thereby guaranteeing 
their business continuity and survival.” (2009: 494-495) 
 
Oloruntoba and Gray list supply chain management (SCM) as key differentiator 
that provides a sustainable competitive advantage (2009: 495). Recovering the 
already elaborated facts of this thesis it can be argued that pool sharing is 
embodied in the SCM concept. Its principles like value-oriented cooperation 
mirror those of SCM. Consequently the author of this thesis believes that pool 
sharing can support an agency’s core competence and is itself a competence that 
can make the difference. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, for instance, call a 
“central platform” of agencies81 – a structure well known in pool sharing – a key 
differentiator when it comes to donor funding as the administrative costs of the 
platform are lower than those of solo-acting organizations (2009b: 85-86). In 
conclusion all the manifestations of pool sharing presented in chapter four – 
already realized or yet concept – have the potential to constitute this competitive 
advantage and secure an agency’s funding.  
                                                 
81
 The in 4.2.3 presented HELIOS Users Group (HUG) would be an example of a central platform. 
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4.5. Obstacles to Pool Sharing  
This subchapter deals with obstacles to pool sharing. Before the four main 
obstacles are presented – namely donor orientation, competition, organizational 
culture, and lack of strategic thinking – the context of pool sharing is briefly 
reviewed.  
 
Pool sharing is an eligible concept within humanitarian logistics whose main 
benefits are a decrease of cost, a decrease of risk, an increase of service level, and 
an increase of income. However, it is mainly conceptual as the number of 
organizations that thoroughly apply pool sharing is supposedly low82. Many 
logisticians prefer to work on their own with only little cooperation (Thomas and 
Kopczak 2005: 6). Schulz and Heigh, for instance, attach logistics personnel little 
willingness to account for best practices either applied by other humanitarian 
actors or by private business (2007; quoted in Pettit and Beresford 2009: 451). 
Reasons for the former may be the reluctance of NGOs to communicate - this is 
especially valid for Southern NGOs (Lenzen 2001: 12; quoted in Appel 2009: 
97) – and the conflict of an organization’s self-interest and its professional 
interest (Brock 2001; quoted in Appel 2009: 97). The actors themselves respond 
differently. Asking, for example, major Austrian relief organizations about 
cooperation during the 2004 Asian tsunami emergency response, Bock found out 
that they reduced cooperation to information sharing due to different 
philosophies, key activities, goals, budgets, and so on (2006: 52). In addition they 
tend to work within the existing network structures of their partner organizations 
(Bock 2006: 52). The Austrian Red Cross works within the IFRC, CARE Austria 
within CARE International, and the like. 
 
                                                 
82
 Some findings of a study of Koch and Van der Laan: although 58% of 47 questioned NGOs in the 
Arusha region of Tanzania (characterised by agency concentration) have cost sharing agreements with 
other organizations, only 43% share human resources, 34% share means of distribution (especially 
vehicles), and 27% conduct joint fundraising (2007: 7). Regarding the sharing of information in the relief 
efforts triggered by the 2004 Asian tsunami 56% of logisticians shared information about how to set up 
the supply chain (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 6). 
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However, besides the lack of communication, ad-hoc management and well-
established agency-specific networks, the author of this thesis chose donor 
orientation, competition, organizational culture, and lack of strategic thinking to 
be the main obstacles to pool sharing.      
 
Following research humanitarian logistics are characterized by a reluctance of 
agencies to communicate and the conflict of an organization’s self-interest and its 
professional interest. The actors themselves speak of different philosophies, key 
activities, and goals and prefer to work in the network structures of their partners. 
 
Figure 72: Obstacles to Pool Sharing: Reasons  
 
4.5.1. Donor Orientation 
Basically donors are - as income-providing institutions - very important 
stakeholders of humanitarian organizations. Their importance must be taken into 
account and their interests, requirements and conditions considered (Thomas and 
Kopczak 2005: 11). This basic donor orientation is valuable. Anyway, often the 
relation between sponsors and aid agencies incorporates dynamics that prevent 
interagency cooperation and thus pool sharing. Their consequences – at the same 
time the name of the following sections – are misguided funding, earmarked 
donations, and adoption of donor structures.   
 
Misguided funding 
When we talk about the work of humanitarian actors, basically programs and 
support services are meant. The former activities are highly ‘visible’ and include 
services like the provision of food, water, shelter, sanitation, and the like, 
whereas the latter ones are rather ‘invisible’ and comprise logistics, technology, 
communication, human resources, and more (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 5). 
Pool sharing is incorporated within the second – ‘invisible’ – sphere. As it 
combines logistics, technology, communication, and human resources, it 
provides the basis for the front-line activities mentioned above. Unfortunately, 
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donors want to fund programs, not support. Regarding logistics, for example, 
Thomas argues that many sponsors not even understand its role and importance 
(2003: 1). Hence receivers of funding would spend their money on operations 
rather than on administration (Lewis 2007: 20). Thomas and Kopczak state:      
 
“Funds are usually allocated by donors to programs with a certain percentage 
allowed for administration, which includes support. Thus, the focus is on short-
term direct relief rather than investment in systems and processes that will reduce 
expenses or make relief more effective over the long-term. As a consequence, 
logistics and other support services may not have adequate funding for strategic 
disaster preparedness, and investing in infrastructure, such as information 
systems83, is discouraged.” (2005: 5)  
 
Arguable aid agencies follow this direct requirement. It is called direct as it is 
usually bound to public support and thus funding. Nevertheless, thereby pool 
sharing is impeded as “strategic disaster preparedness opportunities are 
discouraged” (Thomas 2003: 7). 
 
In contrast to ‘invisible’ activities like logistics or information technology, 
donors tend to fund ‘visible’ ones like the provision of water or shelter. 
 
Figure 73: Obstacles to Pool Sharing: Misguided Funding 
 
Earmarked donations 
Another type of direct requirement is an earmarked donation. Regarding 
procurement, for example, there are basically many possibilities for humanitarian 
actors. They could choose between an open and a restricted tender (McGuire 
2006: 142) as well as pool sharing where information with partner agencies is 
shared or even joint purchasing agreements are stipulated. Anyway, often 
national legislation and – especially – donor requirements must be considered 
(McGuire 2006: 142). Sponsors may, for instance, tag donations to a special 
source of supply, to a country of origin, or even to a type of purchase like 
collaborative sourcing. The first two examples do not support any pool sharing 
                                                 
83
 Mayr, for instance, lists e–procurement, advanced tracing and tracking methods, and inventory 
management systems (2006: 87). 
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thoughts, whereas the third one does. Hence donors – through their requirements 
– have the possibility to do both encourage and discourage pool sharing. 
However, historically sponsors have not fostered clear incentives to coordinate 
and cooperate (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 85). Unfortunately, this 
pattern still appears to prevail today. Tomasini and van Wassenhove state: 
 
“Agencies also differ in their funding mechanisms which have a direct impact on 
their flexibility. Earmarked donations pose a challenge for coordination, limiting 
the ability of agencies on the ground to reallocate resources as they deem most 
suitable.” (2009b: 84) 
 
Sponsors often tag donations to a special source of supply or to a specific country 
of origin. 
 
Figure 74: Obstacles to Pool Sharing: Earmarked Donations 
 
Adoption of donor structures 
As we have heard before, donors tend to fund operational rather than strategic 
disaster response and may require earmark donations – both direct formalities 
that humanitarian actors usually comply with in order not to loose income. 
Sometimes aid agencies even – consciously or unconsciously – adopt their 
organizational structures to those of their sponsors. In this case we can speak of 
an indirect requirement. This is especially valid for NGOs. Their work is often 
characterized by a cycle of temporary and underfunded projects and thus they 
“live from grant to grant and project to project” (Gustavsson 2003: 7). In order to 
secure long-term funding many organizations start to align their funding 
applications and their financial conduct84 to those of their donors. Regarding 
‘Northern’ NGOs this development has been recorded by Kuhn who traces this 
change back to co-financing agreements stipulated by donors (2005: 171-173; 
quoted in Appel 2009: 129).  
 
                                                 
84
 This comprises accounting, reporting, and the like. 
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Further bureaucratic structures manifest themselves due to strict regulations 
relating to the sizes of food aid, and the categorization of beneficiaries 
(Feldbrügge 2001: 76). These new administrative demands on aid agencies are 
challenging. Suzuki states:   
 
“NGOs which are funded by donors must always prioritize the provision of 
reports and information to these donors, but at the same time the organization 
must maintain a focus on the implementation of projects and the maintenance of 
effective relationships with the beneficiaries.” (1997; quoted in Lewis 2007: 202) 
 
Altogether this situation incorporates considerable problems to pool sharing as it 
makes the – besides agency-beneficiary and agency-donor cooperation - third 
layer of humanitarian work, namely agency-agency cooperation, even more 
difficult. As an organization’s capabilities are limited, and used to full capacity, 
inter-agency activities like joint appeals for funds are often neglected. In 
addition, following Carroll, this growth of ‘contracting’ reduces organizational 
learning and effectiveness in general (1992: 18; quoted in Lewis 2007: 77).  
 
In order to secure funding many organizations start to align their financial 
conduct to those of their donors. This growth of contracting impedes pool sharing 
as an agency’s capabilities are limited and joint appeals for funds thus neglected.    
 
Figure 75: Obstacles to Pool Sharing: Adoption of Donor Structures 
 
This subchapter has dealt with donor orientation. Dynamics of donor-actor 
relations often constitute an obstacle to pool sharing as they often lead to 
conforming actions of aid agencies and thus to misguided funding, earmarked 
donations, and adoption of donor structures. Oloruntoba and Gray conclude: 
 
“A significant proportion of the problems, challenges and complaints associated 
with both the international and domestic management of emergency relief chains 
may be traced to a simplistic, almost exclusive customer service focus (and 
reliance) on governmental donors and their agencies.” (2009: 488) 
 
 135 
4.5.2. Competition 
This subchapter deals with competition as obstacle to pool sharing. Before two 
main drivers of competition in the humanitarian world are analysed in detail – 
namely power and agency concentration – the general context of competition in 
this sector is presented. 
 
An aid agency has two types of interests, professional and selfish ones. In an 
ideal world, the former interests would by far outweigh the latter ones, and all 
participating actors in crisis relief would have the same goals as well as thorough 
knowledge with regard to the capabilities of the other partners (Relief Web 2005; 
quoted in Mayr 2006: 24). Anyway, in the present world it appears that 
professional and self-interests are in constant struggle for the lead. On the one 
hand there is cooperation to achieve humanitarian objectives, whereas on the 
other hand there is competition (Mayr 2006: 24). Thereby self-interest especially 
addresses an organization’s mode of operating and funding (Long and Wood 
1995: 216-226). Thus fundraising is of major importance as first, aid actors 
presumably do not have any income generated by own products or services, and 
second, limited resources trigger competition (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
2009b: 84).  
 
Hence competitive patterns have flourished between UN agencies and 
international NGOs (Stephenson 2005; quoted in Oloruntoba and Gray 2009: 
495). These patterns are fortified if aid actors neglect to differentiate themselves. 
With regard to NGOs Oloruntoba and Gray state: 
 
“Many humanitarian NGOs do exactly the same things: they go to the same 
donors (governments, institutional and private); they use the same mass media to 
raise funds; their marketing strategies are very similar; and they use the same 
transport carriers and logistics service providers.” (2009: 495) 
 
Especially marketing is of major importance when it comes to fundraising. The 
more distinguishable an agency is, the easier is it to market itself as something 
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special. Eventually this may culminate in being a brand. If, however, an 
organization lacks to achieve this, other actors will be able to quickly copy any 
new marketing strategies employed (Daugherty, Stank, and Ellinger 1998: 47). 
The result is competition and “often to the detriment to valuable coordination” 
(Fenton 2003: 24). Thus it would be purposeful to give these organizations an 
incentive to collaborate. Then their cooperation itself would incorporate a 
distinguishing effect and promote funding. So far donors have lacked to do this 
as Tomasini and Van Wassenhove report: 
 
“They (note: donors) have indirectly promoted competition by funding individual 
agencies based on their standalone performance,[…]capacity, and, to some 
extent, branding.” (2009b: 85) 
 
In the humanitarian sector professional and self-interests are in constant struggle 
for the lead. Due to limited funding, competitive patterns have flourished. These 
patterns are fortified if aid actors neglect to differentiate themselves. So far 
donors have rewarded individual, but not joint differentiation. 
 
Figure 76: Competition in the Humanitarian World 
 
OCHA and UNJLC85 aim at avoiding competition. However, due to power and 
agency concentration a certain degree of competition is likely to remain.  
 
Power 
Every cooperative effort needs the sharing of information. This force for good 
may be at the same time seen as a force for evil. This is because of the fact that 
information is power. Data, information, and knowledge usually make an 
organization special and thus may deliver a competitive advantage. Agencies fear 
to loose this advantage when they share information with others. As these 
patterns of power are supposedly valid for both the corporate86 and the 
humanitarian world, we can use an argument of Bowersox, Closs and Cooper 
                                                 
85
 Others would be the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) or the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 
86
 Harrison and Van Hoek, for instance, identify the misuse of power as a main barrier to a functioning 
supply chain (2002: 236).   
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who state that “in most business situations, knowledge is power, so unwillingness 
to share and a general lack of understanding how to share knowledge are not 
uncommon” (2007: 259).  
 
A type of power-bearing information that agencies are reluctant to share is 
funding source information (Lewis 2007: 184). Another would be information 
about logistics processes – thereby Mayr even attests many organizations to 
follow the “The organisation which is first at the disaster site gets more publicity 
and thus more donations” principle (2006: 87-88).  
 
Information is power. Thus many organizations are not willing to share it. A type 
of power-bearing information that agencies are reluctant to share is funding 
source information. Another would be information about logistics processes. 
 
Figure 77: Power – Background of Competition 
 
Agency concentration 
The second driver of competition presented is agency concentration. As 
explained in 3.4.5 Location decisions, increasing returns to scale, labour 
mobility, and path dependence are triggers of NGO concentration. This 
phenomenon causes competition and thus impedes cooperation. In literature on 
humanitarian logistics such statements can be found on a regular basis. Thomas 
and Kopczak, for instance, argue that “with an increasing number of aid 
agencies, the competition for donor funding is getting more intense” (2005: 4). 
Similarly Perry reports with regard to the 2004 Asian Tsunami that “the presence 
of so many aid groups hampered coordination efforts” (2007: 421). In order to 
better understand this connection between agency presence and competitive 
patterns, we first have to distinguish between different types of cooperation. 
Thereby a reference is made to chapter 4.1 where those levels of cooperation 
were already explained. These were introduced by Koch who set up the 
following benefit-oriented classification scheme (2009: 130):  
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• Level 1 cooperation is characterised by high selective benefits for individual 
NGOs, but not for the end beneficiaries. A classic example of this level would 
be cooperation that aims at the funding supply constraint like joint 
fundraising via websites, joint project proposals or joint appeal for funding. 
 
• Level 2 cooperation stands for general benefits for both individual NGOs and 
the target group. It usually aims at operational quality like joint training 
centres for staff or a mutual quality control system.  
 
• Level 3 cooperation delineates high benefits for the end beneficiaries, but not 
for the individual NGOs. Activities like the coordination of regional and 
thematic priorities fall into this level.    
 
Given this basic information the elaboration of the causal connection between 
organizational concentration and competition can be started. Works on this issue 
can be both conceptual and practical.  
 
Authors like Cooley and Ron (political economy applied on NGOs), Giles and 
Evans (social psychology applied on inter-group hostility), and Olson (political 
economy on collective action) argue from a theoretical point of view. Cooley and 
Ron, for instance, assert that the more local concentration of aid agencies takes 
place, the more strategic and opportunistic behavior would be the consequence as 
organizations seek to secure their survival (2002; quoted in Koch 2009: 128). 
Similarly, Giles and Evans - who use a power-oriented approach - come to the 
conclusion that increasing concentration would result in individual action to 
struggle for the control of economic, social, and political structures (1986: 483). 
Also the argumentation of Olson relates to the former ones. He argues that in 
bigger groups individual benefits would become less noticeable, whereas 
transaction costs would increase - an incentive-reducing situation that eventually 
leads to less cooperation (1971: 62). As we have seen, theoretical publications 
from 1971 to 2002 state ‘The more concentration, the fewer cooperation’ and 
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trace this competitive pattern back to the conflict about influence spheres. 
Arguable the trigger of cooperation manifests itself in the selective benefits for 
the individual organization, and not in the common benefits for the group (Olson 
1971: 2). As Olson argues this is especially valid for medium- to large groups:  
 
“Indeed unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small[…]rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests." (1971: 2) 
 
This has an impact on the level of cooperation preferred by humanitarian actors. 
Thus the conceptual approaches presented before are applied on the cooperation 
classification scheme of Koch. Thereby, level 1 cooperation - exclusively 
benefiting individual organizations - manifests itself often and following Olson is 
the maximum cooperation level of large groups87 (1971: 2, 62). Level 2 
cooperation benefits both agencies and the target group, and according to Olson 
would be the maximum cooperation of small groups (1971: 2, 62). The third 
level of cooperation provides mainly collective benefits. Its manifestation 
follows the ‘Value especially to beneficiaries, but not to agencies’ pattern and is 
supposedly rare. Interestingly, collective benefits tend to reach their maximum at 
medium-level concentration due to existing NGO complementarities and modest 
competition for funding and beneficiaries (Wade 1988; Barr and Fafchamps 
2005; both quoted in Koch 2009: 128-130).  
           
Practical approaches to the concentration-competition issue deliver a NGO study 
of Van Laan and a NGO simulation game of Koch, both simultaneously 
conducted in 2007 in the Arusha region of Tanzania, Africa. The former is a 
classical survey made up of 47 structured interviews (Van Laan 2007: 16). Its 
two main findings are now introduced to the reader. First, Van Laan found out 
that 69% of respondents state to cooperate on level 1, 57% on level 2 and only 
9% on level 3 (2007: 39). Second, it shows that the more concentration occurs 
                                                 
87
 This is valid unless there “is coercion or some other special device” (Olson 1971: 2). Olson names “the 
force of patriotism, the appeal of the national ideology, the bond of a common culture, and the 
indispensability of the system of law and order” (1971: 13). 
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(Arusha city), the lower cooperation (fewer hours) is (Van Laan 2007: 32). Both 
points basically validate the theoretical assumptions presented before. The 
second endeavour to proof the causal connection between concentration and 
competition is the NGO game conducted by Koch with the help of 37 
participating agencies (Koch 2009: 172). The findings of this extensive 
simulation game88 are analogous to the ones of the survey:  
 
“The more concentrated teams (teams that worked on the same theme and/or had 
more players) scored lower on cooperation. They succeeded in funding fewer 
joint projects that benefited the community.” (Koch 2009: 137) 
 
Consequently Koch concluded his research by stating that both survey and game 
“make it clear that high levels of concentration tend to reduce cooperation” 
(Koch 2009: 143). Interestingly, both empiric studies listed fundraising - an 
example of level 1 cooperation – the only exemption of this relation. NGOs 
reported to continue respectively continued this type of joint action even in a 
competitive environment (Koch 2009: 143). Koch comments this with “NGOs 
are only willing to cooperate when it benefits their own organization, and cease 
to do so when those benefits are not guaranteed” (2009: 143).  
 
In bigger groups individual benefits become less noticeable, whereas transaction 
costs increase - an incentive-reducing situation that leads to less cooperation and 
more competition for the control of economic, social, and political structures. 
Consequently, following a survey of 47 NGOs in Tanzania 69% cooperate on 
level 1, 57% on level 2, and only 9% on level 3 (Van Laan 2007: 39). 
 
Figure 78: Agency Concentration: Trigger of Competition 
 
 
                                                 
88
 For information regarding internal (game design) and external validity (survey), see Koch 2009: 139-
141.  
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4.5.3. Organizational Culture 
This subchapter deals with organizational culture as obstacle to pool sharing. 
Before presenting manifestations of this scenario, characteristics of aid agencies’ 
organizational culture are presented. They lay the background of this challenge to 
pool sharing.     
 
Characteristics of aid agencies’ organizational culture 
This section starts with a quote of Osborne and Plastrik who define 
organizational culture to be “a set of behavioural, emotional, and psychological 
frameworks that are deeply internalized and shared by the organization’s 
members” (1998: 255). This shared value system guides individual and collective 
decision-making and thus is a strong determinant for all activities. Regarding 
humanitarian actors these common frameworks relate to “the alleviation of 
suffering of victims of disasters and humanitarian emergencies” (Thomas 2003: 
7)89.  
 
Anyway, at the same time organizational culture can be a challenge to new 
logistics approaches like pool sharing. The reasons behind this may be either 
general or specific to the humanitarian sector. An example of the former would 
be information. As was explained in the previous subchapter individual 
knowledge is power – a situation that impedes pool sharing unless the perceived 
benefits of shared knowledge are high enough to change this. With regard to 
organizational culture information is essential too. Data, information, and 
knowledge gathered, compiled, and created by an organization, form its specific 
culture. It is when this information becomes sacred that pool sharing is 
discouraged. The main reason behind this may be that pool sharing incorporates 
new and/or differing information. It is hard to replace old ideas and realities with 
new ones if data, information, and especially knowledge are “entrenched and 
hard to replace” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 129).  
                                                 
89
 Values are based on general assumptions of life. In this case they could be traced back to faith, the 
humanitarian principles, altruism, and the like. 
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An example of the latter – reasons specific to the humanitarian sector – would be 
aid agencies’ values regarding the recruitment of logistics personnel. Thereby 
humanitarian actors tend to appreciate an individual’s attitude more than his or 
her capabilities. Consequently many neo-logisticians have no prior on- or off-the-
job training. Thomas reports: 
 
“People who choose a career in this world come from diverse and varied 
backgrounds. Our sample of head logisticians included an actor, an osteopath, an 
extreme sports enthusiast, a nurse and a country manager.” (2003: 7) 
 
Following Oloruntoba and Gray only 45 out of 100 logisticians of humanitarian 
organizations have a university degree or any other formal qualification in areas 
like transport or logistics (2003:4; quoted in McGuire 2006: 33). This type of 
culture tends to promote logisticians that are rather attitude-led than capability-
led. Their focus is rather on the ‘big thing’ than on process improvement 
(Thomas 2003: 7) and their background often lacks any experience with 
corporate logistics management (Gustavsson 2003: 7). Even if this slowly starts 
to change, it is still a situation leading to mismanagement and lack of strategic 
thinking. Pool sharing, however, needs strategic thinking. Whereas examples of 
mismanagement are presented in the next section, lack of strategic thinking is 
elaborated in the following subchapter.  
 
Organizational culture can be a challenge to pool sharing. The reasons behind 
this may be either general or specific to the humanitarian sector. An example of 
the former would be information as it forms an organization’s specific culture. It 
is when this information becomes sacred that pool sharing is discouraged. An 
example of the latter would be aid agencies’ values regarding the recruitment of 
logistics personnel. As these are rather attitude-led than capability-led, only 45 
out of 100 logisticians have a formal qualification in transport or logistics. 
 
Figure 79: Organizational Culture: A Challenge to Pool Sharing 
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Manifestations of the obstacle ‘organizational culture’ 
The author of this thesis chose three examples, namely lack of institutional 
learning, ineffective leveraging of technology, and organizational independence. 
The first phenomenon was explained by Thomas as consequence of 
“organizational culture and high employee turnover” (2003: 7). Thereby it can be 
argued that ‘high employee turnover’ also belongs to the sphere of an agency’s 
value system due to its temporary mission and reluctance to insist on a stable 
staff. From a value point of view it is accepted to be active as logistician for only 
nine months or one year. Consequently high (field-) logistics personnel turnover 
is enabled – Thomas and Kopczak speak of up to 80% (2005: 6). As staff 
changes frequently, usually information is lost, matters are not followed up, and 
individual connections with employees of other actors are discontinued. Edwards 
speaks of a value system that restricts information exchange (1994; quoted in 
Lewis 2007: 214). And Thomas and Kopczak mention: 
 
“The experience of the occasional veteran logistician is largely tacit and difficult 
to communicate to the next generation, nor is it transferred from one field context 
to another.” (2005: 6) 
 
The incubation time of innovative processes is thus elongated. And pool sharing 
can be regarded as (process-) innovation. The second manifestation is the 
ineffective leveraging of technology. As the organizational culture of many 
humanitarian actors for a long time has appreciated mission more than 
implementation respectively ‘product’ more than ‘process’, opportunities with 
regard to technology have been wasted. Thomas calls this a ‘pain point’ as 
“while the technology exists for creating the desired IT 
solutions[…]organizational culture[…]impeded systems development” (2003: 8). 
 
The third issue to address is organizational independence. Basically a positive 
thing it can turn out an obstacle to pool sharing when laid out in a radical way. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is such a case where the 
struggle for absolute independence impedes cooperation. Toby Lanzer, the 
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Humanitarian Coordinator of UN activities in the Central African Republic, had 
to take this in consideration:     
 
“Of course, some organisations, such as ICRC, are careful of such efforts to 
bring together the aid community, but we made it clear at each step that joint 
analysis and coordinated planning would in no way diminish or infringe on the 
independence of organisations.” (2008: 110) 
 
Red Cross representatives themselves – in this case an Austrian Red Cross 
officer interviewed by Lipok - state that extensive cooperation with actors like 
UN agencies or NGOs would be restrictively scrutinized as following the 
organization’s principle of independence such joint action would not be possible 
(2007: 79). As dunantists90 they see themselves as being different to UN 
agencies. So the latter would often pursue different politics, e.g. in combination 
with a peace-keeping mission91 (Lipok 2007: 107).  
 
As we have seen organizational culture can limit information exchange and 
logistics capabilities, and thus may lead to a lack of institutional learning, to 
ineffective leveraging of technology, and to the uncompromising desire to stay 
independent. Such a value system impedes pool sharing. 
 
Figure 80: Manifestations of the Obstacle Organizational Culture 
 
4.5.4. Lack of Strategic Thinking 
Organizational culture can trigger a lack of strategic thinking. This subchapter 
describes what this implies for pool sharing. These manifestations are now 
presented in the following sections, namely no recognition of the strategic 
                                                 
90
 Dunantists solely adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. Their 
beliefs follow the ones of Henry Dunant – the spiritus rector of the Red Cross - and they “advocate a non-
interventionist strategy in conflict” (Tomasini and van Wassenhove 2009b: 24). For more information see 
3.4.2.2. 
91
 Peace-keeping missions and large-scale emergencies involve the military. Usually aid agencies neglect 
cooperation with the military as they fear “that close association with the military could undermine the 
neutrality, impartiality and independence that characterises humanitarian aid” (OECD 1998: 10). 
Anyway, regarding large-scale emergencies like the 2004 Asian tsunami such an assessment is 
unfounded. Following the OECD the UN even build capacity of their aid agencies’ logistics systems in 
order to “‘raise the bar’ above which military involvement becomes necessary” (OECD 1998: 15). 
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importance of logistics, no communication of the strategic importance of 
logistics, and no understanding of strategic management. Thereby the word ‘no’ 
is symbolic and refers to insufficient. 
 
No recognition of the strategic importance of logistics  
Pool sharing is about individual agencies that share capacity in any form like 
information, human resources, inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and 
equipment. A prerequisite of this concept is a supply chain perspective92. 
Bowersox, Closs and Cooper define supply chain management (SCM) as “firms 
collaborating to leverage strategic positioning and to improve operating 
efficiency” (2007: 4). However, if aid agencies fail to regard logistics as 
essential, as key to SCM, this lack of strategic thinking constitutes an obstacle to 
pool sharing. As this is still common today we have to deal with no recognition 
of logistics’ strategic importance. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b state: 
 
“A significant stumbling block to better preparedness in the humanitarian sector 
has been the failure to have logistics recognized as an essential element of any 
relief operation.” (2009b: 52) 
 
Similarly argue Fenton (2003: 23) and Gustavsson (2003: 7). Of course, this 
attitude also affects human resources. From the senior to the field level 
logisticians are underrepresented. Thomas and Kopczak, for instance, revealed in 
their research that most budget-controlling jobs are occupied by program staff93, 
and that only 42% of the field assessment teams active in the 2004 Asian 
Tsunami emergency response included a logistician (2005: 5). Furthermore 
logistics personnel lack on- and off-the-job training – a prerequisite of pool 
sharing. The Fritz Institute94 conducted a survey of 104 senior logistics managers 
employed by 17 different aid agencies in order to explore if the ‘required skills’ 
in their job are matched by ‘perceptions of available and required training’ (Fritz 
                                                 
92
 The major difference between commercial and humanitarian SCM is their bottom-line goal: in the 
former case it is profit, in the latter case it is the adequate service level granted to beneficiaries (Tomasini 
and Van Wassenhove 2009a: 549) 
93
 In contrast to support staff. Program staff provides ‘visible’ activities like the provision of food, water, 
and shelter. Support staff conducts ‘invisible’ activities like logistics, technology, and communications. 
94
 For more information see 4.2.3.  
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Institute 2007a: 14). The following figure shows the six key skills identified by 
the respondents and their approval rating as well as the existing training of these 
skills (expressed in %). 
 
Key Skills Approval rating in % Training in % 
Managing people who 
perform logistics 
95% 41% 
Performance 
Measurement 
91% 41% 
Development of logistics 
strategy 
91% 34% 
Recruitment and training 
of new personnel 
88% 33% 
Setting up supply chains 
for new programs / 
operations 
85% 39% 
Process development 83% 20% 
 
Figure 81: Lack of Strategic Thinking: Insufficient Training of Key Skills                                    
(based on Fritz Institute 2007a: 15) 
 
All these skills are essential to pool sharing. They incorporate the potential to 
learn from past missions, to constantly think about future requirements, to start 
matching these requirements with the organization’s processes, and to make 
human resources ready for these processes. Unfortunately however, aid agencies 
do not adequately address these issues as Fritz Institute’s survey shows.  
 
With this background information in mind one should not wonder that there was 
a lack of qualified personnel in the 2004 Asian Tsunami relief efforts. Following 
a survey of Thomas and Kopczak 88% of large humanitarian agencies 
temporarily withdrew senior logisticians from ongoing missions in Sudan in 
order to fill this gap (2005: 5). Thus: pool sharing needs more ambition. And: 
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training is not training. Its proper realization needs adequate project 
management, input from outside the organization, and standardization (Thomas 
and Kopczak 2005: 6).  
 
No communication of the strategic importance of logistics  
Even if aid agencies are aware of logistics’ importance, pool sharing potential is 
often lost due to communication problems. Thomas and Kopczak chose an 
analogy to explain this issue:     
  
“The transformation of logistics from a peripheral function to a strategic one in 
the private sector can be traced back to the time when logisticians began to be 
able to measure and communicate their value.” (2005: 10) 
 
Basically this is also valid for humanitarian logistics. In order to communicate 
achievements to the public, to donors, to beneficiaries, to governments, or to 
other humanitarian actors, performance measurement is necessary. Thereby 
evaluating best practices could be obtained from companies that – like aid 
agencies – are active in an environment characterised by a series of projects 
(Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 11).  
 
No understanding of strategic management  
Aid agencies lack understanding of strategic management. This inadequate 
thought and practice may be due to the fact that humanitarian actors historically 
have shown the pattern of following commercial approaches with considerable 
delay. NGOs, for example, considered management to be - per se - insufficient to 
the non-profit sector (Lewis 2007: 191). This attitude has led to a situation where 
management is only seen on an ad-hoc basis – to the detriment of “formal 
management training and techniques” (Lewis 2007: 191). Following Dartington 
this created priorities in management that appreciate mission more than 
objectives (1992; quoted in Lewis 2007: 191). And this operations-only 
management is still common.  
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Another lesson of history provides the strategic planning approach in 
humanitarian logistics. The strategic planning concept was introduced by 
academic institutions and large US-American corporations in the 1970s. 
Ironically it is basically the opposite of the above listed ‘ad-hoc management’. In 
the humanitarian sector it needed 20 years for this concept to be accepted and 
implemented – at a time when strategic planning was already considered out-
dated in private business (Lewis 2007: 23). A phase began where aid agencies – 
especially big Northern NGOs – have tried to ‘design’ their activities with help 
of plans. However, how would you ‘plan’ a pool sharing partnership? Plans are 
too static to deal with this type of active partnership characterised by “ever 
evolving roles and unexpected outcomes” (Lewis 1998; quoted in Lewis 2007: 
185). In addition strategic planners tend to lay a disproportionate focus on their 
own organizations factors while neglecting the ones of their environment. Lewis 
states:  
 
“The success or failure of a development NGO therefore depends largely on its 
ability to influence its environment and appreciate outside forces correctly, and 
NGOs are more dependent on these external factors than most other 
organizations.” (2007: 166)  
 
Thus researchers95 demand that a truly strategic management perspective - 
incorporated in overall supply chain management - has to be applied. If the 
historical pattern of ‘humanitarian management follows business management’ 
stands the test of time, future humanitarian logistics performance will be 
measured at the supply chain, and not at the organization level96. 
 
Aid agencies often use either some kind of ad-hoc management, or plan-oriented 
planning procedures. Regarding the creation of an atmosphere that enables pool 
sharing both management techniques are insufficient.    
 
Figure 82: Lack of Strategic Thinking: Insufficient Management Approaches 
                                                 
95
 An example being Perry (2007: 414) 
96
 This thought is based on Bowersox, Closs and Cooper who predict the “supply chain as a primary unit 
of competition” in logistics (2007: 8).    
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5. Conclusion and Outlook 
Conclusion and Outlook consist of three sections. The first is a brief summary of 
the thesis’ scope, structure, and findings. The second answers the research 
questions stipulated at the beginning of this work. The last section provides an 
outlook based on the factors that promote pool sharing. 
 
This thesis has dealt with pool sharing in humanitarian logistics. Recovering the 
already elaborated facts of this thesis it can be argued that pool sharing is 
embodied in the supply chain management concept. Pool sharing is the capability 
of pool members to share capacity in any form like information, human 
resources, inventory space, distribution, and relief goods and equipment. All 
kinds of actors - civil, public, and private - can be part of such a pool. This thesis, 
however, focuses on civil actors like non-governmental organizations (NGO) and 
UN agencies. 
 
Pool sharing – defined as process innovation – is analysed on both the 
conceptual, and the practical levels. On the former level literature on partnerships 
is used to define the fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship - the sharing of 
risk, the free exchange of information, and process integration. In addition 
different designs of this concept are presented. On the practical level the thesis 
summarizes the status quo and presents the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Centre (UNJLC), and the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA).  
 
With help of this structure’s findings it can be concluded that pool sharing is an 
eligible concept within humanitarian logistics. Its main benefits are a decrease of 
cost, a decrease of risk, an increase of service level, and an increase of income. 
However, pool sharing is found to be mainly conceptual as the number of 
organizations that thoroughly apply it is supposedly very low, with pool sharing 
of information being an exemption. Existing obstacles to the implementation of 
pool sharing turned out to be donor orientation, competition, organizational 
culture, and lack of strategic thinking. 
 150 
Q1: Why do organizations cooperate?  
This question is of utmost importance to pool sharing. The author sees pool 
sharing as part of cooperation. Cooperation - joint operation or action (Princeton 
University 2009) – stems out of a certain relationship between actors. Identified 
as triggers of cooperation have been interdependence, supply chain management 
and donor requirements. Interdependence denotes that humanitarian actors are 
dependent on others with regard to capacity or specialisation. Supply chain 
management, on the other side, tackles the challenge of globalization. Also in the 
humanitarian sector globalization is a big issue. Parker states: 
 
“Increasingly a world with fewer boundaries calls for organizations able to 
transcend vertical and horizontal boundaries and create hybrids that are both cost 
effective and responsible to local, regional, domestic, international and global 
communities of interest.” (1998; quoted in Lewis 2007: 132) 
 
These fewer boundaries combined with a higher number of crises and NGOs 
make it necessary to cooperate. Donor requirements, the third trigger of 
cooperation, are also influenced by this paradigm shift and now show more 
incentives for cooperation than in the past. 
 
Q2: What are the fundamentals of a pool sharing relationship? 
As there is neither a specified definition of pool sharing nor a defined framework 
of its characteristics, the author has applied thoughts of business partnership 
literature as well as his own thoughts on pool sharing in order to close this gap. 
Pool Sharing is defined by the author as being a partnership – a specific form of 
relationship within a supply chain. This type of ‘working together’ stands in 
between arm’s length relationships – where transactions are solely based on the 
market price – and vertical integration – where two or more actors own a 
common organization (Harrison and Van Hoek 2002: 218).  
 
Following the author of this thesis a pool sharing relationship’s fundamental 
requirements are the sharing of risk, the free exchange of information, and 
process integration. Moreover, pool sharing relationships are characterised by a 
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part-standardised organizational structure. This means that the partnership has 
“common elements in organization, terminology, and procedures” (Auf der 
Heide 1989: 137).  
 
Q3: Which designs of pool sharing exist? 
Pool sharing relationships are designed around the type of capacity shared. Some 
share only information, while others share multiple types of capacities. In total 
this thesis has identified information, human resources, inventory space, 
distribution, and relief goods and equipment.  
 
Information - defined as data, information, and knowledge - is the most 
important capacity and yet the only one widely shared in the humanitarian sector. 
Examples of information coordinators would be the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (4.2.1.2), and the UN Joint 
Logistics Centre (UNJLC) (4.2.2.2). They collect material of their participating 
agencies and disseminate NGO contact details, forecasts, GIS-based country 
maps, infrastructure assessments and updates, transport procedures and 
schedules, and customs issues.  
 
Manifestations of shared personnel, on the other side, are common projects 
where persons from different agencies come together in order to work on a 
specific topic, or even the sharing of persons in the sense of an agency for 
temporary work. Examples presented in this thesis are – inter alia – the 
development and implementation of HELIOS software (4.2.3) and WFP’s stand-
by partners (4.4.1).  
 
Similar solutions exist with regard to inventory space. Either member 
organizations provide it to other agencies in exchange of another form of 
capacity. Or pool partners set up an inventory centre together and thus share 
investment- and operating costs. Regarding the former type of inventory pool 
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sharing Bock recommends an online platform that allocates free space to other 
humanitarian actors in a fast and efficient way (2006: 57).  
 
Sharing distribution capacity in the form of free volume in aircrafts, trucks, ships, 
trains, and cars, is another possibility of pool sharing. With the help of this 
approach excess capacity can be avoided and thus costs reduced respectively end 
beneficiaries faster served. In this matter UNJLC Afghanistan acted as 
coordinator: especially airlift capabilities and capacities of manifold actors were 
recorded, matched with the needs of humanitarian actors, and assigned 
accordingly (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b: 71-72). Furthermore it 
would be opportune - analogous to inventory space - to set up an information 
system that works like a distribution capacity exchange.  
 
The last type of design - pool sharing of relief goods and equipment - is rather 
conceptual. The WFP again uses this approach with its standby partners that 
deploy service packages which - inter alia - comprise relief goods and equipment 
(Scott-Bowden 2003: 18). 
 
Q4: What are the benefits of pool sharing? 
With help of conceptual and practical examples a decrease of cost, a decrease of 
risk, an increase of service level, and an increase of income are identified as 
benefits of pool sharing.  
 
A decrease of costs can be registered with regard to operations and investments. 
Thanks to pool sharing operative expenditures – costs of goods and services as 
well as transaction costs – of tasks like needs assessment, procurement, inventory 
management, and distribution are reduced. Similarly investment expenditures of 
projects like software development are shared by partners.  
 
Decrease of risk is another benefit of pool sharing. Thereby risk addresses the aid 
agencies themselves, and not the victims of a crisis. Especially one type of risk 
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appears to be mitigated by pool sharing, namely security risk. The sharing of 
information regarding necessary security preparations, cultural issues, dangerous 
routes, military checkpoints, reliable middlemen, and more, helps to reduce risks.  
 
In addition pool sharing provides the basis for an increase of service level. 
Sharing capacity adds flexibility as well as operational and geographical range, 
and thus makes an organization more capable and beneficiary-oriented. 
Consequently needs assessment and demand forecasting are more accurate as 
well as global pre-positioning and more frequent deliveries possible.  
 
Eventually an increase of income can be recorded. Aid agencies depend on 
donors’ funds. Thus it is important for an agency to have a core competence that 
distinguishes one from another. The author of this thesis believes that pool 
sharing is a competence that can make the difference.    
 
Q5: What are the obstacles to pool sharing? 
Obstacles to pool sharing are donor orientation, competition, organizational 
culture, and lack of strategic thinking. Thereby especially donor orientation 
needs further specification. Basically donors are very important stakeholders of 
humanitarian organizations. Anyway, aid agencies often orientate themselves too 
much towards their sponsors with regard to questions like ‘What has to be 
funded?’, ‘Where should these goods be bought?’, and ‘How should the funding 
mechanism be designed?’ This is important as donors tend to fund highly visible 
activities like the purchase of 10,000 tons of wheat, but are reluctant to fund 
‘invisible’ activities like logistics (Thomas and Kopczak 2005: 5). Regarding 
procurement, on the other side, sponsors may tag donations to a special source of 
supply or to a specific country of origin. Eventually donor orientation can lead to 
bureaucracy as humanitarian actors tend to adopt their organizational structure to 
those of their donors. This growth of administrative demands impedes the - 
besides agency-beneficiary and agency-donor cooperation - third layer of 
humanitarian work, namely agency-agency cooperation.  
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Competition is another obstacle to pool sharing. Its roots lie in the funding 
criteria of donors, use of power, and agency concentration. The funding criteria 
of donors have benefited single humanitarian actors which are highly 
distinguishable instead of organizations that work together. In addition aid 
agencies are often reluctant to share power-bearing information like funding 
source information or information about logistics processes. Eventually - as both 
conceptual and empiric works have shown - agency concentration is the third 
trigger of competition. Theoretical publications as well as a NGO survey of Van 
Laan and a NGO simulation game of Koch state ‘The more concentration, the 
fewer cooperation’ and trace this competitive pattern back to the conflict about 
influence spheres.  
 
The third obstacle to pool sharing is organizational culture. Principles, for 
instance, restrict information exchange at the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Or existing, entrenched ideas and 
realities are hard to replace.  
 
The last obstacle – lack of strategic thinking – manifests itself in insufficient 
recognition and communication of logistics’ importance, and insufficient 
strategic management. The first statement refers to the fact that in a sector whose 
logistics costs account for 80% of total costs, logisticians are underrepresented 
from the senior to the field level. Moreover logistics personnel often do not have 
any logistical background respectively do not receive sufficient on-and off-the-
job training. The second phenomenon is insufficient strategic management. Many 
aid agencies either lack any strategic management, or they apply a strategic 
planning perspective that intends to ‘design’ all activities with help of plans. 
However, how would you ‘plan’ a pool sharing partnership? Plans are too static 
to deal with this type of active partnership. 
 
 
 155 
Outlook 
The outlook deals with factors that promote pool sharing, namely trust and donor 
requirements. Thereby the first factor has its merits when we talk about agencies 
that already cooperate in some form or another. In order to make the next step – 
pool sharing – they have to build trust in each other. It is an aid agency 
perspective. The second factor – donor requirements – is valid if sponsors intend 
to promote pool sharing of humanitarian actors. It is a donor perspective.  
 
Starting with trust, it is an endogenous endeavour of extraordinary importance 
when it comes to an agreement on and the implementation of pool sharing. 
Thereby knowledge about other organizations is essential as it fosters inter-
agency communication and coordination (Dynes and Quarantelli 1970: 5). 
Knowledge can be acquired with regard to an organization’s roles, competence, 
resources, needs, and terminology (Wenger, Quarantelli and Dynes 1986: 33). 
Another important issue is the organizational culture of partner agencies. Pool 
sharing needs some form of agreement with regard to responsibilities, 
procedures, terminology, and performance measurement. Thereby it is essential 
to incorporate “existing organizational structures and respective cultures of 
relevant network members” in order to build trust (Pagram 1999: 28).  
 
However, many humanitarian actors do not intend to form such a thorough form 
of cooperation. Unlike the profit margin in the corporate sector, the humanitarian 
sector lacks a clear trigger of cooperation (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 
2009b: 87). This is where donors can play their part. As they are more and more 
interested in agency cooperation, donors could promote pool sharing through 
their incentive system. Part of their funding criteria could be a key performance 
indicator (KPI) that measures the degree of cooperation with other agencies 
(Fritz Institute 2007a), or – more concrete – the degree of pool sharing. Anyway, 
this direct requirement could be seen as interference to the work of humanitarian 
actors, especially of non-governmental organizations. Thus indirect requirements 
will be necessary as well. Possibilities include the acceptance of insurance, the 
 156 
granting of credit, and the provision of a premium for actors that apply pool 
sharing. Donors could accept insurance regarding the political risk of a country 
or they could grant credit to agencies that invest in shared capacities and the 
accompanying logistics and IT infrastructure (Koch 2009: 158). An example of 
the latter would be the funding of inventory space pool sharing by the European 
Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). It sponsors warehouses of both the 
IFRC and the WFP which also other UN agencies and NGOs are able to use. 
Another method would be the strategic support of actors active in underfunded 
crisis regions in order to avoid competitive patterns due to agency concentration. 
Furthermore sponsors could provide all the above-mentioned incentives in order 
to enlarge existing pool sharing relationships.  
 
Eventually – this is valid for pool sharing in general - it is important to 
communicate the benefits of pool sharing to the public. It would be appropriate 
to find a media partner that conducts coverage of the partnership and thus enables 
a ‘pool sharing friendly’ environment. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Logistical map Sudan 
Basic information includes “sea and airlift capacity and availability, transport 
procedures and schedules, infrastructure assessments and updates, customs 
issues…; Reporting through specific information products such as Situation 
reports, bulletins, roads status map & matrix, snapshots” (GLC 2009). The figure 
below assesses Sudan’s infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 83: Logistical Map Sudan (GLC 2009) 
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Appendix I: Cargo Movement Request (CMR) for Joint Supply Tracking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 84: Cargo Movement Request (CMR) (adapted from GLC 2009) 
 
 
PRIORITY
ETD:
Mvt Req #:
Item Qty
Unit 
of 
Mea
sure
Package 
Type
Package 
Qty
Total 
Gross 
Weight 
(Kg)
Total 
Gross 
Volume 
(m³) 
Org. Item 
Desc.
Org. 
Item 
Code
Ex 24 kit pallets 2 15 2 Analysis Kit
ABC1
23
1
2
3
4
5
TOT 0 0 0
Callsign/planned date/transport Callsign/actual date/transport Remarks
I hereby certify that the above cargo either contains no dangerous goods,                                                                                                                                                                                       
Signature/Name (electronic): 
Agency/Organization Authorised 
Comments, Special information on cargo (Cold Chain) and Dangerous Goods Info
Dangerous Goods cargo for sea transport according to IMO & operators regulations.                                                                                                                                                   
All customs / governmental / taxation /transport issues should be complete,                                            
UNJLC will confirm your booking by return email/phone call/fax
WEIGHT (Kg) / VOLUME (m^3)
Be prepared to move to shipment to the loading point with 24 hours 
Health Kit
If you need to request movement for more than 14 line of commodities, please use several forms, do not add lines to this spreadsheet
Description of 
Items
E-mail E-mail
Tel/Sat. Tel/Sat. Ready to Move Date 
Title Title
Sender Consignee
TOContact Contact 
One form per destination
Organization FROM
Email to 
UNITED NATIONS JOINT LOGISTICS CENTER -  OPERATION
CARGO MOVEMENT REQUEST
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE:  Please complete this form as much as possible and 
attach a full packing list as a supplement.  The form and packing list may be sent 
electronically to UNJLC.   If there is insufficient space in the Load Description 
area, please use additional forms - please do NOT add lines.                                                        
For UNJLC use only
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Appendix III: Helios module structure  
Helios software is structured in modules – a fact that provides a lot of flexibility. 
Like when solving a puzzle, users can decide where to ‘start’. Modules of Helios 
include Project Management, Request Processing, Procurement, Warehouse, 
Mobilization, and Tracking. They are presented in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 85: Module Structure of HELIOS (Fritz Institute 2009a) 
 
A solution to the puzzle is given by the Fritz Institute who gives the following 
explanation with regard to proper understanding of HELIOS: 
 
“HELIOS supply chain begins when a project is created using the Project 
Management module. Demands for projects are managed with the Request 
Processing module…using tools such as Request Orders and Sales Invoices. 
The…Mobilization module enables the planning, tracking and reporting of in-
kind donations. Procurement…provides powerful tools to manage the acquisition 
of goods and services, including Purchase Order, Procurement Invoice, Request 
for Quotation, Bids, Comparative Bid Analysis and Framework Agreements. 
The…Warehouse module manages inbound and outbound 
consignments…Finally, the Tracking module is used to track the flow of goods 
through the supply chain…from demand to delivery point, using a commodity 
tracking number.” (2009a)   
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Appendix IV: Technical specifications of HELIOS 
The technical specifications of HELIOS are now briefly presented with help of 
an explanation and a figure. Information and figure are obtained from the Fritz 
Institute: 
 
“HELIOS was developed using the popular and reliable Microsoft .NET 
platform. It currently uses .NET 3.5 on the Microsoft Windows Server 2003 
operating system, with a Microsoft SQL Server 2005 database. This can be 
delivered via a hosted solution, or from an organisation's own servers. Where 
connectivity into a country is restricted, HELIOS has been deployed on servers in 
country offices. To access it, users require Internet Explorer browser version 5.0 
or higher. There is a planned UI upgrade that will support Firefox and other 
standards compliant browsers. HELIOS can also run stand-alone on a laptop 
running Windows XP. HELIOS can be hosted as a Software as a Service 
(SAAS). Data transfer between installations is possible allowing laptop and in-
country installations to upload and download both master data and transactions 
where there is no web connectivity.” (2009a) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 86: Technical Specifications of HELIOS (Fritz Institute 2009a) 
 
Furthermore it is possible to integrate HELIOS into an agency’s ERP, 
Procurement, Financial or other legacy systems (Fritz Institute 2009a). 
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